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Abstract
The thought suppression literature (Wegner et al. 1987; Wegner & Erber, 
1992) illustrates that there are secondary costs of suppressing the cognitive content of 
conscious experience. A ‘thought rebound’ effect has been demonstrated in both 
healthy populations and psychopathology (Purdon, 1999), whereby the harder a 
thought is pushed out of mind the more likely it is to subsequently return. It is 
increasingly realised that people try to control affect as well as cognitions (Gross, 
1998; 2001), but as yet the secondary consequences of different forms of emotion 
regulation have not been studied in detail. In particular, whether an ‘emotional 
rebound’ effect occurs following suppression of emotions rather than thoughts during 
processing of distressing material has not been investigated. ‘Emotional rebound’ 
could potentially help explain some of the secondary symptoms seen in PTSD and 
related conditions.
This thesis examines the concurrent and subsequent impact of attempting to 
suppress (both internally experienced and externally expressed) emotion while 
processing traumatic information, and is intended as a preliminary investigation of 
whether emotion suppression contributes to PTSD. Healthy participants were asked to 
watch a video trauma induction, either under emotional suppression (n = 21) or 
control (n = 23) conditions. The consequences of emotional suppression on mood, 
emotional response to novel material, episodic memory, and occurrence of intrusive 
memories were then measured, using both self-report and psychophysiological 
methods.
Results found that emotional suppression did not alter self-reported emotional 
experience, lead to a more variable heart response, and did not change electrodermal
response while watching the trauma induction. This suggests that emotional 
suppression is a largely ineffective way of regulating emotional experience and that it 
alters psychophysiological activity, although exactly what the change in heart rate 
means at a psychological level is unclear.
Subsequently, emotional suppression impaired free recall but not recognition 
memory of the trauma material, suggesting there is a slight mnemonic impact of this 
form of affect regulation. There was also a trend for suppression to lead to a reduction 
in the experience of intrusive memories about the trauma content, although this did 
not reach statistical significance.
There was no change in self-reported experience of emotion following 
suppression, either in terms of background mood or when processing novel emotional 
material. There was, however, an increased heart rate deceleration when viewing 
subsequent emotional material and a slight increase in depression scores at one week 
follow-up, perhaps indicative of ongoing emotional costs of suppression.
These findings, replicating and extending work from the normative emotion 
regulation literature (Gross, 1998; 2001), suggest that emotional suppression is not an 
effective form of emotion regulation at the time of encoding and that it leads to some 
subsequent emotional and mnemonic changes. A provisional clinical implication is 
that clients should perhaps be discouraged from using emotional suppression as form 
of mood control. In terms of understanding PTSD, it seems plausible to tentatively 
suggest that emotional suppression could contribute to the hyper-arousal and impaired 
recall of trauma seen in PTSD. It is important, however, to replicate and extend these 
findings to clinical populations to support these conclusions.
While emotional suppression has been found not to lead to a ‘rebound’ effect 
directly analogous to that seen following thought suppression, it does appear to have
some unexpected secondary costs that could perhaps contribute to symptoms of 
PTSD.
xi
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The paradoxical effects of attempting to regulate the contents of conscious 
experience have been powerfully illustrated in the thought suppression literature. In 
the seminal thought suppression experiment, Wegner, Schneider, Carter and White 
(1987) found that by asking participants in the suppression condition to avoid thinking 
about a white polar bear, while they were initially able to successfully suppress the 
thought, they later had more thoughts about the bear than the control group. The 
harder the thought was pushed out of conscious experience, the more frequently the 
thought returned to the mind later (the so called ‘rebound’ effect). Suppression of 
intrusive thoughts has now been implicated in a variety of forms of psychopathology 
(see Purdon, 1999 for a review).
Thought suppression clearly demonstrates the way in which initial attempts to 
control thoughts and feelings can have subsequent impact on cognitive and emotional 
experience and how this can potentially contribute to psychopathology. Post- 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which can develop as a reaction to exposure to 
extreme traumatic events, perhaps best encapsulates this phenomenon. PTSD is 
characterised by the subsequent emergence of three cardinal sets of symptoms, 
including re-experiencing of the trauma, avoidance of internal and external cues 
associated with the trauma, and increased arousal. While up to 93% of the population 
report exposure to traumatic events, only a proportion of these go on to develop PTSD 
(Lee & Young, 2001)1.
It is possible that one of a number of factors mediating whether or not 
someone will develop PTSD is how they control their thoughts and feelings when 
they initially process the traumatic event. Further, the way in which people regulate
1 The conditional risk of PTSD following exposure to the trauma appears to depend on the nature of the 
stressor. For example, Breslau, Kessler, Chilcoat et al. (1998) found that 54% of people tortured, held 
captive or kidnapped developed PTSD, whereas only 2% of people in a car crash developed PTSD.
1
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emotions and cognitions when encountering re-experiencing symptoms may also 
potentially contribute to the maintenance of PTSD.
Diagnostic criteria for PTSD require that the individual feels afraid, horrified 
or helpless in response to the trauma (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorder Version 4 [DSM-IV]; APA, 1994), reflecting both the emotional and 
cognitive content of their experience. Reaction to the trauma can be mediated by 
modifying the meaning attached to the traumatic event (cognitive regulation) or 
altering the emotions people are experiencing or expressing (emotional regulation).
An emerging literature has developed a sound understanding of the 
consequences of cognitive regulation in maintaining PTSD symptoms (for example, 
see the cognitive theory of PTSD put forward by Ehlers & Clark, 2000). While 
cognitive regulation and its impact on memory and appraisal of the trauma have been 
well investigated, the use of different emotion regulation strategies and their 
consequences are largely unknown. Further, relatively little is understood about the 
extent to which either cognitive or emotional regulation during the initial coding of 
trauma are involved in the development of PTSD.
A clearer understanding of how emotional, as well as cognitive, regulation at 
the time of initial encoding shapes subsequent emotional and cognitive experience 
may aid understanding and treatment of PTSD and other related disorders. In 
particular, it may be useful to explore whether an ‘emotional rebound’ effect can be 
demonstrated, where suppression of emotion in response to stimuli at time one leads 
to alteration in information processing at time two. If this hypothesis is supported, it 
may be of interest in both clinical and theoretical terms.
In particular, emotional suppression could be a significant maintaining factor 
in negative emotional experience in psychopathology. A vicious cycle may be
2
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formed, whereby short-term emotional suppression could reduce negative affect 
(therefore reinforcing its use), but longer-term, unknown to the user, lead to a rebound 
of negative affect (therefore encouraging the user to apply emotional suppression 
again).
1.1 Thesis Overview
This thesis presents a study investigating the effects of emotion suppression at 
the time of traumatic encoding on concurrent self-reported affect and 
psychophysiological response and on subsequent emotional and cognitive processing. 
An experiment is reported in which healthy participants were asked to watch a 
distressing video about real road traffic accidents, either under emotion suppression or 
control conditions. The impact these conditions had on participants’ emotional 
response to the video, their processing of subsequent emotional material, their 
episodic memory of the video, and the number of intrusions they experienced about 
the video was then measured over a one week follow-up period.
Before presenting the results of the experiment, this introduction will discuss 
the evolution of the notion in psychological theory that initial processing strategy can 
shape subsequent cognitive and emotional experience. The way in which the longer 
term consequences of emotion regulation on subsequent experience have been 
relatively ignored to date will be highlighted. The relevance of an emotion regulation 
perspective for understanding PTSD will then be put forward. A brief overview of the 
presentation of PTSD, main theoretical models of the disorder, and empirical 
investigation of the mechanisms contributing to the condition will be presented. It will 
be shown that, paralleling the normative literature, there has been a focus on cognitive
3
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rather than emotion regulation to date. It will then be considered how adoption of an 
emotion regulation perspective, particularly focusing on emotional suppression, could 
inform understanding and treatment of PTSD. Results of the experiment investigating 
the impact of emotion suppression on analogue trauma encoding will then be detailed.
1.2 Evolution of Understanding of Cognitive and Affective Regulation
The evolution of the idea that cognitive and emotional regulation can shape 
subsequent experience evolved will now be reviewed, in particular focusing on the 
thought suppression literature.
1.2.1 Psychoanalytic Accounts
The idea that how we manage thoughts and feelings can positively or 
negatively impact on subsequent functioning was first put forward in a variety of 
psychoanalytic accounts. Janet (1889; 1925) proposed that a breakdown in the 
regulation of conscious experience can lead to the development of a traumatic 
response. It was argued that the processing of extreme emotions in traumatic 
situations can sometimes unintentionally fragment, leading to the development of 
multiple separate, dissociated streams of consciousness, each with its own memories, 
sensations, and affects. This results in the memory for the trauma event being split off 
(or ‘dissociated’) from ordinary consciousness. Occasionally this dissociation breaks 
down and the trauma memory intrudes in the form of perceptions, obsessional 
preoccupations, and somatic complaints. This was used to explain the re-experiencing 
of symptoms following trauma.
4
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The Freudian concept of defence also suggests that there are consequences of 
how we control the contents of consciousness. Freud (1937) defined defence 
mechanisms as ‘the ego making use of various procedures for fulfilling its tasks, 
which, to put in general terms, is to avoid danger, anxiety and displeasure’2. Defences 
minimise conflict between different parts of the mind and external reality, thus 
reducing tension, maintaining intra-psychic equilibrium, and allowing the 
development of a sense of self in the face of a defective relational environment 
(Winnicot, 1965; Kohut, 1984). When defences are working, the individual remains in 
a calm state of equilibrium. When defences cease to work, perhaps because the 
external environment has changed or there is some secondary cost of the defence that 
is problematic, the individual becomes symptomatic.
A number of defences refer to emotion regulation strategies. Repression is 
where the content of a thought is pushed back outside consciousness but the affect 
remains. Isolation is where the memory of an event remains but is denuded of any 
feeling. Dissociation is where both affect and memory remain but are no longer 
reliably connected (see Bateman & Holmes, 1995 for an overview). While 
theoretically interesting and clinically useful, psychoanalytic concepts initially 
received relatively little empirical validation.
1.2.2 Investigation of the Stress Response
Empirical examination of the consequences of the regulation of conscious 
experience was first conducted in studies looking at how people react to stressful 
material (see Lazarus & Opton, 1966 for a review). Lazarus argued that stress occurs
2 The Freudian concept of defence is therefore a more ‘intentional’ form of regulation than the 
accidental dissociation that occurs in Janet’s (1925) model of trauma.
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when a situation is perceived as thwarting or potentially thwarting to a motivational 
state, thus producing affective arousal and subsequent processes to regulate this 
arousal (Lazarus & Baker, 1956). These regulation processes were akin to the 
defences described in the psychoanalytic literature.
In a scries of experiments, participants were asked to watch a film of 
‘subincision rites’ while listening either to a trauma soundtrack that maximised the 
threatening aspect of the film to two defensive soundtracks that reduced threatening 
aspects of the film. The defences used were denial and reaction formation or 
intellectualisation. The trauma condition produced a greater galvanic skin response 
than the defensive conditions and less pleasant mood ratings. Intellectualisation was 
more effective at reducing a stress response than denial and reaction formation.
In follow-up work mixed results have been obtained. In one study a sample of 
115 undergraduate students watched a film portraying accidental physical injuries 
under natural conditions (Koriat, Melkmann, Averill et al., 1972) and were instructed 
to either ‘involve’ or ‘detach’ themselves from the experience. The conditions 
differed in terms of the psychophysiological and self-report responses they produced, 
with detachment leading to reduced experience of emotion and an altered heart rate 
response but no difference in galvanic skin response. Steptoe and Vogele (1986) 
attempted to replicate the original Lazarus experiment while controlling for different 
delays between conditions and did not find that reappraisal could short-circuit the 
emotional response.
Lazarus’s conceptualisation of the mediation of the stress response gradually 
moved from an ego-defence framework to a cognitive reappraisal framework (see 
Lazarus, 1993 for a review). Building on the coping literature, a distinction was drawn 
between problem-focused coping (changing the relationship with the environment so
6
Chapter 1: Introduction
the stressor is ameliorated) and emotion-focused coping (changing attention to or 
interpretation of the stressor). Which of these was most adaptive was found to depend 
on the nature of the stressor and the individual involved (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 
Folkman & Lazarus, 1988).
This body of work is a compelling early demonstration that the way in which 
we make sense of an event changes our initial emotional reaction to it. What it did not 
explore was the consequences of different forms of regulation on subsequent 
processing, for example, altered emotional experience or experience of intrusive 
memories. Further, it could not inform understanding of PTSD, since this was not 
officially recognised as a diagnostic concept in its present form at the time.
1.2.3 Thought Suppression and the Rebound Effect
In cognitive psychology, the notion that there are secondary costs of 
information processing strategies has been clearly encapsulated in the thought 
suppression literature. When participants were asked to deliberately not think of a 
particular concept for a short period of time (for example, a white polar bear), the 
concept was then more likely to enter their mind subsequently (Wegner et al., 1987), 
described as the ‘rebound’ effect.
Ironic process theory (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, 1994) proposes that 
this rebound is the result of the normal operation of mental control when system 
resources are limited. It suggests that mental control is usually regulated by a 
conscious intentional operating process that searches for mental contents that will 
yield the desired mental state (for example, material pertinent to happiness), while an 
automatic ironic monitoring process searches for mental contents that signal the
7
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failure to achieve the desired state (for example, material indicating that happiness has 
not been achieved). The ironic operating process serves the important function of 
noticing lapses in the intentional operating process when the system is distracted and 
thereby reinstating mental control in these instances.
It is this vigilance that can be the source of paradoxical rebound effects. By 
monitoring for signs of failure of mental control, it increases the accessibility of such 
material to consciousness (Higgins & King, 1981). In usual operation the intentional 
process is more effective than the ironic process in introducing material into 
conscious awareness, so this is not problematic. In situation of high cognitive load, 
however, the contents of conscious awareness may be increasingly determined by 
ironic processes. In the case of mood control, it is predicted that trying to induce a 
mood during cognitive load should paradoxically increase the accessibility of 
cognitive contents representing the absence of that mood.
1.2.3.1 Empirical Status o f the Thought Suppression Effect
Early studies showed a reliable increase in subsequent frequency of the target 
thought in suppression conditions relative to expression conditions using a variety of 
different experimental designs (Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, Schneider, Knutson & 
McMahon, 1991; Wenzlaff, Wegner & Klein, 1991). Since these seminal findings, a 
mixed literature has emerged about the paradoxical effect of thought suppression (see 
Purdon, 1999 for a review). A variety of studies have replicated the rebound effect for 
neutral material (Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Clark, Ball & Pape, 1991; Clark, 
Winton & Thynn, 1993; Bowers & Woody, 1996), while others did not find an 
increase in target thought frequency following suppression (for example,
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Merckelbach, Muris, van den Hout & de Jong, 1991; Muris, Merckelbach & de Jong, 
1993; Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; Purdon & Clark, 2000; Purdon & Clark, 2001).
1.2.3.2 Critique o f Thought Suppression Literature
A number of factors may partially explain these inconsistent results. First, the 
nature of the target thought may mediate the tendency to utilise suppression and the 
effects of suppression on subsequent experience. There is some evidence to suggest 
that a reliable rebound effect is only found for neutral thoughts and is not found for 
personal intrusive thoughts (Kelly & Kahn, 1994), meaning that caution is warranted 
before applying the suppression model to psychological disorders.
Second, individuals may differ in their willingness to report thought 
occurrences. It may be the case that thought frequency reports may be open to self- 
report biases and researchers should instead look for other evidence of hyper- 
accessibility, including frequency of thought relevant words on later word association 
tasks and/or emotional reactivity to previously suppressed thoughts (Purdon, 1999).
A number of conceptual limitations of the thought suppression literature 
should also be held in mind. It is important to note that the empirical demonstration of 
a reliable rebound effect would not directly support the ironic process theory put 
forward by Wegner (1994) in any case. These data speak to the consequences of 
thought suppression, rather than elaborating the underlying mechanism by which 
these consequences come about. There is currently little empirical validation of the 
distinction drawn between intentional and ironic operations in the theory. Moreover, 
the literature to date has adopted a very narrow definition of what counts as ‘mental
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control’, focusing on thoughts rather than images and not looking at broader 
activation at a schematic level.
1.2. S. 3 Application o f Thought Suppression to Clinical Conditions
Despite these mixed findings, thought suppression has provided a useful 
heuristic framework for understanding psychological disorders characterised by 
persistent recurrence of intrusive, unwanted thoughts (Purdon, 1999). For example, in 
a variety of anxiety disorders it has been argued that anxious intrusive thoughts are 
difficult to dismiss because positive thoughts are not available as distracters and 
because suppression terminates exposure to unwanted thoughts, therefore blocking 
habituation and disconfirmation of anxious beliefs (Rachman, 1981; Foa & Kozak, 
1986; Foa & McNally, 1996). More recently, it has been suggested that the attentional 
bias found in anxiety may actually be caused by attempts at cognitive avoidance, 
where as soon as suppression is activated there is immediate hypervigilance of threat 
cues (Wegner, 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992).
Empirical support for the association between thought suppression and 
affective disorders in general is currently mixed, however. Purdon (1999) concludes 
that studies investigating suppression of depressive and worry-related thoughts have 
not consistently observed a paradoxical rebound effect. This may be because they 
have focused on analogue rather than clinical populations and have not looked at 
suppression during congruent mood states, so further research on material with clear 
personal salience in clinical populations is necessary.
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1.2.4 Overview of Research into Regulation Processes
The psychoanalytic, stress response, and thought suppression literatures 
clearly illustrate the fact that the way in which information is processed can have a 
strong impact on subsequent thoughts and feelings. What have not yet been 
systematically explored are the longer term cognitive and emotional consequences of 
suppressing emotional, as well as cognitive, responses to stimuli.
For example, what might be the consequences of trying to minimise the 
amount of fear that is felt and shown when experiencing a traumatic event? It seems 
plausible that the adoption of emotional suppression as a form of affect regulation 
could lead to an effect analogous to thought rebound, where that emotion is 
experienced more strongly at a later time. Alternatively, it may be the case that 
emotional suppression could contribute to the development of subsequent ‘emotional 
numbing’ or anhedonic symptoms. Similarly, emotional suppression could change the 
accuracy with which people recall the details of the traumatic event or alter the 
number of intrusions they have in response to a traumatic event.
Demonstration of an ‘emotional rebound’ effect following emotional 
suppression could potentially inform understanding and treatment of a range of 
emotional symptoms seen across different psychopathologies. Work to date looking at 
emotional rather than cognitive regulation will now be presented.
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1.3 The Emotion Regulation Perspective
1.3.1 Definition and Overview
Central to our well-being is our ability to regulate our emotions. While 
emotions predispose us towards time-tested responses to recurrent adaptive problems 
(Lazarus, 1991), we still have the capacity to decide to respond in a different way. For 
example, when we are afraid we may usually tend to run, but may instead decide to 
laugh or express anger. Instead of being ‘passions that come and go of their own 
accord’ (Solomon, 1976), it is increasingly acknowledged that individuals can exert 
considerable control over their emotions using a wide range of strategies (Gross, 
1998).
Emotion regulation is the means by which people influence the emotions they 
have, when they are experienced, and how they are experienced and expressed (Gross, 
1989,2001). This is believed to occur at an intentional, as well as automatic, level. 
The psychoanalytic literature emphasises that defences are usually not wilfully 
activated and are instead unconsciously adopted, thus focusing on automatic emotion 
regulation. The affective science literature has concentrated on the intentional 
regulation of mood, showing that people can also be trained to adopt a particular 
emotion regulation style. For example, Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson et al. (2000) 
looked at voluntary regulation of short-term emotional responses to unpleasant visual 
images. Instruction to suppress negative emotions produced a reduction in startle eye 
blink and activity of the corrugator facial muscle, whereas instructions to enhance 
negative emotions increased both these measures.
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1.3.2 Investigating the Consequences of Emotion Regulation
Mixed findings have emerged about the consequences of emotion regulation. 
On the one hand, clinical tradition dating back to Freud argues that psychological 
health hinges on how emotions are regulated (Freud, 1923/1961). A central 
component of therapy interventions across all orientations is helping people better 
manage their mood. For example, cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) involves 
training people to manage their mood using cognitive strategies (for example, Beck, 
Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). The pioneering work of Lazarus on the stress response 
(see Lazarus, 1993 and Section 1.3.2 for a review) empirically demonstrates the 
positive benefits of some forms of emotion regulation.
On the other hand, the early psychosomatic literature demonstrated the 
potentially adverse consequences of emotion regulation on physical health. The idea 
that the regulation (particularly suppression) of negative emotions could have 
deleterious health consequences became central to psychosomatic accounts of 
physical health (Alexander, 1939). For example, the chronic inhibition of sadness was 
believed to lead to respiratory disorders (Alexander, 1950; Halliday, 1937), chronic 
inhibition of affiliative tendencies was linked to gastrointestinal disorders such as 
ulcers (Alexander, 1950), and chronic inhibition of anger was linked to cardiovascular 
problems (Alexander, 1939).
While some of these ideas are no longer widely accepted, emotion regulation 
is still linked to poor health in the current literature. The claim that hostility and anger 
may be linked to hyper-tension and coronary heart disease has been reiterated in a 
number of studies (for example, Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987; Manuck & Krantz, 
1986; Smith, 1992; Steptoe, 1993) and inexpressiveness has been linked to the
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acceleration of the progression of cancer (Fawzy, Fawzy, Hyun et al., 1993; Gross, 
1989; Spiegel, Bloom, Kraemer & Gottheil, 1989). In addition, a large body of work 
by Pennebaker and colleagues has found that not talking about traumatic experiences 
is associated with a variety of health problems (Pennebaker & Susman, 1988; 
Pennebaker & O’Heeron, 1994). These adverse health consequences are believed to 
be partly a direct consequence of emotional inhibition but also a secondary 
consequence of social isolation and not having the opportunity to ‘work through’ the 
traumatic event via talking (see Pennebaker, 1989; 1997).
The underlying premise of these accounts is that inhibiting emotions leads to 
marked increases in physiological response parameters that may, if maintained long 
term, damage health (Krantz & Manuck, 1984). A mixed literature has emerged to 
support this claim (see Gross & Levenson, 1993 for a review). Some studies show no 
differences on physiological activation between suppression and spontaneous 
responding (Bush, Barr, McHugo & Lanzetta, 1989) and some find decreases in 
physiological activation associated with suppression (Zuckerman, Klorman, Larrance 
& Spiegel, 1981). The more typical finding, however, is that suppression leads to 
acute increases in sympathetic activation consistent with these models (Gross, 1998a; 
Gross & Levenson, 1993; 1997; Harris 2001; Richards & Gross, 1999, 2000). Further, 
different theoretical accounts would suggest that emotional inhibition should lead to a 
subsequent reduction rather than a rebound in emotional response in other emotional 
response systems. For example, it has been suggested by some researchers that 
expressive behaviour is the most significant part of emotional response, such that 
other aspects of emotion are greatly diminished if behavioural expression is stifled 
(for example, Darwin, 1872; James, 1884; Izard, 1971; Tomkins, 1981).
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Gross (1998) reconciles this literature by suggesting that style of emotion 
regulation utilised will influence the positive and negative consequences produced.
For example, the physical health literature attends to response-focused strategies 
(including suppression), which may have adverse consequences on health. In contrast, 
the cognitive literature emphasises antecedent-focused strategies (for example, 
reappraisal), which may be more beneficial (see section 1.3.3 for description of 
Gross’s process model and explanation of these terms). In other words, emotion 
regulation per se is not helpful or unhelpful. Instead, different emotion regulation 
strategies are likely to have different consequences, moderated by the nature of the 
situation and the individual involved.
1.3.3 The Process Model of Emotion Regulation
To map the different consequences of controlling affect, the Process Model of 
Emotion Regulation (Gross, 1998; 2001) has been put forward. This identifies two 
key stages at which emotion regulation can take place. Antecedent emotion regulation 
strategies are used before emotion response tendencies are fully activated. A situation 
that elicits emotion can be avoided or modified, attention can be deployed to aspects 
of a situation that are more or less emotionally arousing, or the meaning attributed to a 
situation can be reappraised. Response-focused emotion regulation involves 
enhancing or suppressing the experiential, behavioural, or physiological responses 
that constitute an emotion.
A series of studies have started to compare the different cognitive and social 
consequences of two forms of emotion regulation: cognitive reappraisal (construing a 
potentially emotion-eliciting situation in a way that reduces its emotional impact) and
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expressive suppression (inhibiting ongoing emotion-expressive behaviour). To 
investigate the impact on affect, participants’ emotional responses while watching 
film material under different emotion regulation conditions has been recorded. Gross 
& Levenson (1993) found that instructions to suppress emotional expression led to a 
reduction in expressive behaviour, an increase in sympathetic and cardiovascular 
responding, and no change in emotional experience, compared to a control condition.
In a later study participants watched a negative film and were instructed to 
either suppress any emotional expression, to change the meaning of the film, or 
simply to watch the film as normal (Gross, 1998). Participants in the suppression 
condition showed much less expressive behaviour, but experienced as much negative 
emotion as participants in the control condition. In contrast, reappraisal both 
decreased the expressive behaviour and reduced the experience of negative emotion. 
Interestingly, a different pattern appears to emerge for the suppression of positive 
emotional material, where both expressive behaviour and reported experience are 
reduced (Gross & Levenson, 1997; Stepper & Strack, 1993; Strack, Martin & Stepper, 
1988).
Different emotion regulation strategies have also been found to have different 
consequences for memory. In a series of studies participants have been asked to 
remember social facts about people presented on slides while either reappraising or 
suppressing. Suppression led to memory impairment for social information, whereas 
reappraisal did not appear to be cognitively taxing (Richards & Gross, 1999; 2000). 
Social consequences of emotion regulation have also been demonstrated. Butler, 
Egloff, Wilhelm et al. (2003) asked unacquainted pairs of participants to watch an 
upsetting film together and then discuss their reactions. One half of each dyad had 
been asked to either suppress, reappraise, or interact naturally with the other person,
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unbeknown to them. Interacting with a partner was more stressful in the suppression 
condition than the reappraisal condition, as indexed by increases in blood pressure. 
Further, suppression alone disrupted communication.
A parallel line of research has started to look at trait disposition to use 
different emotion regulation styles, as opposed to experimental inductions where 
people are given a particular set of instructions. Gross & John (2003) show that 
habitual tendency to reappraise is associated with positive adjustment, whereas 
tendency to suppress is linked with negative adjustment. Reappraisers were found to 
experience and express greater positive emotion and less negative emotion, whereas 
habitual suppressors experienced and expressed less positive emotion and yet 
experienced greater negative emotion. Further, using reappraisal was found to be 
associated with better interpersonal functioning, whereas using suppression was 
linked to worse interpersonal functioning. Finally, suppression was related negatively 
to wellbeing and reappraisal was related positively to wellbeing. Similarly, data 
suggest that those who habitually suppress tend to be less well liked and have poorer 
social support (Gross & John, 2002).
1.3.4 Critique of the Process Model of Emotion Regulation
A number of limitations of the normative literature on emotion regulation need 
to be considered. As with the PTSD literature on cognitive regulation, while these 
studies have looked at the longer term social and cognitive consequences of emotion 
regulation, they have not looked at the longer term affective consequences. This 
means the possibility of ‘affective rebound’ has yet to be systematically explored. In 
particular, studies look at whether emotional reaction to the stimuli being processed is
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changed, but do not look at emotion after the event. Further, a distinction can be 
drawn between mood (background affect, largely unrelated to any stimuli) and 
emotion (foreground affect, generated in response to particular stimuli). It is possible 
that suppression will have different consequences for mood and emotion.
Further, there are some conceptual ambiguities with the process model of 
emotion regulation (Gross, 2001), which mean that the distinction drawn between 
suppression and reappraisal may not be as clear cut as claimed. First, Gross argues 
that appraisal is an antecedent strategy and suppression is a response-focused strategy, 
whereas it seems plausible that both strategies can take place at either time. Appraisal 
is an iterative process that takes place both before emotions are induced and when 
emotions are being experienced. Similarly, emotion can be experienced both during 
and in anticipation of a scenario, so suppression may take place at either time.
Second, Gross adopts a narrow definition of emotional suppression, focusing 
on the consequences of inhibiting expressive behaviour rather than internally 
experienced affect. It is possible that suppression of feeling in addition to expression 
may have more marked (or even quite different) consequences. It seems plausible to 
suggest that feeling suppression may be equally implicated in the development and 
maintenance of psychopathology.
Third, the instructions used by Gross for the appraisal condition ask people to 
view the material clinically and focus on technical detail. In a sense this is just asking 
them to down-regulate their emotional response, which could be achieved by a variety 
of emotion regulation strategies rather than appraisal alone. Fourth, no controls are 
made for cross-over contamination effects between conditions, so it is possible that 
people are using reappraisal to aid suppression and vice versa.
18
Chapter 1: Introduction
Nevertheless, these findings clearly illustrate the potential utility of an 
emotion regulation framework for understanding the persistence of emotional and 
cognitive symptoms across a variety of forms of mental illness. Attempts to date to 
apply an emotion regulation model to psychological disorders will now be briefly 
reviewed.
1.3.5 Emotion Regulation in Psychopathology
Emotion dysregulation is a central feature of multiple forms of both Axis 1 
and Axis 2 psychopathology (Gross & Levenson, 1997). Current understanding of 
how emotions are affected and regulated in different forms of psychopathology is, 
however, limited.
Berenbaum, Raghavan, Le, Vernon & Gomez (2003) have recently proposed a 
taxonomy of emotional disturbances to help improve understanding of the affective 
symptoms seen across different forms of psychopathology. Consistent with earlier 
component models of emotion, in this framework mood is defined as subjective 
feeling state (for example, feeling sad) and affect as briefly outwardly observable 
behaviours linked to the emotion system (for example, frowning when angry). These 
are component parts of a larger emotion system that serves to pursue and attain 
individual goals and needs (including autonomic nervous system, facial expression, 
and approach versus withdrawal behaviour). Pleasant emotional states serve to 
motivate the individual to move towards rewards (‘appetitive’ emotions), whereas 
unpleasant emotional states motivate the individual to avoid punishment (‘aversive’ 
emotions). The emotion system becomes dysfunctional when it impedes rather than
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promotes individual adaptation, resulting in negative consequences for that person or 
those around them.
Three forms of emotional disturbance are identified. Emotion valence 
disturbances are when the balance between experience of pleasant and unpleasant 
emotions is disrupted. For example, in depression people experience elevated negative 
emotions and diminished positive emotions. Emotion intensity/dysregulation 
disturbances occur when the intensity of both positive and negative emotions is either 
increased or diminished. For example, in mixed manic states people experience both 
heightened symptoms of mania and anxiety. In other words, emotion 
intensity/dysregyulation difficulties relate to disruption in the modulation of intensity, 
persistence, onset, range, lability and recovery from emotional responses (Thompson, 
1994). Emotion disconnections are when different component parts of the emotion 
system become dissociated. Affect disconnections are when outward manifestations 
of emotion no longer relate to internal experience and physiological responses. 
Awareness disconnections are when the individual lacks conscious awareness of his 
or her emotional response.
The value of this taxonomy is that it clearly describes ways in which emotions 
may be disturbed in psychopathology. A number of limitations with this model need 
to be held in mind, however. First, the way in which the term ‘emotion dysregulation’ 
is used differs from the wider emotion regulation literature. In the taxonomy, 
dysregulation describes the outcome of the disruptions in the emotion system, rather 
than the mechanism by which this disruption came about. Conventional use of 
emotion regulation refers to the mechanisms by which emotions are generated and 
controlled rather than simply describing the end product, so hold greater explanatory 
power (Rottenberg & Gross, 2003). Second, the taxonomy adopts a dimensional view
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of emotion (where all emotional responses can be placed on two dimensions of 
arousal and valence). There is considerable debate in the literature about whether 
categorical or dimensional frameworks best map affective experience. Third, Watson 
(2003) argues that the taxonomy does not place due emphasis on behavioural aspects 
of emotion, for example behavioural avoidance maintaining anxiety disorders.
Despite its limitations, this taxonomy points out the significance of adopting 
an emotion regulation perspective to understand psychopathology. A number of 
researchers have begun to focus on the nature of emotional disturbance in mental 
illness, but as yet emotion regulation has not been systematically investigated.
Depression will be considered as a representative case to illustrate this point. 
A variety of empirical studies have delineated the nature of the emotional profile in 
depression, but without suggesting how this comes about. For example, depression 
has been linked to decreased emotional reactivity to positive material (Rottenberg, 
Kasch, Gross et al, 2002; Dunn, 2002; Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence et al., 2004), but 
whether this is a product of blunted emotional response per se or the adoption of 
different emotion regulation strategies is unknown. It may be the case that different 
emotion regulation strategies confer vulnerability to particular disorders or are 
involved in their development or relapse. For example, use of a ruminative response 
style may predispose an individual to depression if they encounter a negative life 
event (for a review see Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).
In addition, some theoretical models of depression begin to explore the nature 
of emotional disturbance in the disorder, but do not explicitly link this to the 
intentional use of emotion regulation strategies. For example, Davidson and Irwin 
(1999) characterise depression as resulting from under-active approach behaviour 
(linked to left-hemisphere decreased activity) and over-active withdrawal behaviour
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(linked to right-hemisphere increased activity). Approach and withdrawal behaviours 
are related to the BIS/BAS distinction made by Gray (1982, 1987) and positive 
affect/negative affect distinction drawn by Clark and Watson (1991). Evidence for 
hemispheric asymmetries is derived from EEG and neuroimaging studies of depressed 
and anxious patients (for example, see Henriques & Davidson, 1989; Bench, Friston, 
Brown et al., 1993). It is unclear in this framework exactly how this deficit in 
approach and excess in withdrawal arises and the extent to which this is related to the 
intentional or unintentional application of emotion regulation strategies.
An emotion regulation perspective has perhaps been most helpfully utilised to 
understand borderline personality disorder (BPD). The biosocial model underpinning 
dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993) argues that borderline pathology 
is primarily a result of dysfunction of an underlying emotion regulation system, which 
develops from a biological deficit in inhibitory control and exposure to an invalidating 
environment in childhood (Linehan, 1993). An invalidating environment is 
characterised by incompatibility between the needs of the child and environmental 
provisions, including abuse of different types (Thomas & Chess, 1985). The child 
learns to think that they are wrong in the sense they make of their feelings, 
specifically their relationship to the external world. As a result, they learn to rely on 
external agencies for understanding rather than developing a sense of personal and 
judgement agency.
According to Linehan, an invalidating environment also prevents the child 
learning to label and modulate internal emotional experience (Linehan, 1993). Often 
the only means by which the child may provoke a helpful environmental response to 
his/her internal distress is to produce an extreme reaction, thus reinforcing dramatic or 
exaggerated modes of self-presentation. For example, a child may leam that crying
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will not elicit sympathy from the family but a threat to self-harm may do so. The 
patterns of behaviour that are learned from early exposure to an invalidating 
environment tend to be repeated in later life, often drawing out an invalidating 
response from subsequent situations and leading to the establishment of a vicious 
cycle between person and environment. Again, while the DBT model offers a useful 
heuristic to understand BPD, the claims of the model have not yet been supported by 
extensive empirical investigation.
In summary, it is increasingly apparent that emotion regulation may contribute 
to onset, maintenance and recovery from mental illness, but currently this area has 
received little empirical attention. Further investigation of which emotion regulation 
strategies are used in different forms of psychopathology, and the consequences these 
have, seems a fruitful avenue for future research. The literature on emotion in PTSD 
will now be reviewed, illustrating how the focus to date has been on the nature of 
emotional experience per se, rather than on how this is regulated.
1.4 Overview of PTSD
1.4.1 History
A lasting, adverse reaction following exposure to stress was first widely 
recognised as a clinically significant condition following the First World War. The 
debilitating effects of war related traumas on soldiers was variously described as 
either ‘shell shock’ (Mott, 1919) or ‘war neurosis’ (Grinker & Spiegel, 1943) and The 
American Psychiatric Association [APA] eventually included ‘Gross Stress Reaction’ 
in their diagnostic taxonomy (APA, 1952). Understanding of reaction to trauma
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developed greatly during the Vietnam War, where it was observed that veterans often 
reported similar patterns of psychological symptoms following combat trauma. PTSD 
was introduced as a diagnostic construct in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorder Version 3 (DSM-III: APA, 1980), with intrusive re-experiencing, 
avoidant, and physiological reactivity symptom clusters developing following 
exposure to an ‘event outside the range of usual human experience’. Recent 
diagnostic criteria additionally emphasise that the person experiencing the traumatic 
event must respond to it with intense fear, helplessness and/or horror (DSM-IV; APA, 
1994).
1.4.2 Diagnosis
PTSD in DSM-IV is currently defined as the following:
• Exposure to an event in which the individual experienced, witnessed, or was 
confronted by actual or threatened death or serious injury or a threat to 
physical integrity of self or others. Further, the person’s response must involve 
intense fear, helplessness, and/or horror.
• At least one symptom of re-experiencing of the event, via dreams, visual 
flashbacks, intrusive thoughts, or triggered internal or external cues to 
reminders of the event.
• At least three symptoms of avoidance of related stimuli and/or numbing of 
responsiveness. These include avoidance of thoughts and behaviour related to 
the event, avoidance of activities, places or people, psychogenic amnesia,
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diminished interest in significant activities, emotional numbing, and 
detachment from others.
• At least two symptoms of increased physiological arousal, including
irritability and anger outbursts, difficulty sleeping, concentration problems, 
hyper-vigilance, and potentiated startle responses.
These symptoms must be present for at least one month post-trauma and cause 
clinically significant distress and interfere with function. A distinction is drawn 
between acute PTSD (symptoms lasting less than three months) and chronic PTSD 
(symptoms lasting more than three months). A similar set of criteria is outlined in the 
International Classification of Diseases framework (ICD-10; World Health 
Organisation, 1993), although emotional numbing is not seen as a necessary symptom 
requirement (Yule, Williams & Joseph, 1999).
Lee & Young (2001) outline how differential diagnosis often needs to be made 
between PTSD and adjustment disorder, acute stress disorder (where response to 
trauma is seen in first four weeks; if this reaction persists beyond four weeks a 
diagnosis of PTSD is made), obsessive compulsive disorder (where intrusive 
phenomena are not always related to trauma), malingering (where the person is faking 
illness for financial gain or for mitigating legal purposes), and psychosis (where 
hallucinations and delusions are experienced about a trauma that did not occur).
The diagnosis of PTSD has been criticised on the grounds that it does not 
capture people who are very symptomatic but do not show features of all three 
symptom clusters, that what counts as a traumatic event continues to change 
frequently, that severity distinctions are largely arbitrary, and the high co-morbidity
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with other conditions suggests it may not be a distinct construct (for a review, see Lee 
& Young, 2001).
1.4.3 Presentation and Prevalence
PTSD frequently presents co-morbid with other conditions (Kulka, Schlanger, 
Fairbank et al., 1990; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet et al., 1995). Further, it more often 
occurs subsequent to at least one previous episode of another disorder, particularly 
those with an anxiety component (Kessler et al., 1995; Prekonigg, Kessler, Stortz et 
al., 2000). In contrast, co-morbid conditions that develop after PTSD diagnosis may 
reflect maladaptive coping with the trauma, including agoraphobia and drug 
dependence (Buckley, Blanchard & Hickling, 1998).
Research does not reliably support the presence of the three distinct symptom 
clusters outlined in DSM-IV in the disorders presentation. For example, Taylor, Kuch, 
Koch et al. (1998) subjected the reported PTSD symptoms of 103 road traffic accident 
survivors and 419 United Nation Peace Keepers to factor analysis, producing a two 
factor model of intusion/avoidance and hyper-arousal/numbing. Alternatively, 
Asmundson et al. (2000) produced a four factor model of re-experiencing, avoidance, 
numbing, and hyperarousal symptoms. These studies suggest that diagnostic criteria 
for PTSD may need to be revised in the future.
The prevalence estimates of exposure to traumatic events vary depending on 
which criteria of what counts as a traumatic event are adopted and the different 
questioning methods used (Lee & Young, 2001). For example, estimates of male 
lifetime exposure rates to traumatic events vary from 43% (Breslau et al., 1992) to 
93% (Breslau & Davis, 1998). Prevalence estimates of PTSD suggest that between 5-
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6% of men and 10-12% of women in the general population have experienced the 
disorder at some point over their life course (Resick, 2001). Estimates of the 
conditional probability of developing PTSD following exposure to a stressful event 
again vary, ranging from 9% (Breslau et al., 1998) to 24% (Breslau et al., 1991). 
What this illustrates is that PTSD is only present in a significant minority of people 
exposed to traumatic events and thus some mediating variables must explain who 
goes on to develop the disorder (for example, nature of the stressor, nature of the 
coping response, and individual differences variables). Risk factors identified to date 
include trauma severity, lack of social support post-trauma, life stress post-trauma, 
previous psychiatric history, childhood abuse, family psychiatric history, low socio­
economic status, lack of education, low intelligence, previous trauma, other adverse 
childhood factors, female gender, younger age at trauma, and minority race status 
(Brewin, Andrews & Valentine, 2000; Lee & Young, 2001)3.
1.4.4 Theoretical Models of PTSD
A brief review of theoretical models of PTSD that inform understanding of 
how thoughts and feelings are regulated in the disorder will now be presented, based 
on the reviews of Brewin & Holmes (2003) and Dalgleish (2004). How an emotion 
regulation perspective could contribute to these models will be highlighted where 
appropriate.
3 Importantly, from an emotion regulation perspective, there is preliminary evidence to suggest that the 
nature of the traumatic event may determine the extent to which emotion regulation difficulties are 
implicated in the disorder. Cloitre, Koenon, Cohen et al. (2002) observe that people who were victims 
of childhood sexual abuse are much more likely to show inter-personal and emotion regulation 
difficulties alongside a more typical PTSD profile. These symptoms have been linked to poorer 
prognosis and treatment outcome in typical exposure-based treatments.
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1.4.4.1 Horowitz Stress Response Model
Horowitz (1976,1986) pioneered the earliest theoretical frameworks to 
understand the regulation of processing in PTSD when it was first included in DSM- 
III (APA, 1980) as a diagnostic concept. The stress response model described how 
people typically react to trauma with an initial outcry followed by attempts to 
assimilate the traumatic information with prior knowledge. A consequence of 
assimilation can be ‘information overload’, where the person is unable to connect 
their earlier model of the world with the traumatic event, leading to considerable 
tension. Various psychological defence mechanisms are utilised to reduce this tension, 
helping to avoid the trauma memory and/or control how speedily it is remembered. 
These include denial, emotional numbing, and avoiding cues that remind people of it. 
Thus, two competing processes can be operating: suppression of trauma information 
to reduce stress and bringing the trauma memory to mind to promote its assimilation 
into autobiographical memory. The individual can swing between intrusions of the 
trauma and marked avoidance.
In many ways, the stress response model parallels the earlier account of 
Lazarus describing how regulation strategies are brought into play to control reaction 
to stressful events (Lazarus & Opton, 1966). What it elaborates is how there can be 
marked conflict between different psychological processes operating, which can lead 
to the individual being stuck in a PTSD-like state. The stress response model first 
considered the consequences of trauma regulation in PTSD and served as a foundation 
for subsequent accounts of the disorder, which have begun to delineate more fully the 
way in which encoding at the time of trauma shapes development of subsequent 
psychopathology.
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It is possible to reconceptualise the defence mechanism identified in this 
model as the activation of different forms of emotion regulation strategies during 
initial encoding and re-experiencing. As yet there has been limited empirical 
validation to support the defences postulated by this model.
1.4.4.2 Conditioning Theory
Mowrer’s (1960) two factor learning theory has also been used to explain the 
development and maintenance of PTSD (for example, Keane, Zimering & Caddell, 
1985). When exposed to a traumatic event, classical conditioning results in neutral 
stimuli in the traumatic situation becoming fear eliciting cues through their 
association with the trauma. These neutral stimuli can then subsequently acts as 
triggers for re-experiencing symptoms. Habituation is prevented as the person actively 
attempts to avoid or distract themselves from the memories or images, making any 
exposure incomplete. This avoidance is instrumentally reinforced by the short-term 
reduction in fear it brings about. A limitation of this account is that it does not 
distinguish PTSD from the development of other anxiety disorders and cannot 
account for the full range of phenomena observed in PTSD (for example, experience 
of other negative emotions). Further, it views PTSD as the result of simple 
conditioning processes, neglecting the impact of the way in which the event is 
processed on the development of subsequent symptoms.
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1.4.4.3 Information Processing Theories
A class of models have focused on the processing of the traumatic event itself 
rather than on wider personal and social context. The central claim of these 
‘information-processing theories’ is that the way in which the traumatic event is 
processed and represented in memory contributes to the development of 
psychopathology (for example, Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Carlson & Twentyman, 
1988; Foa, Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989; Litz & Keane, 1989).
Building on the work of Lang (1979) they claim that, following exposure to 
trauma, people develop unusually coherent and stable fear networks, linking stimulus 
information, physiological information, and meaning information about the event 
tightly. These memory traces can thus be unusually easily activated by usually 
ambiguous stimulus elements that bear some small resemblance to the trauma. The 
person then re-experiences the physiological reactions and makes sense of the world 
in the same way that they did during the trauma. Foa et al. (1989) further claim that 
the memory of trauma holds particular significance and violates assumptions of basic 
safety that the person previously held, similar to the theory of shattered assumptions 
(Janoff-Bulmann, 1992). The degree of distress brought about by the reactivation of 
trauma structures means that people actively try to avoid or suppress them, which 
prevents full exposure. These accounts cannot fully explain the impoverishment of 
detail of memory for some aspects of trauma.
Again, an emotion regulation perspective seems a potentially helpful 
framework to better delineate the processes by which people prevent reactivation of 
trauma structures, but has so far been little researched.
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1.4.4.4 Cognitive Model o f PTSD
A substantial body of work from a cognitive regulation perspective has looked 
at how the meaning attached to a traumatic event determines whether PTSD develops. 
Cognitive accounts of PTSD postulate that processing the trauma in a way that leads 
to a sense of serious, current threat is what makes symptoms persistent (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). This sense of threat arises as a consequence of excessively negative 
appraisals of the trauma and its sequelae and the disturbance of a clear 
autobiographical memory trace. These appraisals are not allowed to change because 
the individual adopts a series of problematic behavioural and cognitive strategies, 
including thought suppression, distraction, avoidance, selective attention to threat, 
dissociation, and symptom control behaviours. Successful treatment is believed to 
involve elaborating the trauma memory, modifying appraisals, and preventing use of 
dysfunctional coping strategies.
The strength of the cognitive model is that it identifies a number of 
psychological processes that are likely to contribute to PTSD. First, if the person 
appraises the traumatic event in a negative way PTSD may be more likely (Dunmore, 
Clark & Ehlers, 1997; Murray, Ehlers & Mayou, 2002). The content of appraisals 
relate to personal responsibility, control, safety in the world, reliability of others, and 
implications for the future. Second, appraising early symptoms of PTSD in a negative 
way can maintain them (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999). Third, PTSD is more likely if a 
person suffers ‘mental defeat’ at the time of trauma, where the person experiences an 
extreme form of helplessness and feels unable to protect themselves (Ehlers,
Maercker & Boos, 2000). Fourth, the use of data driven (focusing on sensory 
impressions) rather than conceptual encoding (focusing on the meaning of the
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situation and organising information) increases the likelihood of developing PTSD, 
since the person develops a memory trace less related to their autobiographical 
database, that is subject to strong perceptual priming, and that is hard to retrieve 
intentionally (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Halligan et al, in press; Murray et al, 2002).
Fifth, use of problematic coping strategies after experiencing the trauma can increase 
the likelihood of developing PTSD.
Interestingly, a number of the risk factors for trauma identified in the cognitive 
model may potentially be related to emotion regulation processes. For example, use of 
suppression may lead to data-driven coding (making trauma more likely) whereas use 
of reappraisal may lead to conceptually-driven coding (making trauma less likely)
1.4.4.5 Dual Representation Theory
Dual representation theory (Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996) links the 
development of PTSD to disturbance in the integration of different aspects of memory 
following trauma. It proposes that memories are of two distinct types, stored in 
different representational formats. Verbally accessible memory (VAM) supports 
ordinary autobiographical memory that can be retrieved either automatically or using 
deliberate, strategic processes. Situationally accessible memory (SAM) contains 
information obtained from the more extensive, lower level perceptual processing of 
the scenes, including visuospatial information and bodily response. When processing 
traumatic events, extreme stress can lead to these memory systems failing to be 
integrated such that an impoverished VAM and strengthened SAM trace is 
established. These results in flashbacks and re-experiencing of the trauma when SAM 
is activated, which cannot be controlled and contextualised by the VAM trace.
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Successful resolution of PTSD symptoms involves integrating the two memory 
systems.
It seems plausible to suggest that emotion regulation processes may also 
influence the extent to which these two memory traces are elaborated. For example, 
emotional suppression pushing material out of conscious experience may lead to an 
impoverished VAM trace (therefore impairing episodic memory) and a strengthened 
SAM trace (therefore leading to intrusive symptoms). While there has been 
investigation of how dissociation may contribute to this memory impairment 
(Holmes, Brewin & Hennessy 2004; see section 1.5.2), the consequences of more 
intentional emotion regulation strategies such as suppression have not yet been 
systematically explored.
1.5 Regulation of Processing in PTSD
Empirical work unpacking how information processing may lead to the 
development of symptoms in PTSD will now be reviewed, focusing on the role of 
thought suppression and the consequences of dissociation on intrusive memory. It will 
be highlighted how this work has largely focused on cognitive rather than emotional 
regulation. Investigations of emotional processing in the disorder will then be 
described, illustrating how emotion regulation has not been systematically explored.
1.5.1 Thought Suppression in PTSD
A number of theorists have proposed a link between control of thoughts and 
PTSD. It is believed that trauma related thoughts are avoided as much as possible, and
33
Chapter 1: Introduction
when they come to mind they are then actively suppressed. Avoidance of trauma 
thoughts may powerfully maintain trauma by preventing full activation of the fear 
structures maintaining the phobic response to stimuli linked with the trauma, and thus 
blocking the natural habituation processes (Foa, Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989; Foa & 
McNally, 1996). Suppression of thoughts may lead to an ironic rebound effect as 
suggested by Wegner (1987).
The connection between PTSD and thought suppression has been empirically 
demonstrated in both longitudinal, regression based studies and in studies using 
modified versions of the thought suppression paradigm (Wegner, 1987). Longitudinal 
studies have shown that catastrophic negative appraisal of trauma-related intrusions 
predicts the behavioural and cognitive avoidance of the intrusions, which in turn 
predicts PTSD severity (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Further, the 
tendency to suppress intrusions at three months after a traumatic event has also been 
found to predict persistence of PTSD symptoms at a one year follow-up (Mayou & 
Bryant, 1998) and three-year follow-up (Mayou, Ehlers & Bryant, 2002).
As with the control data on the thought suppression paradigm, a complex 
pattern of data has emerged with experimental studies. Preliminary studies found that 
non-clinical participants who suppressed while watching a traumatic film showed 
impaired episodic memory for the film but did not report more film-related thoughts 
(Wegner, Quillian and Houston, 1996). This supports the opposite claim that 
suppression of trauma thoughts, rather than making memory of the trauma hyper- 
accessible, may impede memory for the trauma and result in psychogenic amnesia.
In contrast, data consistent with the broader thought suppression literature 
were later uncovered. Rassin, Merckelbach and Muris (1997) asked a non-clinical 
sample to watch a distressing film, half of whom were instructed to suppress thoughts
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about the film and the other half were given no instructions. At five-hour follow-up, 
the suppression group reported a higher number of film-related thoughts, consistent 
with ironic processing theory (Wegner & Erber, 1992). Suppression had no effect on 
the accuracy of episodic recall about the content of the film. This study relied on 
retrospective self-report of intrusion frequency, however, which may have been 
biased by the instructions participants were given to suppress.
Similar results using a counting methodology were produced by Davies & 
Clark (1998), who found that a non-clinical sample asked to suppress their thoughts in 
response to a distressing film reported fewer thoughts in the suppression condition but 
more thoughts in the subsequent free viewing condition, relative to a control group.
Davies and Clark (1999) investigated whether individual differences in 
tendency to suppress would mediate response to traumatic material. Healthy 
participants watched a stressful film about a real fire and then monitored and recorded 
their intrusions about the film immediately afterwards and for a seven day period. Pre­
existing tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts in combination with a more negative 
mood state after watching the film predicted more frequent intrusions immediately 
after watching the film (but not over the seven-day follow-up).
More recent studies have looked at the consequences of thought suppression in 
clinical samples. For example, Shipherd and Beck (1999) investigated the effects of 
suppressing rape-related thoughts in a thought suppression paradigm on female sexual 
assault survivors. The PTSD participants experienced an increase in frequency of 
rape-related thoughts following deliberate suppression, whereas the control 
participants did not show any rebound effect.
These findings are broadly consistent with accounts suggesting that 
suppression of thoughts about trauma may make those memories hyper-accessible, as
35
Chapter 1: Introduction
suggested by the ironic processing theory (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, 1994), 
and potentially contribute to the maintenance of PTSD. A limitation of most of the 
above studies, however, is that they used analogue film inductions, which have 
questionable ecological validity and, in particular, do not have the ideographic 
relevance of a personally experienced traumatic event. Nevertheless, this work 
generally supports the claim that thought rebound following thought suppression is an 
important maintaining factor in PTSD. What this literature has not explored is the 
short and long term consequences of thought suppression on emotional processing in 
the disorder.
1.5.2 Dissociation and its impact on intrusive memories in PTSD
A parallel line of investigation has looked at the consequences of dissociation 
on intrusive memory in PTSD. A central feature of PTSD is experiencing repeated 
intrusive images of the traumatic event (Brewin, 1998), which may relate to a 
dissociative response at the time of encoding (Holmes, Brewin & Hennessey, 2004). 
Dissociation is defined by DSM-IV as ‘disruption in the usually integrated functions 
of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the environment’ (APA, 1994, p 
.477). It is seen as a response to extreme stress that limits conscious processing of the 
traumatic material, thus reducing negative affect and the physiological stress response 
(Brewin & Saunders, 2001). In PTSD, dissociation may lead to the disruption of the 
encoding of stressful events, making the events more likely to be re-experienced as 
intrusive flashbacks than be integrated into wider autobiographical memory.
If dissociation is viewed as an active rather than involuntary coping response 
to stress, it should be possible to induce it experimentally by asking participants to
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process stressful material in a dissociative way. Analogue studies that train 
participants to use dissociative encoding strategies while viewing distressing material 
have so far produced mixed results about the impact on long term memory of the 
event, however.
Murray (1997) asked participants to watch a distressing film and either 
emotionally engage with the film or to dissociate from it by trying to induce a state of 
emotional numbness. Contrary to prediction, the dissociation group showed no 
elevation in levels of distress after watching the film and no increase in intrusive 
memories. It is possible, however, that participants were unable to carry out the 
dissociation instructions fully.
An alternative way to understand intrusions in PTSD in terms of competing 
memory traces was first put forward by Holmes (2000). Dual representation theory of 
PTSD (Brewin, 2001; Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996) proposes that in traumatic 
situations memory encoding is disrupted by heightened levels of arousal, such that 
events are encoded predominantly in a situationally accessible form (perceptual or 
image based memory) rather than in a verbally accessible form (language based 
memory). This makes memories less likely to be integrated into autobiographical 
memory and more likely to be experienced as sensory flashbacks and intrusions.
This account was used to make sense of what initially appeared to be 
paradoxical data. Brewin and Saunders (2000) asked participants to watch a stressful 
film either under standard conditions or while simultaneously performing a tapping 
task. Dual-task processing was hypothesised to limit the amount of attention and 
conceptual processing given to the film, thus leading to less well organised memory. 
Paradoxically, there were no differences in levels of distress or explicit memory 
between the two conditions, but the dual task condition produced significantly fewer
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intrusive memories over the following two weeks. In the experiment the dual task 
condition (a spatial tapping task) may actually have occupied situationally accessible 
memory and left verbally accessible memory intact, thus reducing rather than 
increasing the number of intrusions experienced.
To back up this interpretation, Holmes, Brewin & Hennessy (2004) contrasted 
the effects of a verbal distraction task and a visual distraction task while encoding 
traumatic material in a series of studies. The rationale was that the verbal task should 
block verbally accessible memory, whereas the visual task should block situationally 
accessible memory acquisition. As predicted, the visual task decreased the frequency 
of later memory intrusions and the verbal task increased the frequency of later 
memory intrusions.
The strength of this approach is that it focuses on coding at the time of trauma 
exposure and looks at a regulation style that has both a cognitive and affective 
component. Further, the work measures longer term consequences of regulation in the 
form of intrusive memories experienced after coding. While the work looked at the 
cognitive consequences of a form of affective regulation, the emotional consequences 
were not systematically examined in depth. This means it is still an open empirical 
question as to whether the way in which emotion is regulated at the time of coding 
shapes subsequent emotional experience in PTSD.
1.5.3 Emotion Processing in PTSD
Work exploring emotion processing in PTSD will now be reviewed, 
highlighting how the focus has been on mapping out the emotional disturbance rather 
than understanding how it is regulated.
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Two common emotional symptoms reported by sufferers of PTSD are reports 
of intense negative emotional reactions (particularly fear and sadness) when reminded 
of the trauma they experienced and a general ‘numbing’ of interest in and emotional 
response to other situations that would previously have elicited an emotional reaction 
(APA, 1994).
Empirical validation of these reports has been largely based on studies looking 
at emotional response to trauma-related cues in PTSD. It has been found that people 
with PTSD react intensely to cues reminding them of their trauma, which can be 
characterised as an integrated negative emotional response involving central and 
peripheral nervous system activity and a variety of unpleasant feelings (Malloy, 
Fairbank & Keane, 1983; Pallmeyer, Blanchard & Kolb, 1986; Pitman et al., 1987; 
Rauch, van der Kolk, Fisler, & Alpert, 1996).
It is currently unclear, however, how emotional numbing symptoms are related 
to these heightened negative responses to trauma reminders. Behavioural theories 
suggest that emotional numbing is the consequence of chronic avoidance of trauma 
reminders and reactions (for example, Keane, Fairbank, Caddell, Zimering, & Bender, 
1985). This is not consistent with data showing that emotional numbing is distinct 
from avoidance in factor analysis (Foa, Riggs & Gershuny, 1995) or that avoidance 
symptoms explain only a small proportion of variance in the report of numbing 
symptoms (Litz et al., 1997).
Other investigators suggest that the emotional blunting seen in PTSD is 
similar to ‘conditioned analgesia’ responses to uncontrollable and unpredictable 
aversive stimulation (Foa, Zinberg & Rothbaum, 1992). In other words, after repeated 
exposure to trauma reminders, people with PTSD show a numbing in their reactivity 
to subsequent emotional material. Evidence for this account is largely based on
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animal stress studies, however, so its applicability to humans with PTSD is 
questionable.
Horowitz (1986) proposes that trauma creates two sets of internal processes to 
cope with and resolve responses to extreme stressors. The intrusion phase of 
adjustment leads to re-experiencing and hyper-emotionality, whereas the denial phase 
is activated to defend against these difficult feelings and memories linked to the 
trauma. In particular, emotional numbing allows patients with PTSD to reduce 
feelings associated with traumatic memories. It is believed that people with PTSD 
shift back and forth between denial and intrusion until resolution of the trauma occurs. 
Although of heuristic value to explain PTSD, the central claim that denial is a phasic 
response after a period predominated by intrusive symptoms has not been empirically 
demonstrated (for example, see Joseph, Yule & Williams, 1995).
Associative network models argue that re-experiencing comes about by 
activation of a fear network linked to the traumatic event (Foa, Steketee, &
Rothbaum, 1989; Litz & Keane, 1989; Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Carlson & 
Twentyman, 1988). PTSD is distinguished from other disorders by the unusually 
coherent and stable network of trauma memories, such that the network can be easily 
activated by environments that share only a few matching elements to the trauma 
trace. These models explain the re-experiencing and hyper-emotionality symptoms 
but cannot account for the emotional numbing found in the disorder.
Building on these frameworks, Litz (1992) argues that emotional numbing can 
be explained as a deficit in emotional processing in times of hyperemotionality, 
typically triggered by exposure to trauma cues. When reminded of trauma, patients 
with PTSD may experience less intense positive feelings and be more reactive to 
negative cues.
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There is also a dearth of studies testing out whether emotional numbing is 
reliably found in PTSD. Indeed, evidence to date suggests that PTSD is not 
characterised by a global reduction in response to non-trauma related material. Litz, 
Orsillo, Kaloupek, and Weathers (2000) looked at the impact viewing trauma cues 
had on subsequent emotional processing of positive, negative and neutral images 
selected from the International Affective Picture Set (IAPS; Lang, Greenwald,
Bradley et al., 1993) in Vietnam veterans with PTSD, compared to a well adjusted 
Vietnam veteran control group.
A complex data set emerged, which was inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
emotional processing in PTSD is characterised by a global ‘numbing’ of emotional 
response. Following exposure to non-trauma related cues, both groups’ emotional 
response to a series of positive, neutral and negative images was modulated by 
stimulus valence. Following exposure to reminders of Vietnam, the PTSD group 
showed suppressed facial displays of emotion to positive but not negative or neutral 
images (measured by zygomatic facial muscle activation), relative to the control 
group. Unexpectedly, the PTSD group also showed a reduction in pleasantness ratings 
of neutral stimuli (but not negative or positive images). There were no statistically 
significant differences in electrodermal response to the images, but the PTSD group 
showed elevated heart rate to both the positive and negative images.
This pattern of findings is inconsistent with associative models of PTSD, 
which would predict that a trauma prime should lead to a cascading activation of fear 
networks, and thus intensification of experience of negative emotions. It should be 
noted, however, that the failure to find a global numbing of emotional response in this 
study may be because non self-referent emotional material was used. A different 
pattern may emerge if personally salient, idiographic material was presented.
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As yet there has been limited empirical examination of the extent to which 
intentional adoption of emotion regulation strategies influences symptoms in PTSD. 
Wastell (2002) reports a cross-sectional study looking at the long term effects of 
suppressing emotional reactions following exposure to trauma in 437 Australian 
ambulance workers. The use of suppressing defences (including withdrawal or acting 
out) was positively correlated with the development of both physical and 
psychological stress symptoms. Unfortunately, correlational evidence is insufficient to 
demonstrate any causal link between the use of different emotion regulation strategies 
and the development of stress symptoms. For example, it is possible that other 
variables could lead to both increased stress and the use of suppression strategies. 
Further, reliance on subjective, retrospective measures of suppression strategies may 
have biased the result.
Further, Joseph, Dalgleish, Williams et al. (1997) investigated factors 
affecting traumatic response in survivors of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry 
disaster. They found that negative attitudes towards the expression of emotion at 
three- year follow-up were associated with higher PTSD symptom scores at five-year 
follow-up. Additional work is needed, however, to support and extend these 
preliminary findings.
In summary, while the nature of emotion deficits in PTSD is now better 
understood, the contribution of intentional emotion regulation strategies to the 
disorder has not been sufficiently investigated.
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1.5.4 Overview of Regulation of Processing in PTSD
Work to date on PTSD has illustrated how initial processing shapes memory 
of the traumatic event and has begun to explore emotional processing in the disorder. 
The secondary emotional consequences of different processing styles are currently 
unclear and the relative advantages and disadvantages of cognitive versus emotional 
regulation are uncertain, however. To clarify these issues it may be useful to 
incorporate normative models of emotional regulation into models of PTSD.
The central proposition of cognitive accounts of PTSD is that the sense one 
makes of a traumatic event while it is happening, and how this is subsequently 
reinforced and elaborated, determines whether or not PTSD will develop. Implicit in 
the model is that cognition precedes and shapes affect, so it focuses more on the 
consequences o f ‘appraisal based’ regulation strategies rather than ‘emotional 
expression based’ regulation strategies. Moreover, the “down the line” consequences 
of trauma regulation that are focused on are changes in memory trace of the event and 
how it is appraised, rather than how emotional experience is altered.
Multi-representational theories of cognition increasingly realise the reciprocal 
relationship between cognition and affect (Interactive Cognitive Subsystems [ICS] 
Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Schematic Propositional Associative Analogue 
Representational System [SPAARS]; Power & Dalgleish, 1997), however, suggesting 
emotional consequences of trauma regulation may have greater aetiological 
significance.
To illustrate multiple representation frameworks, ICS will be considered as a 
representative example. This argues that to understand how the mind works we have 
to recognise that there are different, interacting forms of information, or ‘mental
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codes’, which represent distinct aspects of experience. These include basic sensory 
input, feedback from the body, and a series of higher level codes that represent 
increasingly abstract meaning. Propositional meanings are logical, truth-like 
statements akin to thoughts that can be expressed in language. The implicational 
representation is a holistic, higher order framework that incorporates sensory and 
proprioceptive information within schematic models of the world. It generates non­
verbal emotional beliefs or feelings as well as intellectual thoughts.
Information is passed from one code to another and patterns of activity across 
each code are stored in memory. To fully understand an individual’s experience, the 
dynamic activity across different levels of representation needs to be considered. For 
example, to comprehend a given emotional response, the interplay between its 
sensory and proprioceptive ‘feel’, its intellectual ‘cold’ propositional representation, 
and its emotive ‘hot’ implicational representation should be outlined. People’s 
predominant focus of attention can rest with different codes at different times, altering 
their experiential awareness.
Therefore, ICS predicts that both feedback from the emotions (largely via the 
implicational system) and cognition (largely via the propositional system) shape 
experience. For this reason it seems sensible to further investigate the cognitive and 
affective consequences of emotional, as well as cognitive, regulation strategies.
An emotion regulation perspective could potentially inform understanding of 
how coding at the time of trauma produces the cluster of symptoms seen in PTSD and 
how the disorder is maintained by subsequent adoption of affect control. It is possible 
that, when exposed to trauma, people voluntarily or involuntarily adopt differing 
emotional regulation styles that have variable short and long term consequences. 
Further, even if particular emotion regulation strategies are not adopted during trauma
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encoding, their later use to manage re-experiencing symptoms may maintain the 
disorder.
1.6 Applying an Emotion Regulation Perspective to PTSD
Speculation now follows on the consequences of different forms of emotion 
regulation while encoding traumatic material, focusing particularly on emotional 
suppression.
Suppression is defined here as the intentional inhibition of any emotion that is 
felt or expressed to others. Suppression seems the most relevant form of emotion 
regulation to focus on, owing to the high number of avoidant symptoms that 
characterise sufferers of PTSD. A variety of different experimental literatures, briefly 
reviewed below, make somewhat different predictions about the consequences of 
using emotional suppression, which will be briefly reviewed below.
Research into the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998; 2001: see 
section 1.3.3) would predict that suppression in trauma should not lead to marked 
experiential change but may produce impaired episodic memory and physiological 
hyper-arousal. The work makes no predictions about the longer term emotional 
consequences of suppression, in terms of either self-report or arousal. Further, it does 
not separate the consequences on mood (background affect) and emotion (foreground 
affect, triggered by particular stimuli). Perhaps most importantly, the definition of 
suppression adopted focuses on limiting overt expression of feelings rather than 
reducing the feeling state internally. It seems likely that the primary goal of emotion 
regulation in sufferers of PTSD is to escape internal experience of distress rather than 
limit its communication, so the strength with which the Gross findings can be
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generalised to this disorder may be limited. It may be the case that attempts to 
suppress internal feelings would change self-reported emotional experience.
In contrast, the thought suppression literature (Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, 
1994: see sections 1.2.3 and 1.5.1) might suggest that emotional suppression should 
lead to successful initial regulation of emotion but subsequent affective rebound 
(where emotion is increased). This prediction would only hold, however, if it can be 
assumed that the mechanisms by which thoughts and emotions are suppressed are the 
same, which we do not yet know to be the case. Further, the thought suppression 
literature generates no clear predictions about the differential consequences of thought 
suppression on self-report and psychophysiology, between mood and emotion, or on 
different types of memory.
Finally, the dissociation literature (for example, Holmes, Brewin & Hennessy, 
2004: see section 1.5.2) might predict that emotional suppression would lead to an 
increase in the number of intrusions experienced about the trauma material but no 
deficit in episodic memory. Again, the validity of these predictions depends on the 
extent to which emotional suppression can be viewed as similar to dissociation.
In summary, different predictions about the consequences of emotional 
suppression can be generated depending on which literature is considered. Perhaps 
one way to integrate these somewhat different accounts is in terms of multiple 
representation theories of emotional processing. For example, in terms of the dual 
representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish & Jospehs, 1996: see section 
1.4.4.4), it is possible that emotional suppression leads to a marginally strengthened 
SAM trace (causing increased intrusions as predicted by the thought rebound 
literature; increased physiological arousal as predicted by process model literature; 
and perhaps affective rebound as predicted by the thought suppression literature) and
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a slightly impoverished VAM trace (leading to poorer episodic recall as predicted by 
the process model literature). Similarly in terms of ICS (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), 
emotional suppression may lead to a disturbance of the inter-relationship between 
implicational and propositional levels of representation, where the propositional 
representation of the trauma is weakened and the implicational level of representation 
is no longer inhibited.
To frame this prediction in the Bemebaum et al. taxonomy (2003) of 
emotional disturbance, it may be the case that emotional suppression leads to both an 
affect disconnection (where component parts of emotional response are no longer 
related to one another) and an awareness disconnection (where aspects of the situation 
are no longer consciously remembered in explicit memory but the memory trace in 
implicit memory systems is strengthened).
The consequences of emotional suppression can be contrasted with those of 
other forms of affect regulation. In severe trauma where emotional arousal is so 
extreme that other mechanisms to control it break down, dissociation may result. 
Dissociative symptoms include emotional numbing, derealisation, depersonalisation, 
and out-of-body experiences. Dissociation can be seen as a cluster of regulation 
strategies with the goal of avoiding as much as possible the cognitive, emotional, and 
bodily impact of a trauma, thus producing limited short term gain. The long term 
consequences of dissociation, however, may be to lead to a fragmented memory trace, 
increased rate of intrusions, and a blunted or potentiated emotional response to 
subsequent material. Again in terms of dual representation theory (Brewin, Dalgleish 
& Joseph, 1996), dissociation may lead to a very strong SAM trace and a very weak 
VAM trace. Dissociation can be contrasted with suppression, which is a more focal
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attempt to reduce the internal experience and expression of an emotion without the 
wider attempts to avoid the cognitive and bodily aspects of the trauma.
In contrast to suppression and dissociation, the use of a reappraisal strategy 
could help control emotions during the trauma encoding and be of benefit long term. 
Research into the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1988) has shown that 
reappraisal reduces experience and expression of negative emotional states during 
encoding. It seems likely that use of reappraisal would also ensure that the event is 
integrated into autobiographical memory, therefore blocking re-experiencing 
symptoms. In dual representation theory terms (Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996), 
reappraisal would lead to a strengthened VAM trace which can regulate the SAM 
trace, thereby reducing likelihood of a PTSD reaction.
In summary, different emotion regulation strategies, used either when actually 
going through the traumatic event or when re-experiencing it, may contribute to the 
development of maintenance and PTSD.
A study will now be outlined that investigates the concurrent and subsequent 
effects of emotional suppression when processing traumatic material. It will be 
examined whether attempts to minimise emotions experienced during an analogue 
trauma induction may paradoxically lead to an emotional ‘rebound’ effect, where 
there is increased likelihood of subsequently experiencing PTSD-like phenomena.
1.7 Project Overview and Rationale
The project presented in this thesis explores the consequences of emotional 
suppression at the time of trauma encoding, to see whether it is an effective way of
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regulating response during initial encoding and whether an ‘emotional rebound’ effect 
emerges subsequently.
Emotion suppression was selected for investigation because it was felt to be 
the strategy most directly analogous to thought suppression, which has been clearly 
linked to onset and maintenance of PTSD. Further, suppression was felt to be the 
strategy most easily definable, best established in the literature, and most clearly a 
form of ‘emotional’ rather than ‘cognitive’ regulation.
Since the focus of the study was on initial trauma encoding, the decision was 
made to use an analogue trauma induction rather than recruiting a sample with PTSD 
(where the initial trauma encoding has necessarily already occurred). Suppression 
was operationalised as attempts to reduce any emotions experienced internally (for 
example, feeling angry subjectively) and displayed externally (for example, having an 
angry face, posture, or behaviour).
It is important to note that this is not the same definition of suppression used 
in the series of emotion regulation experiments by Gross (1998), which limited the 
construct to the suppression of external expression of emotion. The decision to adopt 
a broader definition of emotional suppression was made for a number of reasons. The 
key aim of the current project was to look at the consequences of altering subjective 
experience of emotion. The Gross data show that using emotional expression 
suppression influences observable signs of experienced affect but does not change 
subjective experience. Moreover, the focus of the Gross experiments was on 
contrasting different ways of down-regulating emotional experience, whereas the 
focus in the current study was on the consequences of down-regulating emotion, to 
some extent irrespective of how this is achieved. To maximise the likelihood of 
successful down-regulation, it was decided not to limit the strategies participants
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could use to external expression alone. Finally, the distinction drawn between 
different forms of emotion regulation in the process model may not in any case be 
valid (see section 1.5.2).
To investigate the consequences of emotion suppression when encoding 
traumatic material, the following experiment was conducted (see Chapter 2 for full 
details of methodology). Healthy participants were asked to view a distressing video 
about real road traffic accidents (compiled by Steil, 1996), which was intended to act 
as an analogue trauma induction. A video stress induction was chosen as this has been 
widely used in the normative emotion regulation literature (Gross 1998,2001), the 
Lazarus stress response literature (Lazarus, 1993), and the cognitive literature on 
PTSD (Davies & Clark, 1998).
Half of the participants were instructed to watch the video as normal (control 
condition), whereas the other half of participants were asked to minimise how much 
emotion they were expressing and experiencing (suppression condition). How 
successfully they followed these instructions was measured in terms of self-report of 
emotional experience and psychophysiological response (heart rate and galvanic skin 
response) during the video. Both self-report and psychophysiology measures were 
included as emotions are increasingly viewed as having a number of different 
component responses that can be measured by language, behaviour, or physiological 
change (for example, Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993). 
Psychophysiological indices may be less susceptible to demand characteristics than 
self-report and less susceptible to display rules than facial expressions (Sloan et al., 
2001) and may therefore reveal a different pattern of findings.
The consequences on subsequent emotional processing were indexed by 
asking participants to view a series of emotional images and record their emotional
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response (again both self-report and psychophysiological response). This intends to 
extend the normative emotion regulation literature (Gross, 1998; 2001) by looking at 
the consequences of suppression on processing of subsequent emotional material and 
shorter and longer term background mood, rather than simply investigating mood at 
the time of encoding. Further, previous research into PTSD has looked at subsequent 
processing of emotional images (Litz et al., 2000), so it will be possible to test 
whether emotional suppression leads to a PTSD-like profile when viewing other 
emotional material.
The impact the suppression and control conditions had on concurrent and 
subsequent mood was measured by asking participants to rate their emotional state 
immediately before and after the induction and for the week before and after the 
induction. It was felt to be important to measure background mood as well as 
emotional response to new material, as the consequences of emotional suppression 
may not be uniform across these indices. A variety of different emotions and mood 
states will be indexed, to make it possible to test whether suppression has a generic 
effect on all affect or a specific impact on the predominant emotions that were being 
suppressed.
To assess how the conditions influenced episodic memory, participants 
completed memory tests about the content of the video at a one-week follow-up. 
Further, to explore the influence on intrusive memories about the video, participants 
completed an auditory stream of consciousness task immediately after watching the 
video and filled in a daily intrusion diary for the following week. These measures 
allow comparison to the series of studies by Brewin and colleagues looking at the 
consequences of dissociation as form of trauma regulation (see Holmes, Brewin &
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Hennessey, 2004) and also the general thought suppression literature (Wegner et al.,
1993).
1.8 Hypotheses
Integrating findings from the thought suppression, process model of emotion 
regulation, and dissociation literatures in terms of dual representation theory (Brewin, 
Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996: see section 1.6), the general prediction of this thesis is that 
emotional suppression will lead to a strengthened situationally accessible memory 
trace (SAM; visual memory) and a weakened verbally accessible memory trace 
(VAM; verbal memory) of the trauma material. This is hypothesised to have the 
following concurrent and subsequent consequences.
First, replicating the findings from the process model of emotion regulation 
(Gross et al. 1998; Gross, 2001), it is hypothesised that participants in the emotional 
suppression group will show an increase in psychophysiological response while 
viewing the trauma film, compared to volunteers in the control condition. In contrast 
to the predictions arising from the process model of emotion regulation, it is 
hypothesised that extending suppression to internal feeling state as well as external 
expression will mean that self-reported negative affect will decrease rather than 
remain unaffected following suppression.
Second, consistent with the rebound hypothesis (Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner,
1994) it is predicted that participants in the emotional suppression group will show a 
subsequent increase in negative mood and a decrease in positive mood, compared to 
volunteers in the control condition.
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Third, also consistent with the rebound hypothesis (Wegner et al., 1987; 
Wegner, 1994), it is hypothesised participants in the emotional suppression group will 
show an elevated self-report and psychophysiological emotional response when 
viewing subsequent negative affective material and a decreased self-report and 
psychophysiological emotional response when viewing subsequent positive affective 
material, compared to volunteers in the control condition.
Fourth, replicating the dissociation literature (see Brewin, Hennessey & 
Holmes, 2004), it is predicted that participants in the emotional suppression group 
will report experiencing a higher number of intrusive thoughts and images about the 
trauma film. This will be indexed by verbalising a higher number of intrusions and 
talking about the film for longer during the stream of consciousness task and 
recording more intrusions in the week long intrusion diary, compared to volunteers in 
the control condition.
Fifth, replicating the Gross data (Gross, 1989, 2001), it is hypothesised that 
participants in the emotional suppression group will show impaired episodic memory 
for the trauma film, compared to volunteers in the control condition.
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2.1 Ethical Approval
The study was approved by the Human Psychology Experiment Research 
Ethics Committee, University of Cambridge School of Biological Sciences. In 
accordance with ethical guidelines, all participants were sent a letter describing the 
study, read an information sheet and gave written, informed consent prior to taking 
part in the experiment. They were instructed that they could withdraw from the study 
at any time and for whatever reason. Volunteers were given an honorarium of five 
pounds an hour for their time and a contribution was made towards their travel 
expenses. A copy of the ethics approval letter, the consent form, the information 
sheet, and letter written to participants are shown in Appendix 1.
2.2 Participants
2.2.1 Power Calculation
To estimate required sample size for the experiment, a power calculation was 
conducted. Power is defined as the probability of correctly rejecting a false null 
hypothesis. A majority of analyses that will be reported in this thesis will be 
independent sample t-tests/univariate F-tests, so power calculations were derived for 
this statistic. Assuming a large effect size1 and an alpha value of .05, Cohen (1988) 
suggests recruiting a sample of 26 people to have a power (d) of .80. A value of d = 
.80 would produce a type II error rate (Beta) of .20. This equates to a 1 in 5 chance of
1 For any consequences of emotional suppression found in the current study to have clinical or 
theoretical utility it was felt that the effect would need to be of a reasonably large magnitude. For this 
reason, the study was designed to detect large effect sizes. This introduces the risk that some smaller 
magnitude effects may be missed in the analysis, but these effects are unlikely to have high ecological 
validity.
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accepting the null hypothesis when it is in fact false. For this reason, the target sample 
size aimed for in the current project was 26 participants in each group. This was felt 
to ensure adequate power in the study without placing undue logistical pressures on 
the project. Further, this intended sample size was comparable to that used in the 
original Gross and Levenson (1993) study that found significant effects of expression 
suppression (21 participants in the suppress condition; 22 participants in the control 
condition).
2.2.2 Recruitment Process
Participants were recruited into the study from the Medical Research Council 
(MRC) Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (CBU) Volunteer Participant Panel. 
Volunteers were initially contacted by letter outlining the experiment and asked to opt 
into the study by returning a form. 250 letters were posted out, from which 56 people 
replied saying they were willing to take part (52 people said they did not wish to take 
part in the study, the other letters generated no response). Participants who 
provisionally agreed to take part in the study were then contacted by telephone to 
discuss the study and dates for testing arranged. A further 4 participants withdrew 
from the study at this stage. Of the remaining 52 people who agreed to participate, 48 
people attended the testing session.
To ensure that participants were not vulnerable to the potentially distressing 
emotional material used in the study, the information sheet advised participants not to 
take part if they had any mental health history. Prior to the experiment participants 
were also screened for any psychopathology. People who reported being diagnosed by 
their GP or any other mental health practitioner with a past or current diagnosis of a
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Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) condition were advised not to take part in the study. Significant 
mental health history led to two participants being excluded from the study (one with 
a history of OCD; one with a history of depression).
In addition, participants were specifically screened for history of traumatic 
reaction to life events (c.f. Hennessey, 2002). Volunteers were asked if they had ever 
encountered any of 12 common traumatic situations (derived from the Posttraumatic 
Stress Diagnostic Scale; Foa, 1995). If answering yes, further details of the event were 
taken to see whether they had experienced a reaction consistent with a diagnosis of 
PTSD. Participants reporting a PTSD-like response to these life events would have 
been advised not to take part in the experiment. No participants described a PTSD- 
like reaction.
Further, to control for current symptoms of depression or anxiety, people 
scoring on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) above ten (symptomatic range on the 
BDI as defined by Shaw, Vallis & McCabe, 1985) and people scoring more than two 
standard deviations from the mean on either scale of the Spielberger State-Trait 
anxiety inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) would also be excluded from the study. 
No participants were above clinical cut offs on these measures.
2.2.3 Final Sample Characteristics
Volunteers were all aged between 18 and 65 and were of either gender. They 
were screened for colour blindness and instructed to wear their glasses if they 
normally used them for reading or watching television. After screening, participants 
were randomly assigned to the control or suppress conditions of the experiment (n =
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23 in each condition). To ensure that the comparability of groups could be examined, 
age, gender, intelligence, and medication status were recorded. Intelligence was 
estimated using the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982) to predict 
full-scale IQ.
Two participants withdrew during the testing session (both from the 
suppression group), leaving a final sample size of 44 (23 in the control condition; 21 
in the suppress condition). It is important to note that this final sample size is smaller 
than the intended sample size generated by the power calculation, making the 
analyses reported slightly under-powered. Owing to time constraints and running out 
of available participants on the CBU panel, it was not possible to recruit a larger 
sample prior to the data collection deadline. This means that any null results should be 
interpreted cautiously, as they may reflect a lack of statistical power rather than 
genuine comparability between the two experimental conditions.
2.3 Measures
2.3.1 Rest Task
To measure baseline psychophysiology activity independent of task demands, 
participants were asked to relax for three minutes while their galvanic skin response 
(GSR) and heart rate (HR) were recorded (see section 2.4 for details of 
psychophysiology methodology). These data were then used as a baseline to compare 
with the psychophysiological response to the trauma induction, affective picture task, 
and stream of consciousness task.
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2.3.2 Emotion Regulation Training and Practice
Participants in each condition were then trained in how to to control their 
emotions during the trauma induction. Participants were shown written instructions 
for either the control or suppression condition (see Appendix 2).These instructions 
were based on those used by Jackson (2000), elaborated to give a clearer definition of 
suppression in terms of down-regulating both internal feeling and external 
expression2. Following any questions about the instructions, participants then 
practised following them while viewing a two minute segment of an American war 
film in black and white called ‘A Tale of Two Cities’, which documented the nuclear 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
After watching the practice film, volunteers were asked to rate how they were 
feeling in various ways. Participants recorded how much happiness, sadness, anger, 
surprise, fear, and disgust they experienced and also to what extent they felt helpless, 
horrified, and distressed on computerised 100 point visual analogue scales (ranging 
from 0 not at all to 100 extremely). They also rated arousal and valence of each scene 
on 9 point sliding visual analogue scales (arousal: 1 not at all arousing to 9 very 
arousing; valence: 1 very unpleasant, 5 neutral, to 9 very pleasant). GSR and HR were 
recorded to measure emotional arousal.
2 Piloting using the original Jackson (2000) suppression instructions revealed that participants found it 
hard to understand what was meant by suppression, so struggled to achieve this. To elaborate the 
definition of suppression, the reappraisal and expression suppression instructions used by Gross (1998) 
were included. Further piloting revealed that participants felt more confident following the revised 
instructions.
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2.3.3 Trauma Induction: Road Traffic Accident Video
To induce an analogue of trauma, participants then watched a 12.5 minute 
digitised trauma video of real-life footage of road traffic accidents (compiled by Steil, 
1996). The footage consisted of five traumatic scenes made up from the aftermath of 
vehicle crashes, including emergency service personnel working to extract trapped 
victims, injured victims screaming, dead bodies being moved, and body parts among 
car wreckage. Between scenes, a brief commentary provided context to each accident 
and the people involved (see Appendix 4). This film has previously been found to be 
an effective trauma induction without unduly disturbing participants (Murray, 1997; 
Brewin & Saunders, 2000; Holmes, Brewin & Hennessey, 2003). The film content is 
similar to that seen in news broadcasts of road traffic accidents or programmes about 
the work of emergency service personnel.
Participants were instructed to continue following the emotion regulation they 
had been given while they watched the film. After the film, they rated how it had 
made them feel on the same rating scales described above (see section 2.2.2). 
Volunteers were then told they could stop following the emotion regulation 
instructions. GSR and HR were recorded for the duration of each video.
To control for the potentially harmful effects of showing a film with traumatic 
content a number of steps were taken. Participants were screened prior to taking part 
and it was emphasised they could withdraw at any time during the study (see section 
2.1). All participants were encouraged to contact the experimenter should they feel 
distressed about the film, either in the week between testing sessions or after the end 
of the experiment. Depending on the degree of distress, volunteers could then be 
offered either a debriefing or a referral made to local psychological services. In
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practice, two participants withdrew from the experiment during the video. Both of 
these participants reported feeling better soon after the film and did not report any 
adverse effects at a one week telephone call follow-up, so no further action was taken.
2.3.4 Compliance With Emotion Regulation Instructions
To measure compliance with the emotion regulation instructions, participants 
completed a brief questionnaire asking them how they controlled their emotions while 
watching the film (see Appendix 3) at the end of the testing session. Participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which they attempted to suppress their emotions, tried to 
change the meaning of the material, looked away from the screen, did not pay 
attention, or deliberately thought of other things (all rated on 100 point sliding visual 
analogue scales from 0 not at all to 100 extremely).
2.3.5 Mood Monitoring: Self-Report Measures
To measure the impact of the trauma induction on emotion, participants were 
asked to rate their mood before and after watching the video. Mood ratings were taken 
both immediately pre- and post the induction and over the week before and the week 
after the induction. The following self-report measures were completed:
2.3.5.1 Week Long Mood Measures
• The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al 1961) was used as a self- 
report measure of depressive symptoms over a week long period. On each of 
21 items, four statements describe increasingly severe presentation of a given
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symptom of depression. Participants circle the response (or sometimes 
responses) that describes their mood over the past week, on a scale of 0 
(symptom absent) to 3 (symptom severe). The following cut-offs have been 
recommended for detecting depression: 0 -  9 = asymptomatic, 10 -  15 = mild 
depression, 16 -  23 = moderate depression, 24 -  63 = severe depression (Shaw 
et al., 1985). The BDI has been found to have high reliability and stability and 
has also been demonstrated to correlate highly with clinicians’ ratings of 
depression (Beck et al, 1988).
• A modified version of the trait scale from the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al, 1983) was given to measure anxiety 
symptoms over a week long period. The STAI is one of the most frequently 
used and long standing measures of anxiety. It is made up of two forms that 
generate a trait (stable propensity to experience anxiety) and a state (current 
experience of anxiety) measure. Each form has 20 statements that require 
individuals to rate how they feel on a four-point scale. Reliability and validity 
of the scale is high (Bieling et al, 1998), with test-retest reliability ranging 
from .65 to .86 and internal consistency reported to range from .83 to .92. In 
the standard version of the trait scale, participants are asked to rate how they 
generally feel. In the version used in this thesis, participants were asked to rate 
how they had felt over the past week.
• A modified version of the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) was administered to measure affective 
experience over a week long period. The PANAS measures the extent to 
which participants experience positive and negative emotions. It is made up of 
sixteen adjectives, eight of which are positive (for example, ‘excited’, ‘active)’
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and eight of which are negative (for example, ‘distressed’, ‘irritable’). In the 
standard version, participants are asked to rate to what extent they generally 
feel that way on a five point scale (1 very slightly or not at all: 5 extremely). 
Instructions were modified to ask participants to rate how they had felt over 
the past week rather than how they generally feel.
• In addition to the above scales, participants also completed a series of pen and 
paper 100 point visual analogue scales rating how much happiness, sadness, 
fear, disgust, surprise, anger, guilt, shame, helplessness, horror, terror, and 
distress they had experienced over the past week (from 1 not at all to 100 
extremely). These rating were included to make it possible to measure change 
in particular discrete emotional states that pilot work suggested the video 
induced. Further, participants rated how aroused they had felt over the past 
week (from 1 not at all to 9 extremely) and how pleasant they had felt (from 1 
very unpleasant, 5 neutral, to 9 very pleasant) over the past week. High arousal 
was defined to participants as “feeling stimulated, jittery, wide awake and/or 
alert” and low arousal was defined to participants as “feeling relaxed, calm, 
sluggish, dull and/or sleepy”. Arousal and valence measures were included to 
make it possible to index emotion change in dimensional as well as categorical 
terms. A copy of these measures is shown in Appendix 4.
2.3.5.2 State Mood Measures
• The state scale of the STAI was administered to measure anxiety symptoms
• A second modified version of the PANAS was administered to measure 
positive and negative affect. The instructions asked participants to say how 
much each adjective described their mood at that precise moment in time.
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• Modified versions of the pen and paper visual analogue mood scales were 
given to measure experience of different emotional states and to gain arousal 
and valence ratings. Instructions were altered, asking participants how they 
felt at that precise point in time rather than over the past week (see Appendix 
5).
2.3.6 Thought Monitoring: Stream of Consciousness Task
To measure the impact of emotion regulation on thought content immediately 
after the induction, participants were asked to complete a verbal stream of 
consciousness task as used in the thought suppression literatures. This task simply 
asks volunteers to speak out loud whatever is going through their mind, with their 
responses being recorded onto audio cassette using an external microphone (c.f. 
Wegner, Erber & Zanakos, 1993). To minimise participants feeling self-conscious 
verbalising their thought, the experimenter left the room while this practice was being 
performed.
To ensure participants were familiar with the demands of the task, prior to the 
trauma induction they were given written instructions (based on Wegner et al., 1993: 
see Appendix 6) and asked to complete a two minute practice. At the end of the 
practice, the experimenter checked that they had been able to complete the task and 
answered any further questions. Following the trauma induction, participants were 
reminded of the instructions and asked to repeat the stream of consciousness task over 
a five minute period. The number of intrusions about the content of the film and the 
length of time (in seconds) that people talked about the film during this time were
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then calculated by the experimenter. GSR and HR were recorded and averaged for the 
duration of the stream of consciousness task.
2.3.7 Affective Picture Task
To measure the impact of the emotion regulation condition on subsequent 
processing of emotional material, participants were shown fifty images selected from 
the International Affective Picture Set (LAPS; Lang et al, 1993) in each of the 
following categories: positive, fearful, sad, disgusting and neutral (ten of each 
category). The IAPS is a series of emotional and neutral images that have detailed 
normative rating and psychophysiological response data (for a review, see Bradley,
2000). Use of the IAPS makes it possible to measure emotional processing relatively 
unconfounded by differences in the content of material being imagined or recalled by 
participants.
The positive images incorporated pictures of people smiling, beautiful scenes 
from nature, and sports. The fearful images were made up of scenes of frightening 
animals and human attack. The sad images consisted of scenes of people crying, loss, 
deprivation, and injury. The disgusting images included pictures of decaying food, 
waste, and litter. The neutral images had pictures of common household and road-side 
objects. Figure 2.3.7.1 shows an example of an image from each category and 
Appendix 7 reproduces all of the images used. Selection of pictures for each block 
was initially based on a pilot study of ten people which identified images that 
generated a particular emotion and were rarely confused with other emotions. The 
images chosen have subsequently been validated on over 60 control participants and
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shown to reliably induce the desired discrete emotions and to generate distinct valence 
and arousal ratings as intended (Dunn et al, 2002).
Participants viewed each image for six seconds, rated how the image made 
them feel, and there was then an eight second inter-trial interval before the next image 
was shown (based on timings used by Bradley et al, 2001). Participants rated how 
much happiness, sadness, fear, and disgust they had experienced on the same 100- 
point scales and rated how arousing and pleasant each images was on the same 9-
Figure 2.3.7.1: Example Images Used in the Affective Picture Task.
Typical Fear Image Typical Disgust Image
Typical Positive ImageTypical Sad Image
Typical Neutral Image
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point scales used in the trauma induction. GSR and HR response to each image were 
also recorded.
Participants were instructed to view the pictures normally, without following 
any particular emotion regulation instructions, and to then rate how they felt as 
honestly as possible (see Appendix 8 for a copy of the instructions used). To control 
for order effects, the images were presented in a pseudo-random sequence. On each 
block of five trials, one of each image type would be randomly selected, presented, 
and then excluded from selection on subsequent trials. The task took around 30 
minutes to complete on average.
2.3.8 Intrusion Diary
To monitor the number of intrusions participants experienced about the road 
traffic accident video, they were asked to complete a daily intrusion diary for one 
week after the first testing session (c.f. Holmes, Brewin & Hennessey, 2004; Brewin 
& Saunders, 2001). Intrusions were defined as spontaneously occurring (not 
deliberate) memories or images of the film. One diary page was provided for each day 
of the following week, divided into spaces for morning, afternoon, evening, and night. 
For each intrusion experienced, participants were asked to record: a) the number of 
times it occurred; b) whether it was primarily a thought, image, or both; c) a brief 
description of the content; and d) a rating of how much distress it caused them 
(ranging from 0 not at all distressed to 100 extremely distressed). For all times where 
participants did not experience any intrusions they were asked to enter a zero. The 
total number of intrusions was counted from the diary entries by the experimenter.
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To ensure compliance with the diary, participants were instructed how to use it 
at the end of the first testing session and they were a given a cover sheet with full 
instructions and a completed example of the diary for one day (see Appendix 9).
At follow-up, participants were asked how often they had been unable or forgotten to 
complete the diary on an 11 point scale (0: not at all true; 10: extremely true; Davies 
& Clark, 1998).
2.3.9 Memory for Trauma Induction
To measure recall of the road traffic accident video at session two, participants 
completed a recognition memory questionnaire and a cued recall explicit memory 
questionnaire about the film (c.f. Hennessy, 2002). The recognition memory 
questionnaire was made up of 20 descriptions of traumatic scenes and participants had 
to judge whether that item had or had not occurred in the film. Half of the items were 
genuine and half did not occur in the video. The cued recall questionnaire was made 
up of 15 questions about specific details in the film (three from each scene). A copy 
of both measures is shown in Appendix 10.
2.4 Psychophysiological Recording and Analysis
The rationale for including psychophysiological measures of GSR and HR as 
well as the behavioural measures is that emotions are increasingly viewed as having a 
number of different component responses that can be measured by language, 
behaviour, or physiological change (e.g., Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993). 
Psychophysiological indices may be less susceptible to demand characteristics than
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self-report and less susceptible to display rules than facial expressions (Sloan et al.,
2001) and may therefore reveal a different pattern of findings. GSR and HR are two 
of the best studied psychophysiology measures, are relatively simple to record, and 
are relatively robust to artefact.
2.4.1 Galvanic Skin Response
GSR is assessed by passing a small current across two electrodes placed on the 
surface of the skin and measuring how much resistance there is. This technique was 
first used in the laboratory of Charcot over 100 years ago, both to explore differences 
in tonic skin resistance level as a diagnostic sign of illness (Vigouroux, 1879,1888) 
and to measure changes in skin resistance in response to a variety of stimuli (Fere, 
1888).
The GSR measures used today are simply the reciprocal of skin resistance, 
calculated by dividing voltage by current and in turn taking the reciprocal of this.
GSR is used as an index of a wide range of psychological concepts, including arousal, 
emotion and attention. Care needs to be taken not to assume GSR is specific to any 
one of these processes.
The physiological basis of GSR is believed to reflect activity of the eccrine 
sweat glands, which increase the amount of sweat released when we are emotionally 
or physically aroused, which in turn boosts skin conductance (see Edelberg (1993) for 
a review of the single effector model). Activity of the eccrine sweat glands is based on 
sympathetic cholinergic and adrenergic innervation (Shields et al, 1987). Control of 
this system is complex. Excitatory hypothalamic, cortical, and brainstem projections
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interacting with inhibitory projections from the hippocampus are believed to regulate 
these neurotransmitter pathways (see Dawson et al, 2000).
The advantages of GSR are that it is a relatively pure measure of sympathetic 
activity, where as heart rate is influenced by both sympathetic and parasympathetic 
activation. Further, it is easy to measure and discriminate if a response has occurred; 
cheap, easy to record, safe, and relatively insensitive to potential sources of artefact 
such as electrical noise. Its disadvantages are that it is a slow moving system so has 
limited temporal resolution, and that it is multiply determined by a range of stimuli so 
its specificity has been questioned.
A typical GSR profile is tonic response to specific stimuli being super­
imposed on a drifting phasic baseline. The current study was most interested in tonic 
response to stimuli, so activity during each trial had a pre-stimulus baseline subtracted 
from it to minimise the confounding effects of phasic activity on the signal. Further, a 
measure of GSR variability (standard deviation) during the tasks was included.
2.4.2 Cardiovascular System
Both stroke volume and heart rate influence the cardiac output of the heart. 
Stroke volume is the difference between the systolic, or relaxation, and diastolic, or 
contraction, phases of the heart. In other words, it is how much blood is pumped out 
of the heart on each contraction, which is a function of both blood pressure and 
resistance to flow in the body. Heart rate measures how frequently the heart contracts 
and is measured in beats per minute, or bpm (see Brownley et al, 2000 for a review).
Most psychophysiological studies of cardiovascular function focus on heart 
rate. Heart rate is indexed using electrocardiography, or ECG. This was first used in
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the early twentieth century (see Einthoven et al, 1913). Electrodes are placed on 
appropriate points of the body and leads go to the electrocardiograph, thus forming an 
electrical circuit between the amplifier and heart. The ECG records electrical 
impulses that stimulate the heart to make it contract. The ECG of a single cardiac 
cycle is made up of three waveforms and three intervals, of which the R-wave is the 
most easily identifiable. Heart period is the interval between the R-waves of each 
cardiac cycle and heart rate is the reciprocal of this value.
Control of the heart is influenced by both neuronal and neuroendocrine 
factors. The intrinsic rate of the heart (i.e how fast it would beat in the absence of any 
inhibitory control) is around 105 bpm but resting rate in most humans is between 60 -  
80 bpm. In particular, the vagus nerve provides neuronal constraint and an interaction 
of sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the ANS provides neurochemical and 
hormonal control. Heart rate increase can be due either to an increase of activity in the 
sympathetic division or a decrease of activity in the parasympathetic division; these 
two systems tend to be mutually antagonistic (Bemston & Cacioppo, 2000).
Heart control is largely reflexive, influenced by reflex arcs in the brain stem 
and higher level input from the limbic system and cortex. For example, in a ‘defence’ 
response cardiac output increases and peripheral resistance decreases, thus readying 
the organism for action. This is controlled by activation of the hypothalamic-adrenal 
axis and the sympathetic adrenomedullary systems (see Schneiderman & McCabe, 
1989). Interestingly, elevated activity of this system in response to stress is now 
believed to be predictive of subsequent elevated blood pressure and hypertension (for 
example see Menekes et al, 1989), both important risk factors for coronary heart 
disease (CHD).
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The advantages of rate measures of cardiovascular function are that they are 
insensitive to artefact, easy and safe to record, and are known to be sensitive to 
manipulations of a range of psychological phenomena. The disadvantage of heart rate 
is that it is hard to interpret any changes found, since increases can either reflect 
increase of the sympathetic activation or parasympathetic deactivation division of the 
autonomic nervous system.
In the current study, a variety of ways of measuring HR were used. HR does 
not linearly increase or decrease following stimulus presentation. For example, 
following exposure to fearful pictures, a triphasic pattern of response is typically seen, 
where HR initially decreases, then increases, and finally decreases again. For this 
reason, simple measures of mean HR activity are not particularly informative.
For longer term measures (video task, stream of consciousness task, rest task) 
analysis will use HR variability measures. HR variability is defined as variations in 
instantaneous heart rate over time (Bemston, Bigger, Eckberg et al., 1997). Research 
guidelines (Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology and the North 
American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology, 1996) recommend indexing HR 
variability both in terms of standard deviations between normal-normal intervals on 
the ECG (SDNN) and the square root of the mean of the sum of the square of 
differences between adjacent normal-normal intervals on the ECG (RMSSD). This 
thesis will report both of these measures.
For shorter term measures (the response to each emotional image in the 
affective picture task) component acceleration and deceleration responses will be used 
to best model the triphasic HR response (c.f. Bradley et al., 2002: see section 3.6.3 for 
more details).
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2.4.3 Psychophysiological Equipment Setup
Psychophysiological recording used a BIOP AC™ MP100 unit, with one GSR 
100B amplifier and one ECG 100B amplifier (BIOPAC, 1997). The GSR amplifier 
was set to direct current, had a sensitivity of 10 umho/V, with a 10Hz low-pass filter 
and 0.05 Hz high-pass filter. The ECG amplifier gain was set at x 2000, the R-wave 
detector was switched on, and the filter was switched off. The sampling rate was 200 
samples per second for all acquisitions, providing a temporal resolution of 5ms. The 
MP100 was connected through the Comm port to a Pentium 300 computer, which 
recorded the amplifier output using the Acqknowledge™ 8.0 software. The 
experimental tasks were presented on a separate Pentium 300 computer with a 15" 
display. This communicated with the digital input ports of the MP100 through the 
parallel port of the computer, marking when and what kind of events occurred during 
the experimental task on the Acqknowledge record. Figure 2.4.3.1 displays a 
schematic representation of the equipment setup and Figure 2.4.3.2 shows an example 
of a typical Acqknowledge Record.
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Figure 2.4.3.1: Schematic Diagram Showing How Physiological Recordings Are Taken.
Task Computer Recording Computer
MP100
GSR
ECG
Each physiological system is recorded 
as a different analogue channel by the 
MP100.
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Figure 2.4.3.2: A Typical Acqknowledge Record.
The top four channels record on-line activity o f  the physiological systems. The bottom four channels 
indicate when and what kind o f  event is occurring in the behavioural task.
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2.4.4 Electrode Placement and Attachment
To monitor heart rate (in bpm) three disposable Ag-AgCl ECG electrodes with 
clip-on shielded leads were attached to the top sides of each wrist and the right shin of 
each participant. Prior to attachment, electrode sites were cleaned with an alcohol 
wipe. To measure skin conductance (in micro-Siemens; pS) two Ag-AgCl GSR 
electrodes were attached to the volar surfaces of the medial phalanges of the first and 
second finger of the non-dominant hand. Participants were asked to wash their hands 
gently with soap and water prior to electrode attachment and BIOP AC GSR paste was 
used as the electrolyte. Choice of electrode attachment and sampling was based on 
published research guidelines for GSR (Fowles et al, 1981; Dawson et al, 2000), and 
ECG (Jennings et al, 1981; Brownley et al, 2000).
2.4.5 Psychophysiology Data Analysis
Prior to analysis all data were visually inspected for recording artefact and that 
channel excluded if artefact was present. In borderline cases, artefact was defined as 
anything greater than three standard deviations from the channel mean. The ECG 
signal was transformed to a heart rate estimate, using the Acqknowledge interval 
function.
Analysis was conducted using the Physiological Analysis System software 
(PAS; Dunn & Cusack, in preparation). This is a package developed to automate the 
event-related analysis of psychophysiological data. PAS searches through each 
Acqknowledge subject file to find when events to be analysed occurred, using the 
digital markers traced on the record. Summary measures are then calculated to
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characterise the physiological response for each event, typically mean response during 
the stimulus and mean response during a pre-stimulus baseline period. The decision 
was made to report magnitude rather than amplitude of response, owing to the 
arbitrary nature of deciding what counts as a significant threshold for a response in 
either the electrodermal or heart rate data.
The quantification of psychophysiological activity is complicated by a 
distinction drawn between phasic and tonic activity. Tonic activity is the underlying 
level of system activity when no phasic response is occurring. Superimposed on tonic 
activity are phasic changes in response to external or internal stimuli.
Wilders law of initial values (1967) argues that these components of a signal 
are not independent: if the baseline level of activity on a channel is near maximum it 
is harder to produce an event-related change than if the baseline level of activity on a 
channel is near minimum. To illustrate this point, consider measuring activity of 
zygomatic facial muscle with electromyocardography (EMG) to indicate a positive 
response to a stimulus. If the participant is already smiling widely prior to stimulus 
presentation then when the stimulus is shown there will not be a large change in the 
EMG signal because it is already close to ceiling. The interaction of phasic and tonic 
components of a signal makes the analysis of group differences in psychophysiology 
complex. Any group difference could reflect a different level of baseline activity, a 
different response to stimulus presentation, or an interaction of baseline activity and 
response to stimulus.
To ensure event related responses to stimuli were not confounded by 
underlying baseline activity, change scores were used in this thesis. This subtracts 
activity during the event from activity during a pre-event baseline period. For 
example, response to the road traffic accident video had resting state activity during
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the rest task subtracted from it, to minimise the impact of baseline differences. The 
specific psychophysiological measures taken for each experimental task will be 
outlined in more detail the results section (see chapter 3).
2.5 Procedure
Participants sat in a comfortable chair in a darkened room while completing 
the computerised tasks. They completed questionnaire measures in an adjacent testing 
cubicle. All computerised tasks were programmed in Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 
(Microsoft, 2000), run on a PC, and presented on a 17” TFT flat screen monitor.
Tasks were piloted prior to testing to check for programming bugs and experimenter 
error.
Testing took place over two sessions, separated by one week. In session one 
(lasting around two hours), a number of baseline measures were taken, participants 
were instructed how to regulate their emotions and then viewed a trauma induction, 
and the impact this induction had on mood and memory immediately afterwards was 
measured. Participants’ psychophysiological responses were recorded during 
performance of the experimental tasks during the session. In the week between 
sessions one and two, volunteers were asked to keep a daily diary of any thoughts 
they had about the trauma induction (taking around five minutes per day). In session 
two (lasting around thirty minutes), participants’ diaries were reviewed, their memory 
for the trauma video assessed, and the impact of the trauma induction on their mood 
over the past week assessed. Participants completed the tasks in the following fixed 
order:
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2.5.1 Session One
• Screening
• Baseline mood measures: past week and current time
• Rest psychophysiology task
• Practice stream of consciousness task
• Practice film (Nagasaki bombing)
• Trauma induction (RTA Video)
• Test stream of consciousness task
• Test mood measures: current time
• Affective Picture Task
• Compliance with emotion regulation instructions
• Instructions given for intrusion diary
2.5.2 Session Two
• Test mood measures: past week
• Cued-Recall Memory Questionnaire
• Recognition Memory Questionnaire
• Review intrusion diary
• Diary compliance rating
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2.6 Statistical Issues
Statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS 8.0 For Windows (SPSS Inc, 
1997). Prior to analysis all variables were explored to check they met the normality 
and homogeneity of variance and sphericity assumptions of parametric statistics (see 
Howell, 1992). If the data were positively skewed a natural log transform was applied 
and if the data were negatively skewed a reciprocal natural log transform was applied. 
Where transformed data have been used this is highlighted in the analysis; all other 
analyses are carried out on raw data.
In some cases transformation failed to normalise variables; in this instance 
both parametric and the closest non-parametric equivalent analyses are run and 
reported on raw data. Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) output 
usually reports the within-participants rather than multivariate output. The exception 
to this is where sphericity was violated and multivariate output was then reported. 
Vasey and Thayer (1987) discuss how multivariate output is much less prone to 
elevation of a type I error when sphericity is violated. An alpha value of .05 was used 
to indicate significance and an alpha value of .1 to indicate a trend. The decision was 
made not to correct for multiple comparisons in the analysis section, as all of the 
contrasts were based on a priori hypotheses.
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3.1 Examining Comparability of Conditions
To check that the participants in each group were comparable, a series of 
independent samples t-tests and chi squared tests were run on key demographic, 
mood, and resting state psychophysiology variables.
3.1.1 Demographic Variables
Table 3.1.1.1 summarises demographic variables of participants assigned to 
the suppression and control conditions. There was no difference between groups for 
age, gender ratio, or NART full scale IQ estimate, suggesting the groups were 
comparable on these variables.
Table 3.1.1.1: Demographic Comparison o f  Participants in Control and Suppress Conditions.
Variable Suppress 
Condition 
(n = 21)
Control 
Condition 
(n »  23)
Statistical Comparison
Age 35.43 (16.38) 33.26(16.48) t (1 ,4 2 ) = 0.44, p = 0 .6 6 a
Gender Ratio 14 f : 9 m 16 f : 5 m Chi (1, 42) = 1.19, p = 0.34
NART full scale IQ estimate 117.97(4.79) 119.10(3.47) t (1 ,3 8 ) = 0.87, p = 0.39 b
Data are mean (standard deviation) values: NART = National Adult Reading Test 
a: Age was significantly positively skewed and could not be corrected by log transformation. Non- 
parametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-test found identical non-significant results, 
b: Four participants reported having seen the NART word list before, so their error scores were
excluded (1 in the control group; 3 in the suppress group).
3.1.2 Mood V ariables
Table 3.1.2.1 measures the mean rating of state mood prior to the trauma 
induction for each group. Independent samples t-tests found that the suppress and
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control conditions were comparable on all measures. Identical results were found 
using non-parametric Mann Whitney U-tests to control for non-normality.
Table 3.1.2.1: Mood Measures Immediately Prior to Trauma Induction in the Suppress and Control 
Conditions.
Variable Suppress 
Condition 
(n = 21)
Control
Condition
(n = 23)
Statistical Comparison
Happiness 68.60(19.39) 67.08(17.22) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.28, p = 0.78
Sadness 12.14(18.53) 8.93(11.75) t (1, 42) = 0.69, p = 0 .4 9 8
Fear 8.06(13.33) 6.78 (8.38) t (1 ,4 2 ) = 0.38, p = 0.70 a
Disgust 2.51 (4.21) 3.01 (3.08) t (1, 42) = 0.45, p = 0.66 8
Surprise 6.44(15.43) 4.35 (5.03) t (1, 42) =0.62 , p = 0.54 8
Anger 3.51 (5.80) 2.72 (3.59) t (1, 42) = 0.55, p = 0.59 8
Guilt 2.62 (3.96) 2.72 (3.60) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.09, p = 0.93 8
Shame 1.73 (2.10) 3.54 (5.47) t (1 ,4 2 )=  1.42, p = 0.16 8
Helplessness 5.76(11.89) 3.44 (4.01) t (1, 42) = 0.88, p = 0.38 8
Horror 2.15(2 .66) 2.91 (3.27) t (1 ,42 ) =0.85 , p = 0.40 8
Distress 3.19(4.17) 3.78 (4.73) t (1, 42) =0.43 , p = 0.67 8
Arousal 5.81 (1.75) 5.74(1.66) t (1 ,42 ) = 0 .14 , p = 0.89 8
Valence 6.24(1 .34) 6.26(1.18) t (1 ,42 ) =0 .06 , p = 0.95 8
PANAS -  positive 30.52 (7.17) 29.87 (6.27) t (1 ,42) =0 .32 , p = 0.75
PANAS -  negative 12.19(3.22) 12.39 (2.19) t (1 ,42 ) =0.24 , p = 0 .818
STAI -  state anxiety 32.09 (4.97) 31.83 (4.70) t (1 ,42 ) =0 .19 , p = 0.85
Data are mean (standard deviation) values
Emotional experience rated on 100 point scale, from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
Valence rated on 9 point scale, from 1 (unpleasant) to 5 (neutral) to 9 (pleasant).
Arousal rated on a 9 point scale, from 1 (low) to 9 (high).
PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale; STAI = Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory, 
a: These variables were significantly positively skewed and could not be corrected by transformation. 
Non-parametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-test found identical non-significant results.
Table 3.1.2.2 plots the mean rating of mood over the week prior to the trauma 
induction for each group. Again, independent samples t-tests found that the suppress
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and control conditions were comparable on all measures, which was also supported by 
non-parametric Mann Whitney U-tests to control for non-normality.
Table 3.1.2.2: Mood Measures for Week Prior to the Trauma Induction in the Suppress and Control 
Conditions.
Variable Suppress 
Condition 
(n = 21)
Control 
Condition 
(n = 23)
Statistical Comparison
Happiness 70.50(18.24) 72.78(15.84) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.42 , p = 0.55 8
Sadness 26.51 (27.33) 22.22(16.95) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.59 , p = 0 .568
Fear 10.85 (13.97) 15.06(19.84) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.76, p = 0 .4 5 8
Disgust 10.46(16.78) 7.65 (7.40) t (1 ,42) =0 .68 , p = 0 .508
Surprise 32.16(26.54) 30.86 (23.00) t (1, 42) =0.16 , p = 0 .878
Anger 19.23 (20.44) 18.21 (14.49) t (1 ,42) = 0.18, p = 0 .86a
Guilt 8.71 (14.93) 11.79(12.96) t (1 ,42) =0 .69 , p = 0 .5 0 8
Shame 5.72(14.10) 7.78(14.06) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.46 , p = 0.65 8
Helplessness 15.46 (21.94) 15.93 (25.56) t (1, 42) = 0.06, p = 0 .958
Horror 9.10(20.55) 6.30 (5.76) t (1 ,42 ) = 0 .58 , p = 0 .958
Distress 9.88(12.33) 11.85(18.12) t (1 ,42) = 0.40 , p = 0 .6 9 8
Arousal 6.21 (1.81) 6.05(1.40) t (1 ,42 ) =0.31 , p = 0 .768
Valence 6.11 (1.41) 6.80(1.20) t (1, 42) = 1.66, p = 0.11 8
PANAS -  positive 33.79 (7.05) 32.40 (7.00) t (1, 42) = 0.62, p = 0.54
PANAS -  negative 15.84 (3.80) 16.60 (3.98) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.61 , p = 0 .558
STAI -  trait anxiety 10.67 (3.38) 11.50 (2.95) t (1 ,42 ) = 0 .39 , p = 0 .70a
BDI 3.33 (2.95) 3.91 (2.95) t (1, 42) = 0.65, p = 0.52
Data are mean (standard deviation) values.
Emotional experience rated on 100 point scale, from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
Valence rated on 9 point scale, from 1 (unpleasant) to 5 (neutral) to 9 (pleasant).
Arousal rated on a 9 point scale, from 1 (low) to 9 (high).
PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale; STAI = Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory; 
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory.
a: These variables were significantly positively skewed and could not be corrected by transformation. 
Non-parametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-test found identical non-significant results.
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3.1.3 Rest Psychophysiology Task
Table 3.1.3.1 shows the psychophysiological response of participants in each 
condition during the three-minute resting task. Both independent samples t-tests and 
non-parametric Mann Whitney U-tests found there were no significant differences 
between the suppress and control conditions on any of the measures of GSR or HR, 
suggesting they are comparable in terms of baseline psychophysiological activity.
Table 3.1.3.1: Psychophysiological Response during the Rest Task in the Control and Suppress 
Conditions.
Variable Suppress 
Condition 
(n = 21 )
Control 
Condition 
(n = 23)
Statistical Comparison
GSR 1.38(0.74) 1.33 (0.57)
eo00
©IID.
<N©IIrTTt
GSR Variability (SDNN) 0.11 (0.11) 0.07 (0.05) t (1 ,4 2 ) = 1.26, p =  0 .2 2 a
Heart Rate 70.17(2.11) 70.47(10.22) t (1,42) = 0.10, p =  0.92
HR Variability 1 (SDNN) 0.07 (0.04) 0.08 (0.07) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.13, p =  0 .9 0 a
HR Variability 2 (RMSSD) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) t (1,42) = 0.80, p =  0.43 8
Data are mean (standard deviation) values.
GSR = galvanic skin response; HR = heart rate
SDNN = standard deviation o f  the normal-normal interval.
RMSSD = square root o f  the mean squared differences o f  successive NN intervals.
HR measured in beats per minute (bpm); GSR measured in micro-siemens.
a: These variables were significantly non-normal and could not be corrected by transformation. Non- 
parametric analysis using Mann-Whitney U-tests found identical non-significant results.
3.2 Trauma Induction
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the emotional suppression group will show a decrease in 
experienced negative affect but an increase in psychophysiological response while 
viewing the trauma film, compared to volunteers in the control condition.
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3.2.1 Compliance with Emotion Regulation Instructions
Table 3.2.1.1 records the mean ratings for the suppression and control 
conditions concerning the extent to which participants suppressed, reappraised, 
looked away, did not pay attention, or deliberately thought of other things while 
watching the films.
Table 3.2.1.1: Use o f Emotion Regulation Strategies during the Test Film by the Suppression and 
Control Groups.
Variable Suppress
Condition
(n = 21)
Control 
Condition 
(n *  23)
Statistical Comparison
Suppressed 60.15(31.70) 35.81 (28.43) t (1,42) = 2.69, P = 0.01**
Reappraised 30.21 (30.88) 21.13(20.65) t (1 ,42)=  1.16, P = 0.25 8
Looked Away 3.36 (4.40) 4.54 (4.57) t (1,42) = 0.87, P = 0 .3 9 8
Did not pay Attention 14.87(17.94) 12.29(12.75) t (1,42) = 0.56, P = 0 .5 8 8
Thought o f  Other Things 13.82 (28.18) 6.30 (6.67) t (1 ,42)=  1.24, P = 0 .2 2 8
Data are mean (standard deviation) values.
Use o f  strategies was rated on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
* = significant at P < .05.
a: These variables were significantly non-normal and could not be corrected by transformation. Non- 
parametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-test found an identical pattern o f  results.
Independent samples t-tests found that the suppress group, as planned, made 
significantly greater use of the suppression strategy but did not differ in use of the 
other emotion regulation strategies. Both groups made moderate use of reappraisal as 
a mood regulation strategy but reported little use of looking away, not paying 
attention, and deliberately thinking of other things. These results suggest that the 
participants were compliant with the instructions presented to them. Again, an 
identical pattern of results emerged in the non-parametric analysis.
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3.2.2 Response to Road Traffic Accident Video
The following section presents participants emotional responses while 
watching the road traffic accident video, measured in terms of both self-report and 
psychophysiology. This is intended to measure the emotion elicited directly by the 
video.
3.2.2.1 Self-Report Data
To control for differences in pre-induction state and trait emotional reactivity, 
it was decided to measure emotional response to the film relative to pre-experimental 
mood measures. Difference scores were computed, subtracting the pre-induction state 
measures of emotions from the comparable emotional ratings of the trauma induction 
video. Analyses reported below look at how experimental condition influenced these 
emotional change scores.
Figure 3.2.2.1 shows changes in basic emotion ratings following the trauma 
induction film by the suppression and control groups. Pilot work (Dalgleish & 
Schartau, 2004) showed that the predominant basic emotions induced by the road 
traffic accident video were an increase in sadness, fear and disgust and a decrease in 
happiness. These variables were therefore entered into a multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA), with Emotion (sadness, fear, disgust, happiness [reverse 
scored]) as the within-subjects factor and Condition (suppress, control) as the between 
subjects-factor. This found no difference between conditions in overall emotional 
change, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.95, F (4, 39) = 0.05, p = 0.73.
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Further, independent samples t-tests also demonstrated no significant effect of 
Condition on happiness, t (1, 42) = 0.64, p = 0.52, fear, t (1,42) = 1.20, p = 0.24, 
sadness, t (1, 42) = 0.47, p = 0.64, disgust, t (1, 42) = 0.93, p = 0.36, anger, t (1, 42) = 
0.25, p = 0.80, or surprise, t (1,42) = 0.32, p = 0.75, ratings. Identical results 
emerged in non-parametric Mann Whitney U-tests.
Participants overall reported experiencing a high increase in levels of sadness, 
a medium increase in levels of disgust, fear, anger, and surprise, and a reduction in 
levels of happiness after watching the video, but this did not vary as a function of 
group.
Figure 3.2.2.1: Change in Self-Report Ratings o f Basic Emotions After Watching the Trauma Induction 
Film in the Suppression and Control Groups.
□ control 
m suppress
Emotion
Data are mean (standard error o f the mean) values.
Figure 3.2.2.2 plots the change in arousal and valence ratings following the 
trauma induction film by each group. Independent samples t-tests found no difference 
between conditions for either valence ratings, t (1, 42) = 0.93, p = 0.36, or arousal
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ratings, t (1, 42) = 0.47, p = 0.64. Identical non-significant results emerged in the non- 
parametric analysis. Both groups reported feeling significantly less pleasant following 
the video but described little change in arousal.
Figure 3.2.2.2: Change in Arousal and Valence Ratings Following the Trauma Induction Film in the 
Suppression and Control Groups.
□ control
□ suppress
Rating
Data are mean (standard error o f the mean) values
Figure 3.2.2.3 plots the change in helplessness, horror and distress self-report 
ratings following the trauma induction film in each group. Independent samples t-tests 
found no difference between conditions for helplessness, t (1, 42) = 0.11, p = 0.91, 
horror, t (1,42) = 0.58, p = 0.56, or distress, t (1, 42) = 0.50, p = 0.62. Identical results 
emerged using non-parametric Mann Whitney U-tests to control for non-normality. 
Both groups reported experiencing an increase in levels of helplessness, horror, and 
distress following the video.
86
Chapter 3: Results
Figure 3.2.2.3: Change in Helplessness, Horror and Distress Self-Report Ratings Following the Trauma 
Induction Film in the Suppression and Control Groups.
□ control 
m suppress
Emotion
Data are mean (standard error o f the mean) values 
3.2.2.2 Psychophysiology Data
To control for tonic differences in baseline physiological reactivity, a 
difference score was created by subtracting the response during the rest task from 
response during the video for each psychophysiological index. These differences 
scores were then compared for each group using independent samples t-tests (see 
Table 3.2.2.1). The only significant difference between conditions was for the 
RMSSD measure of HR variability, where the suppression group showed greater 
variability relative to rest whereas the control group showed lesser variability relative 
to rest while watching the video.
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Table 3.2.2.2: Psychophysiology Response to the Trauma Induction Film, Relative to the Rest Task, in 
the Suppression and Control Groups.
Variable Suppress 
Condition 
(n = 21)
Control
: *\ * j  4 '[ 
Condition
( n - 2 3 )
Statistical Comparison
GSR 0.20 (0.51) 0.10(0.16) t (1, 42) = 0.85, p = 0.40
GSR Variability (SDNN) 0.04 (0.12) 0.03 (0.05) t (1, 42) = 0.19, p = 0.85
HR 1.95 (5.60) 1.11 (3.20) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.61, p = 0.54
HR variability 1 (SDNN) 0.24(1.03) -0.10(0.05) t (1 ,4 2 )=  1.17, p = 0.25
HR variability 2 (RMSSD) 0.0030 (0.00509) -0.0006 (0.00624) t ( 1,42) = 2.06, p = 0.05
Data are mean (standard deviation) values.
GSR = galvanic skin response; HR = heart rate.
SDNN = standard deviation o f  the normal-normal interval.
RMSSD = square root o f  the mean squared differences o f  successive NN intervals.
HR measured in beats per minute (bpm); GSR measured in micro-siemens.
Difference scores are reported, where activity during the rest task was subtracted from activity during 
the video.
3.3 Mood Change Following Trauma Induction
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the emotional suppression group will show a subsequent 
increase in negative mood and a decrease in positive mood, compared to volunteers in 
the control condition.
The following sections present data on participants’ free floating mood in the 
five minute period after watching the video and in the week following watching the 
video. It is important to contrast this analysis of the subsequent impact on mood 
having watched the video with the results presented in section 3.2, which looked at 
the concurrent emotions induced while watching the video.
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3.3.1 Mood immediately pre- and post-induction
To measure impact of the trauma induction on mood, differences scores were 
computed by subtracting the pre-induction rating from the post-induction ratings for 
each variable. Figure 3.3.1.1 plots the difference in ratings of the basic emotions in 
each group. As with the video data, a MANOVA was run on the emotions that pilot 
work (Dalgleish & Schartau, 2004) found the video reliably induced. Emotion 
(sadness, fear, disgust, happiness [reverse scored]) was used as the within-subjects 
factor and Condition (suppress, control) was used as the between subjects-factor.
This found no overall difference between conditions in immediate mood change, 
Wilks’ Lambda = 0.97, F (4, 39) = 0.35, p = 0.84. Similarly, independent samples t- 
tests found no difference between conditions for happiness, t (1,42) = 1.07, p = 0.29, 
sadness, t (1,42) = 0.73, p = 0.47, fear, t (1,42) = 0.03, p = 0.98, disgust, t (1,42) = 
0.05, p = 0.96, surprise, t (1,42) = 0.31, p = 0.76, or anger, t (1,42) = 0.10, p = 0.92. 
Identical results emerged in non-parametric analysis using Mann Whitney U-test. 
Participants in both groups reported experiencing less happiness and more of the 
negative emotions five-minutes post-induction, relative to pre-induction.
Figure 3.3.1.2 shows the difference in arousal and valence ratings in each 
condition. Arousal and valence ratings were compared pre- and post- the induction 
using independent samples t-tests. There were no differences between the conditions 
in terms of valence, t (1,42) = 0.87, p = 0.39, or arousal, t (1,42) = 0.34, p = 0.73. An 
identical pattern of results emerged using non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-tests to 
control for non-normality. Both groups reported feeling much less pleasant and 
slightly less aroused five minutes post-induction, relative to pre-induction.
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Figure 3.3.1.1: Difference in Self-Report o f  Experience o f  Basic Emotions Immediately Pre- and Post- 
Trauma Induction in each Condition.
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Data are mean (standard error o f the mean) values.
Emotional experience rated on a 100 point scale, from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely) pre- and post 
induction. This graph shows the difference between these ratings.
Figure 3.3.1.2: Difference in Arousal and Valence Ratings Immediately Pre- and Post- Induction in 
each Condition.
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Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values.
Arousal rated on a 9 point scale, from 0 low to 9 high; valence rated on a 9 point scale, from 0 (very 
unpleasant) to 9 (very unpleasant). This graph shows difference in these ratings pre- and post­
induction.
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Table 3.3.1.1 records difference in ratings of other emotional states in the two 
samples. There were no significant differences between participants in the suppress 
and control conditions. Participants in both groups reported reduced positive 
emotional experience and increased negative emotional experience five minutes post­
induction, relative to pre-induction.
Table 3.3.1.1: Difference Between Ratings o f  Other Emotional States Immediately Pre- and Post- 
Trauma Induction For the Suppress and Control Conditions.
Variable Suppress 
Condition 
(n = 21)
Control 
Condition 
(n = 23)
Statistical Comparison
Guilt 8.16(18.73) 5.56 (8.89) t (1 ,4 2 ) = 0.60, p = 0.55 8
Shame 10.35(17.80) 3.56 (8.71) t (1, 42) 1.63, p = 0.11 a
Helplessness 24.42 (28.62) 24.80 (28.6) t (1 ,4 2 ) = 0.04, p = 0 .9 7 8
Horror 22.67 (31.08) 25.64 (27.27) t (1 ,4 2 ) = 0.34, p = 0 .7 4 8
PANAS positive affect -8.23 (10.76) -6.09 (9.58) t (1, 42) = 0.70, p = 0 .4 9 8
PANAS negative affect 2.43 (8.19) 3.43 (6.94) t (1, 42) = 0.44, p = 0.66 8
STAI state anxiety 10.52 (9.83) 10.78(11.89) t (1, 42) = 0.08, p = 0 .9 4 8
Data are mean (standard deviation) values.
PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale: STAI = Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
All emotions were originally rated on 100 point scale (from 0 emotion not experienced to 100 emotion 
experienced extremely). Scores reported here are the difference between immediately pre- and post 
trauma induction ratings.
a: These variables were significantly non-normal and could not be corrected by transformation. Non- 
parametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-test found an identical pattern o f  results.
3.3.2 Mood over week prior- and post- experiment
A number of participants’ data were missing in the analyses reported below, as 
they did not attend the follow-up session (three in the control group; three in the 
suppress group) or had not completed all of the measures given to them (two in the 
control group; one in the suppress group). This meant the samples consisted of 18 in
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the control group and 17 in the suppress group. As with the immediate mood data, 
week-long mood differences scores were computed by subtracting the pre-induction 
from the post-induction ratings for each variable.
Figure 3.3.2.1 plots the difference in ratings of the basic emotions in each 
group. As with the immediate mood change data, MANOVA was conducted on the 
emotions the video was known to induce. The between-subjects factor was Emotion 
(fear, sadness, disgust, happiness [reverse scored]) and the within-subjects factor was 
Condition (suppress, control). This found no overall difference in emotion change 
between the two groups, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.98, F (4, 30) = 0.14, p = 0.97. Similarly, 
independent samples t-tests found no difference in change in happiness, t (1, 33) = 
0.05, p = 0.96, sadness, t (1, 33) = 0.65, p = 0.52, fear, t (1, 33) = 0.18, p = 0.86, 
disgust, t (1, 33) = 0.57, p = 0.58, surprise, t (1, 33) = 0.46, p = 0.65, or anger, t (1, 
33) = 1.33, p = 0.19, in the week after the induction. Identical non-significant results 
emerged from the non-parametric analysis.
Figure 3.3.2.1: Difference in Self-Report o f  Experience o f  Basic Emotions in Week Pre- and Post- 
Trauma Induction in each Condition.
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Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values. Emotional experience rated on a 100 point scale, 
from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely) pre- and post- induction. This graph shows the difference 
between these ratings.
92
Chapter 3: Results
Participants in both groups tended to report no change or a decrease in their 
experience of the basic emotions in the week after the experiment, compared to the 
week before. There was a larger reduction in reports of surprise than the other 
emotions.
Figure 3.3.2.2 plots the difference in arousal and valence ratings for each 
condition. These were contrasted using independent samples t-tests. These found no 
difference between conditions for arousal, t (1, 33) = 1.63, p = 0.11, or valence, t (1, 
33) = 0.58, p = 0.57. Identical non-significant results were found using non- 
parametric Mann Whitney U-tests to control for non-normality.
Figure 3.3.2.2: Difference in Arousal and Valence Ratings in Week Pre- and Post- Induction in each 
Condition.
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Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values.
Arousal rated on a 9 point scale, from 0 (low) to 9 (high); valence rated on a 9 point scale, from 0 (very 
unpleasant) to 9 (very unpleasant). This graph shows difference in these ratings pre- and post­
induction.
Table 3.3.2.1 plots the difference in the other emotional ratings for suppress 
and control conditions, which were again compared using independent samples t-tests. 
The suppress group showed a slight increase in BDI ratings in the week after the
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induction, whereas the control group showed a slight reduction. This effect was still 
present as a trend in the non-parametric analysis using a Mann Whitney U-test.
Table 3.3.2.1: Difference in Ratings o f Other Emotional States in Week Pre- and Post- Trauma 
Induction for the Suppress and Control Conditions.
Variable Suppress Control Statistical Comparison
Condition Condition
( n -  17) (n -  18)
Guilt -1.87(12.30) -4.73 (9.88) t (1, 33) = 0.76, p = 0.45 8
Shame 1.84 (8.01) -1.80 (5.61) t (1, 33) =  1.56, p = 0.13 8
Helplessness 7.48 (29.40) -6.71 (24.43) t (1, 33) = 1.56, p = 0.13 a
Horror -2.55 (7.91) -1.62 (6.87) t (  1, 33) = 0.37, p = 0.71 8
PANAS positive affect -1.06 (9.01) -1.87 (6.53) t (1, 33) = 0.30, p = 0.77
PANAS negative affect -1.31 (4.14) -3.06(4.68) t (1, 33) =  1.14, p = 0.26
STAI trait anxiety -2.00 (7.65) -2.94 (4.62) t (1, 33) = 0.44, p = 0 .6 6 8
BDI 0.74 (2.64) -0.90 (2.53) t (1, 33) = 2.01, p = 0.05* *
Data are mean (standard deviation) values.
All emotions were originally rated on 100 point scale (from 0 emotion not experienced to 100 emotion 
experienced extremely).
Scores reported here are the difference between pre- and post trauma induction weekly ratings.
* = significant at p < .05
PANAS = Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale; STAI = Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory; 
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory
a: These variables were significantly non-normal and could not be corrected by transformation. Non- 
parametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-test found an identical pattern o f  results, except that the 
significant difference on BDI between groups had become a trend: z (1, 33) = 1.87, p = 0.06.
94
Chapter 3: Results
3.4 Verbal Stream of Consciousness Task
Hypothesis 4: Participants in the emotional suppression group will report 
experiencing a higher number of intrusive thoughts and images about the trauma film, 
compared to volunteers in the control condition.
3.4.1 Audio Tape Data
Due to equipment failure (a tape was damaged when it became stuck in the 
recorder), three participants’ data from each condition were lost. In the analyses 
reported below there are therefore 20 participants in the control condition and 18 
participants in the suppress condition. Figure 3.5.1.1 plots the mean number of 
intrusions related to the content of the trauma induction verbalised in the five-minute 
stream of consciousness task by participants in the suppress and control conditions. 
Intrusions were defined as any verbalisation of specific content of the video, either in 
thought or image form (for example,61 am seeing the student in scene five being 
ventilated’, ‘I am thinking about the bodies being thrown into the temporary coffin’). 
Non-specific references to the video content were not scored as intrusion (for 
example, ‘I am picturing the road traffic accidents’, ‘I am thinking about emergency 
service personnel’). These data were interpreted by the experimenter and were not 
double-scored.
Independent samples t-test analysis found a trend in the direction of the 
suppress group to report fewer intrusions than the control group, t (1,36) = 1.94, p = 0 
.06. An identical trend emerged in the non-parametric analysis.
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Figure 3.4.1.1: Number o f  Content Related Intrusions about the Trauma Induction during the Stream o f  
Consciousness Task Reported by the Suppress and Control Conditions.
Group
Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values.
Figure 3.4.1.2 plots the length of time (in seconds) spent talking about the 
content of the trauma induction in the five minute stream of consciousness task by 
participants in the suppress and control conditions. Induction related material was 
classified as any utterances about the content of the video (for example, ‘the dead 
body in the coffin was disgusting’) how participants felt while watching the video (for 
example, ‘it was not as bad as I was expecting’), how it related to their own 
experience of road traffic accidents (for example, ‘it reminded me of a similar 
accident I was in’), and the broader meaning of road traffic accidents (for example, ‘I 
will drive more carefully now’). Again, these data were not double-scored. 
Independent samples t-test analysis found no significant difference between 
conditions, t (1, 36) = 1.09, p = 0.29. A similar non-significant pattern emerged in 
non-parametric analysis.
96
Chapter 3: Results
Figure 3.4.1.2: Length o f Time Spent Talking About the Trauma Induction During the Stream o f  
Consciousness Task by the Suppress and Control Conditions.
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3.4.2 Psychophysiology Data
As with the video psychophysiology data, to control for the potentially 
contaminating effects of tonic activity on phasic response, the difference between 
psychophysiology response during the auditory stream of consciousness task and the 
rest task was computed (see Table 3.4.2.1). Again, one participants’ data from the 
suppress condition and four participants’ data from the control condition were missing 
due to either equipment failure or artefact in the psychophysiology data. This meant 
the sample consisted of 19 in the control group and 20 in the suppress group. 
Independent samples t-tests found no difference in psychophysiology response across 
conditions and a similar pattern emerged for the non-parametric analysis.
Group
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Table 3.4.2.1: Psychophysiology Response during the Auditory Stream o f Consciousness Task, 
Relative to the Rest Task, in the Suppression and Control Groups.
Variable Suppress 
Condition 
(n =  20)
Control 
Condition 
(n = 19)
Statistical Comparison
■ Vy , . y ■ ' S -  * L «  , ’ , ' < *
GSR 0.51 (0.64) 0.41 (0.40) t (1, 37) = 0.58, p = 0.57
GSR Variability (SDNN) 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.04) t (1,37) = 0.01, p = 0 .99a
HR 10.73 (16.28) 10.19(11.76) t (1, 37) = 0.12, p = 0.91
HR variability 1 (SDNN) 0.07 (0.09) 0.05 (0.05) t (1, 37) = 0.91, p = 0.37
HR variability 2 (RMSSD) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) t (1, 37) = 0.99, p = 0.33
Data are mean (standard deviation) values.
Difference scores are reported, where activity during the rest task was subtracted from activity during 
the stream o f consciousness task.
GSR -  galvanic skin response; HR = heart rate.
SDNN = standard deviation o f  the normal-normal interval.
RMSSD = square root o f  the mean squared differences o f  successive NN intervals.
HR measured in beats per minute (bpm); GSR measured in micro-siemens, 
a: GSR variability was significantly non-normal for the control group and could not be corrected by 
transformation. Non-parametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-test also found no significant 
effect o f  condition.
3.5 Subsequent Emotional Processing: Affective Picture Task
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the emotional suppression group will show an elevated 
self-report and psychophysiological emotional response when viewing subsequent 
negative affective material and a decreased self-report and psychophysiological 
emotional response when viewing subsequent positive affective material, compared to 
volunteers in the control condition.
3.5.1 Self-Report of Experience of Emotions
Emotional responses to the affective images were analysed using the neutral 
pictures as a baseline to control for differences in orienting response to images or how
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the ratings scales were used between conditions. Emotion ratings for each of the four 
emotional picture blocks each had the comparable rating for the neutral picture block 
subtracted from them. These differences scores were then analysed using 4 by 2 
repeated measures ANOVAs for each emotional image class, with Emotion 
(happiness, sadness, fear, disgust [relative to neutral]) as the within-subjects factor 
and Condition (suppression, control) as the between-subjects factor. Analysis of the 
neutral pictures will first be reported to demonstrate that there were no effects of 
condition on these ratings.
Table 3.5.1.1 reports the emotional ratings of the neutral images by the 
suppress and control groups.
Table 3.5.1.1: Emotional Ratings o f the Neutral Images by the Suppress and Control Conditions.
Rating Suppress 
Condition 
(n = 23)
Control 
Condition 
(n = 21)
Statistical Comparison
Happiness 12.51 (12.32) 9.51 (12.15) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.81, p = 0.42 a
Sadness 3.95(4.41) 3.07 (3.33) t (1 ,42 ) = 0.76, p = 0 .4 6 a
Fear 3.39 (4.40) 2.85 (2.23) t (1, 42) = 0.52, p = 0.61 8
Disgust 3.30 (4.58) 2.75 (3.68) t (1 ,4 2 ) = 0.44, p = 0 .6 6 a
Arousal 2.60(1.48) 1.97(1.22) t (1, 42) = 1.55, p = 0.13 8
Valence 4.85 (0.46) 4.97 (0.49) t (1, 42) = 0.85, p = 0 .4 0 a
Data are mean (standard deviation) values.
Happiness, sadness, fear and disgust experience rated on 100 point scales, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 
100 (extremely); valence rated on a point scale, from 1 (unpleasant) to 5 (neutral) to 9 (pleasant); 
arousal rated on a 9 point scale, from 1 (low) to 9 (high)
a: These variables were significantly non-normal and could not be corrected by transformation. Non- 
parametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-test also found no significant effect o f  condition.
A series of independent samples t-tests found there was no effect of condition 
on emotional response to the neutral images, a pattern which was replicated with non- 
parametric analyses. Repeated measures ANOVA with Emotion (happiness, sadness,
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fear, disgust) as the within-subjects factor and Condition (control, suppress) as the 
between-subjects factor was used to explore whether there was any interaction 
amongst the emotional ratings of the neutral images. A significant effect of Emotion,
F (3,126) = 23.07, p < .01, no Emotion by Condition interaction, F (3,126) = 0.53, p 
= 0.67, and no main effect of Condition, F (1,42) = 0.64, p = 0.43, was found. Both 
groups rated the neutral images as inducing small amounts of happiness and very little 
negative affect. Further all participants tended to rate the images as inducing little 
arousal and of neutral valence.
Figure 3.5.1.1 shows the mean amount of each emotion reported for positive 
pictures by the suppress and control groups.
Figure 3.5 .1 .1: Emotional Ratings o f  Positive Images by the Control and Suppress Groups.
□ control
□ suppress
Emotion
Data are mean (standard error o f the mean values).
Analysis revealed a significant effect of Emotion, F (3, 126) = 166.39, P < 
0.01, no Emotion by Condition interaction, F (3,126) = 0.16, p = 0.93, and no main 
effect of Condition, F (1, 42) = 0.02, p = 0.89. Participants in both conditions tended 
to rate the positive images as inducing medium amounts of happiness but little
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sadness, fear or disgust (relative to ratings of neutral conditions), but this pattern was 
not mediated by being in the suppress or control conditions.
Figure 3.5.1.2 shows the mean amount of each emotion reported for fearful 
pictures by the suppress and control groups. Repeated measures ANOVA found a 
significant effect of Emotion, F (3, 126) = 59.27, p < .01, no Emotion by Condition 
interaction, F (3, 126) = 0.66, p = 0.58, and no main effect of Condition, F (1, 42) = 
0.05, p = 0.82. The fearful images induced a medium amount of fear, small amounts 
of disgust and sadness, and negative amounts of happiness (relative to the neutral 
images), but there was no difference in these ratings between the suppress and control 
conditions.
Figure 3.5.1.2: Emotion Ratings o f  the Fearful Images by the Suppress and Control Conditions.
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Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean values)
Figure 3.5.1.3 shows the mean amount of each emotion reported for sad 
pictures by the suppress and control groups. Repeated measures ANOVA found a 
significant effect of Emotion, F (3, 126) = 99.94, p < .01, no interaction between 
Emotion and Condition, F (3, 126) = 0.25, p = .86, and no main effect of Condition, F
101
Chapter 3: Results
(1, 42) = 0.94, p = 0. 34. The sad images induced medium levels of sadness, small 
amounts of disgust and fear, and negative amounts of happiness (relative to neutral 
images) across all participants, but this pattern was not mediated by being in the 
suppress or control conditions.
Figure 3.5.1.3: Emotion Ratings o f the Sad Pictures by the Suppress and Control Conditions.
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Data are mean (standard error o f the mean values).
Figure 3.5.1.4 shows the mean amount of each emotion reported for disgusting 
pictures by the suppress and control groups. Repeated measures ANOVA found a 
significant effect of Emotion, F (3,126) = 121.27, p < .01, no Emotion by Condition 
interaction, F (3, 126) = 0.29, p = 0.83, and no main effect of Condition, F (1, 42) = 
0.31, p = 0.58. The disgusting images induced medium levels of disgust, small levels 
of fear and sadness, and negative levels of happiness (relative to neutral images) 
across all participants, but this was not influenced by whether assignment was to the 
suppress or control groups.
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Figure 3.5.1.4: Emotion Ratings o f the Disgusting Pictures by the Suppress and Control Conditions.
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Data are mean (standard error o f the mean values).
In summary, all of the emotional picture types induced the intended target 
emotions. There were no differences between conditions in experience of the target 
emotion to each image type or experience of the other emotions to each image type.
3.5.2 Valence and Arousal Ratings
Figure 3.5.2.1 plots the arousal ratings for each of the picture types by 
participants in the suppress and control conditions. As with the basic emotions data, 
the ratings of neutral pictures were subtracted to act as a baseline. A 4 by 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA was then conducted to analyse the data, with Picture Type 
(positive, fearful, sad, disgusting [relative to neutral]) as the within-subjects factor and 
Condition (suppression, control) as the between-subjects factors. There was a 
significant effect of Picture Type, F (3, 126) = 4.44, p < 0.01, no Picture Type by 
Condition interaction, F (3, 126) = 0.23, p = 0.88, and no main effect of Condition, F
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(1, 42) = 0.87, p = 0.36. There were no differences in arousal ratings between the 
suppress and control conditions, but all participants tended to rate fear pictures as 
more arousing than the other emotional image types (relative to neutral).
Figure 3.5.2.1: Arousal Ratings o f Each Ficture Type by the Control and Suppress Groups.
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Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values.
Figure 3.5.2.2 shows the mean valence ratings of each image type by the 
suppress and control groups. As with the arousal data, a 4 by 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA explored valence ratings of each emotional picture type (relative to neutral 
images) as a function of condition. There was an effect of Picture Type, F (3, 126) = 
323.72, p < .01, no interaction of Picture Type and Condition, F (3, 126) = 0.64, p = 0 
.59, and no main effect of Condition, F (1, 42) = 2.27, p = 0.14. The emotional images 
(relative to neutral) were not rated differently by participants in the suppress and 
control conditions, but all participants rated the positive images as pleasant and the 
three negative image classes as unpleasant. The disgusting images were rated as more 
unpleasant than the fearful and sad images.
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Figure 3.5.2.2: Valence Ratings o f  Each Picture Type by the Control and Suppress Groups.
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Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values.
3.5.3 Psychophysiological Response
One participants’ data were missing from the suppress group due to equipment 
failure, meaning that in the analyses below the final sample size was 23 in the control 
group and 20 in the suppress group. GSR was measured in terms of the mean change 
in activity during the six-second picture viewing period, relative to a three-second 
pre-stimulus baseline. HR physiological response to each image was indexed 
following the recommendations of Bradley et al. (2002) to control for the triphasic 
heart rate response typically seen when viewing static images. Data were first 
resampled into half second bins. The initial deceleration during the 1st to the 3rd 
second of picture viewing and the subsequent acceleration during the 4th to the 6th 
second of picture viewing were then both computed, relative to a 3s pre-stimulus 
baseline. The mean response on each physiological index across the ten images in 
each block was computed for each participant. Difference scores were then computed, 
taking the response to the neutral pictures away from the comparable index for each
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of the emotional images. These psychophysiological variables were then analysed 
using a series of 4 by 2 repeated measures ANOVAs, with Picture Type (positive, 
fearful, sad, disgusting [relative to neutral]) as the within-subjects factor and 
Condition (suppression, control) as the between-subjects factor. One participants’ data 
from the suppression group was missing due to equipment failure.
Figure 3.5.3.1 plots the mean GSR change to each image type for the two 
experimental conditions. Analysis found a significant effect of Picture Type, F (3,
123) = 6.68, p < .01, no Picture Type by Condition interaction, F (3, 123) = 1.07, p = 
0.37, and no main effect of Condition, F (1, 41) = 0.26, p = 0.61. Participants tended 
to show a greater GSR to fear pictures than other images, but this did not vary as a 
function of condition.
Figure 3.5.3.1: Mean GSR Change to each Picture Type in the Suppress and Control Conditions.
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Data are mean (standard error o f the mean) values. 
GSR = galvanic skin response.
GSR measured in micro-siemens.
Figure 3.5.3.2 plots the mean HR deceleration in the first three seconds of 
picture viewing for each image class in the control and suppress conditions. Analysis
□ control
□ suppress
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found no effect of Picture Type, F (3, 123) = 1.59, p = 0.19, no interaction between 
Picture Type and Condition, F (3, 123) = 0.32, p = 0.81, but a significant main effect 
of Condition, F (1, 41) = 4.29, p = .05. The suppress group showed a significantly 
greater initial HR deceleration to the emotional images (relative to neutral), compared 
to the control group.
Figure 3.5.3.2: Mean Initial HR Deceleration to each Picture Type in the Suppress and Control 
Conditions.
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Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values.
HR = heart rate.
HR measured in beats per minute (bpm).
Figure 3.5.3.3 plots the mean HR acceleration in the second three seconds of 
picture viewing for each image class in the control and suppress conditions. Analysis 
found no effect of Picture Type, F (3, 123) = 2.01, p = 0.11, no interaction between 
Picture Type and Condition, F (3, 123) = 1.23, p = 0.30, and no main effect of 
Condition, F (1, 41) = 0.18, p = .89.
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Figure 3.5.3.3: Mean Subsequent HR Acceleration to each Picture Type in the Suppress and Control 
Conditions.
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Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values.
HR = heart rate.
HR measured in beats per minute (bpm).
3.6 Intrusions Diary
Hypothesis 4: Participants in the emotional suppression group will report 
experiencing a higher number of intrusive thoughts and images about the trauma film, 
compared to volunteers in the control condition.
A number of participants’ data were missing in the analyses reported below as 
they did not attend the follow-up session (3 in the control group; 3 in the suppress 
group). This meant the sample analysed consisted of 20 in the control group and 18 in 
the suppress group. Table 3.6.1 shows the compliance ratings with the diary 
instructions reported by the suppress and control groups. In general, both groups 
reported keeping the diary accurately, suggesting that the data are valid to analyse. 
Independent samples t-tests found no significant difference between conditions.
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Similar non-significant results were found in the non-parametric analysis using Mann- 
Whitney U-tests, so are not reported here.
Table 3.6.1: Compliance with the Intrusions Diary Instructions in the Suppress and Control Conditions.
Suppress Control Statistical Comparison
Condition Condition
. ' I.
(n = 18) (n = 20)
Compliance with Diary 2.00 (2.11) 2.14(1.32) t (1, 37) = 0.26, p = 0.80
Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values.
Compliance measured on an 11 point scale, ranging from 0 (complied with diary instructions) to 11 
(did not comply with diary instructions)
Figure 3.6.1 plots the mean number of intrusions of each type (thoughts, 
images, both [an intrusion that was made up of thoughts and images]) experienced in 
the week after the trauma induction by the suppress and control groups.
Figure 3.6.1: Number o f Intrusions in the Week after the Trauma Induction Reported by the Control 
and Suppress Groups.
Intrusion Type
□ control
□ suppress
Data are mean (standard error o f the mean) values.
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Independent samples t-tests were used to analyse the effects of condition on 
the intrusions. These revealed no effect of Condition on intrusive thoughts t (1, 37) = 
1.35, p = 0.19, intrusive images, t (1, 37) = 0.54, p = 0.59, or both thoughts and 
images, t (1, 37) = 1.05, p = 0.29. The intrusion data were significantly positively 
skewed in the control group and could not be corrected using log transformation, so 
the analysis was repeated using non-parametric Mann Whitney U-tests. These also 
revealed no significant effect of condition on the number of intrusions.
Figure 3.6.2 plots the mean distress caused by each intrusion for the suppress 
and control groups. An independent samples t-test found no effect of condition on 
distress, t (1, 37) = 0.07, p = 0.95, and an identical non-significant finding emerged in 
the non-parametric analysis.
Figure 3.6.2: Mean Distress Reported During Intrusions by the Control and Suppress Groups.
Group
Data are mean (standard error o f  the mean) values.
Distress was rated on 100 point scale, ranging from 0(not at all) to 100 (extremely)
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3.7 Memory Tests
Hypothesis 5: Participants in the emotional suppression group will show impaired 
episodic memory for the trauma film, compared to volunteers in the control condition.
A number of participants’ data were missing in the analyses reported below as 
they did not attend the follow-up session (3 in the control group; 3 in the suppress 
group). This meant the sample analysed had 20 in the control group and 18 in the 
suppress group. Figure 3.7.1 plots the mean percentage of correct answers given on 
the recognition and free recall memory tests of the trauma induction content by the 
suppress and control groups.
Figure 3.7.1: Percentage Correct on the Free Recall and Recognition Memory Tests o f  the Trauma 
Induction Content by the Control and Suppress Groups.
□ control 
n  suppress
Memory Measure
Data are mean (standard error o f the mean) values.
Independent samples t-tests were used to analyse the data. These found a 
significant effect of Condition on free recall memory, t (1, 37) = 2.66, p = 0.01, but
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not the recognition memory test, t (1, 37) = 1.58, p = 0.12. The suppress group had 
significantly worse free recall of the content of the trauma video than the control 
group. An identical pattern of results was found in non-parametric analysis using 
Mann-Whitney U-tests.
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4.1 Overview of Thesis Rationale
The thought suppression literature has demonstrated that the harder a thought 
is pushed out of conscious experience, the more frequently the thought returns later 
(Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner & Erber, 1992). This ‘rebound effect’ has been 
implicated in PTSD (Steil & Ehlers, 2000; Mayou et al., 2002; Shipherd & Beck, 
1999) and other forms of psychopathology (Purdon, 1999). The thought rebound 
effect, while not always replicated, is a powerful illustration of the more general 
finding that the way in which information is processed during encoding can have 
subsequent, and often adverse, effects on cognitive and emotional processing (in both 
healthy populations and psychological disorders).
While the consequences of regulating the cognitive content of consciousness 
when processing traumatic material have been examined, emotion regulation 
processes are less well understood. It is increasingly realised that people try to control 
their emotional experience as well as their cognitive experience (Lazarus, 1991; Gross 
1998,2001). One common form of emotion regulation is to suppress the emotions 
that are being felt and expressed in response to particular stimulus.
A growing body of work has begun to explore how successfully attempts to 
control emotional expression lead to a down-regulation of affective experience in 
healthy populations. These studies have found that suppression increases 
physiological response, does not alter self-report of affect, and impairs memory for 
the emotional material (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Gross, 1998; Richards & Gross, 
1999; 2000). As yet it has not been systematically empirically examined whether 
emotional suppression subsequently leads to a rebound effect analogous to that seen
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in thought suppression experiments. Further, the consequences of experiential 
suppression, as opposed to expression suppression, have not been explored.
The use of emotion regulation strategies such as suppression has not yet been 
investigated when coding traumatic material specifically. It seems plausible that the 
attempts people make to control their emotions during trauma encoding may 
determine whether they show a PTSD-like profile of symptoms.
In particular, there may be an effect similar to that found in the thought 
suppression literature (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, 1994), where attempts to 
minimise affect expressed and experienced at time one lead to an increase in emotions 
and a disturbance in memory at time two. The form any such ‘rebound’ would take 
can perhaps be predicted by multiple representation theories of PTSD, such as the 
dual representation framework (Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996; Brewin, 2001). 
This argues that PTSD results from a failure to integrate verbal and situational (or 
visual) memory, such that situational memory is not integrated into episodic memory 
and intrudes as re-experiencing symptoms.
It is plausible that emotional suppression may result in a similar 
‘disconnection’ (Berenbaum et al., 2003) in representation, such that verbal memory 
is weakened and situational memory is strengthened. The efforts made to suppress 
emotions may take processing resources away from integrating the trauma experience 
into autobiographical memory, therefore impairing verbal memory acquisition. 
Further, the process model of emotion regulation has shown that emotional expression 
suppression leads to an increase in physiological response to negative stimuli (Gross 
& Levenson, 1993; Gross, 1998), perhaps consistent with greater activity in more 
implicit levels of representation. Such a disconnection between verbal and situational 
encoding following emotional suppression may lead to a deficit in episodic memory
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for the trauma event, an increase in intrusive thoughts and images about the trauma, 
and a subsequent rebound in affect.
Alternatively, it may be the case that emotional suppression is an effective 
way to limit over arousal and remain effective in a traumatic situation, thereby 
minimising the likelihood of developing a post-traumatic reaction. Consistent with 
this prediction, Ozer et al. (2002) found that intense emotion after the traumatic event 
was a risk factor for subsequently developing PTSD, which suggests that any ways of 
down regulating emotional experience in this period should be helpful rather than 
counter-productive. Similarly, emotional suppression may also be a successful way of 
controlling re-experiencing symptoms when they occur without having any secondary 
costs on later information processing.
To begin to explore whether emotional suppression is an effective or 
ineffective form of emotion regulation when processing trauma, the experiment 
reported in this thesis examined whether an emotional rebound effect could be found 
following emotional suppression of response to an analogue trauma induction. How 
effective emotional suppression was in regulating initial response to the traumatic 
material was measured using both self-report and psychophysiological indices. The 
secondary consequences of emotional suppression were measured in terms of 
immediate and longer term mood change, subsequent processing of emotional 
material, recall of the trauma content, and experience of intrusive memories of the 
trauma content.
There were two primary aims of the experiment: first, to assess whether use 
of emotional suppression effectively controls emotion at the time of coding traumatic 
material (reduced experience of distressing emotions, less marked physiological 
response); and second, to examine whether use of emotional suppression increased or
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decreased the likelihood of showing a post-traumatic like response to the material 
(blunted positive affect and/or increased negative affect, poor episodic memory, 
increased experience of intrusions).
This discussion will first summarise the main findings of the study. Second, it 
will evaluate whether use of emotional suppression when coding traumatic material is 
an effective form of emotion regulation. Third, it will examine whether there are any 
secondary costs of adopting emotional suppression on subsequent mood and memory. 
Where appropriate, implications for theoretical models of emotion regulation will be 
identified in these sections. Fourth, a number of methodological limitations of the 
study that limit generalisation of the findings will then be highlighted. Fifth, bearing 
in mind the methodological problems identified, tentative clinical implications for 
understanding and treating PTSD and related conditions will be put forward.
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4.2 Summary of Results
4.2.1 Group Comparison
• The suppress and control conditions were comparable on the key demographic 
variables, the pre-induction mood measures, resting state psychophysiology 
measures, and a majority of the trait individual difference variables.
• This pattern of results suggests the groups were statistically comparable and 
that any differences that emerged were most likely to be due to the 
experimental manipulation.
4.2.2 Experimental Manipulation Checks
• The suppress group reported making greater use of suppression during the 
trauma induction but not the other emotion regulation strategies, compared to 
the control group. This suggests participants were attempting to follow the 
experimental instructions.
• Participants in both conditions reported a significant increase in negative 
affect (particularly sadness, horror and distress) and a decrease in positive 
affect following the road traffic accident video, suggesting the video was 
acting as a negative mood induction.
• Participants in both conditions reported experiencing the target emotions to the 
happy, sad, fearful, and disgusting emotional images, suggesting the pictures 
were acting as the intended emotional induction.
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4.2.3 Experimental Results
The data will be summarised in terms of the experimental hypotheses to which each 
task pertains.
Hypothesis One: Participants in the emotional suppression group will show a 
decrease in experienced negative affect but an increase in psychophysiological 
response while viewing the trauma film, compared to volunteers in the control 
condition.
Road Traffic Accident Video
• There were no global differences in reported emotional response to the video 
in the suppress and control conditions, suggesting that attempts to suppress 
emotional response in the experimental condition were not successful.
• There was some minor indication of a difference in psychophysiological 
response to the road traffic accident video between the two conditions. The 
suppress group had higher HR variability (relative to the rest task) during the 
video, compared to the control group.
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Hypothesis Two: Participants in the emotional suppression group will show a 
subsequent increase in negative mood and a decrease in positive mood, compared to 
volunteers in the control condition.
Mood Change Measures
•  There were no significant differences in immediate mood change between the 
suppress and control conditions.
• There were no global differences in week-long mood change between the 
suppress and control conditions.
• There was, however, a small magnitude but significant difference in changes 
in BDI score between the two experimental conditions, with the suppress 
groups showing a slight increase and the control group a slight decrease.
Hypothesis Three: Participants in the emotional suppression group will show an 
elevated self-report and psychophysiological emotional response when viewing 
subsequent negative affective material and a decreased self-report and 
psychophysiological emotional response when viewing subsequent positive affective 
material, compared to volunteers in the control condition.
Affective Picture Task
• The suppress and control conditions did not differ in self-reported emotions in 
response to the images.
• The suppress group showed a significantly greater initial HR deceleration to 
the emotional images (relative to neutral), compared to the control group.
119
Chapter 4: Discussion
Hypothesis Four: Participants in the emotional suppression group will report 
experiencing a higher number of intrusive thoughts and images about the trauma film, 
compared to volunteers in the control condition. This will be indexed by verbalising a 
higher number of intrusions and talking about the film for longer during the stream of 
consciousness task and recording more intrusions in the week-long intrusion diary.
Stream o f Consciousness Task
• The suppress group showed a non-significant trend to report fewer content 
related intrusions about the road traffic accident video, compared to the 
control group.
• There were no differences in length of time spent talking about the video or in 
psychophysiological response during the task.
Intrusions Diary
• There were no differences between groups in terms of the number of intrusive 
memories about the road traffic accident videos reported in the following 
week or the amount of distress caused by each intrusive memory.
Hypothesis Five: Participants in the emotional suppression group will show impaired 
episodic memory for the trauma film, compared to volunteers in the control condition.
Memory Questionnaires
• The suppress group showed impaired free recall memory of the video, 
compared to the control group.
• There were no differences in recognition memory between conditions.
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4.3 Evaluating the Efficacy of Emotional Suppression during Encoding
It will now be discussed to what extent emotional suppression functions 
effectively as a form of emotion regulation. Based on the work on the consequences 
of expressive suppression in the Process Model literature (Gross, 1998; 2001), the 
first prediction of the current study was that emotional suppression would lead to an 
increase in psychophysiological response. Further, in contrast to the expressive 
suppression work, it was predicted that emotional suppression would also lead to a 
decrease in emotions induced by the video. The rationale for this differing prediction 
was that the definition of suppression had been extended to include both internal 
feeling state and external expression in the current study. The hypothesis was only 
partially supported. While the suppress group did show a more variable HR response 
to the video than the control group, there was no difference between conditions in 
self-report of emotional experience.
This pattern of findings broadly replicates the normative emotion regulation 
literature, which has found that expression suppression does not change subjective 
experience of emotion and increases physiological response (Gross & Levenson,
1993; Gross, 1998). The current data extend these findings by showing that a similar 
pattern emerges if suppression is broadened to include both expression and experience 
suppression.
The current findings also support the observation in the health psychology 
literature that suppression of emotions leads to increases in physiological response 
parameters (Alexander, 1950; Krantz & Manuck, 1984).
The data do not fit with the discovery in the early stress response literature that 
‘detachment’ during viewing of unpleasant stimuli actually reduces physiological
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response and experience of negative affect (Lazarus, 1966; Koriat et al., 1972). 
Subsequent work did not replicate the positive effects of detachment (Steptoe & 
Vogele, 1986), however, and it may be that the detachment instructions used in these 
experiments encouraged participants to use both reappraisal and suppression emotion 
regulation strategies. Further, it is possible that detachment is in some other way 
different from emotional suppression that has not yet been identified.
It is important to point out, however, that the nature of the 
psychophysiological change following suppression may be more complicated than a 
simple increase in activity. The current study showed more variable HR response but 
no change in mean HR, mean GSR, or GSR variability, which is more consistent with 
a specific change in cardiovascular regulation rather than a global increase.
A complex response pattern also emerges if the Gross data are analysed in 
more detail. Gross and Levenson (1993) measured HR, GSR, finger temperature, 
finger pulse amplitude, pulse transmission time, respiration depth, and general 
somatic activity. They found that suppression led to an increase in GSR, a decrease in 
finger pulse amplitude, and a shortening of pulse transmission time, all of which are 
consistent with greater sympathetic nervous system activation. In addition, they also 
found decreased heart rate acceleration and decreased somatic activity following 
suppression, which is not consistent with greater physiological arousal. Gross (1998) 
replicated the pattern of increased sympathetic nervous system activation but found 
no differences in either somatic activity or heart rate. What this illustrates is the 
complexity of psychophysiological response following suppression.
The current data showed a somewhat different profile on the measures in 
common to the Gross studies. In particular, there was no difference in GSR between 
suppress and control, not replicating the Gross pattern of data of increased GSR
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response. Further, a difference in HR variability emerged (not measured in the Gross 
study), rather than a change in mean activity level. It is currently unclear what the 
finding of greater heart rate variability in the current data actually means. It suggests 
that the consequences of suppression can not be seen in terms of a simple increase or 
decrease in system activity and perhaps should be framed in terms of emotional 
dysregulation. Thus, the reliable finding across studies is that suppression leads to 
changes in psychophysiological response, but exactly how this is expressed differs 
between studies. Further work is needed to explore these differences more 
systematically.
In summary, emotional suppression appears to be an ineffective form of 
emotion regulation in that it does not reliably reduce negative emotional experience 
and leads to more variable, perhaps dysregulated, physiological response at the time 
of coding.
4.4 Delineating Longer Term Consequences of Emotional Suppression
It will now be considered whether initial attempts to suppress emotion led to 
any secondary costs on mood and memory. The post-induction consequences of 
emotional suppression were measured in terms of change in immediate and longer 
term mood, subsequent response to emotional material, memory for the induction, and 
immediate and longer term experience of intrusions about the induction. These 
measures will be considered in turn.
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4.4.1 Processing of Subsequent Emotional Material
The second hypothesis predicting that suppression would lead to elevated self- 
report and psychophysiological response when viewing subsequent emotional 
material was not supported for the self-report data but was partially supported for the 
psychophysiology data. The suppress and control conditions did not differ in valence 
ratings, arousal ratings, and report of the target emotion to each of the emotional 
image types, suggesting that suppression has no effect on subsequent emotional 
experience.
In the psychophysiology analysis, the suppress group did show significantly 
greater initial negative HR deceleration to the emotional images (relative to neutral 
images) than the control group, which is superficially indicative of greater 
psychophysiological response. This index is actually somewhat complex to interpret, 
however.
Consistent with the increased activation hypothesis, research into the IAPS 
(e.g. Bradley, 2003) generally shows a triphasic response of initial HR deceleration, 
subsequent HR acceleration, and finally tertiary HR deceleration when viewing 
emotional images. Negative pictures tend to lead to more marked initial deceleration, 
whereas positive pictures tend to lead to greater subsequent acceleration. Therefore, 
greater HR deceleration in the current study may suggest the suppress group found the 
images more negative than the control group.
On the other hand, Fowles (1980) suggests that HR activity is a measure of the 
behavioural activation system (BAS; Gray, 1982; 1987: the motivational system that 
regulates approach towards rewarding stimuli), such that an increase in HR means 
higher BAS activity. Thus, greater HR deceleration in initial picture viewing suggests
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decreased BAS activity, which may reflect either ongoing attempts at suppression of 
emotional response or a less marked positive emotional reaction to the images.
In summary, it is unclear if HR deceleration reflects a less marked approach 
response to the images or a more marked negative emotional response to the images. 
Nevertheless, this finding does show that one cost of using emotional suppression to 
regulate mood is that, in physiological terms at least, when processing subsequent 
emotional material there is a change in response. Further work is needed to interpret 
what the consequences are of this change in psychophysiology profile might be.
4.4.2 Mood Following the Trauma Induction
The third hypothesis predicting that emotional suppression would lead to a 
subsequent increase in negative mood and a decrease in positive mood, compared to 
the control condition, was only very weakly supported.
The immediate mood change data (comparing mood ratings immediately prior 
to the induction and five minutes after the induction) found that the suppress and the 
control groups did not differ on the self-report variables. The week-long mood change 
data (comparing ratings for the week prior to the experiment to the week after the 
experiment) also found no global differences in mood in the suppress and control 
conditions. Interestingly, however, there was a significant difference between groups 
on depression scores reported on the BDI, with the suppress group showing a slight 
increase and the control group a slight decrease. This was an extremely small 
magnitude effect (1 point on the BDI), which cannot be interpreted as a clinically 
significant level of change. Effects of such a small size would have very limited 
ecological validity in terms of predicting real world emotional response. Further, due
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to the large number of statistical comparisons run on emotional self-report variables, 
it is possible this significant finding is a Type I error. The effect would not survive 
correction for multiple comparisons.
This pattern of findings offers only very partial, tentative support for the 
rebound hypothesis in relation to mood change (Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, 1994).
It seems most parsimonious to conclude that emotional suppression does not have 
lasting, marked effects on subsequent mood, so is therefore not a particularly harmful 
form of affect regulation. Thus, findings of a reliable rebound effect on thoughts 
following thought suppression do not clearly extend to mood rebound following affect 
suppression. It is important to bear in mind, however, that there may be a rebound 
effect if emotions are successfully suppressed at initial coding.
4.4.3 Episodic Memory for the Trauma Content
The fifth hypothesis that suppression would lead to impaired episodic memory 
was partially supported. As predicted, the suppress group showed impaired free recall 
memory of the content of the video at one week follow up compared to the control 
group. This finding is consistent with the expression suppression literature, where 
attempts to control visible displays of affect impairs memory for the material 
(Richards & Gross, 1999; 2000). Further, it resembles the finding of impaired 
episodic memory of a trauma induction found following thought suppression (Wegner 
et al., 1996). There were no differences in recognition memory for the trauma 
induction, however. This finding suggests that the mnemonic consequences of 
emotional suppression may differ depending on the type of memory assessed.
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The range of scores found on the two memory measures in the control group 
was comparable to that reported in the Holmes, Brewin & Hennessy (2004) study 
(cued recall: 60% correct in the current study, compared to around 50% correct in 
Holmes et al. data; recognition memory: around 65% correct in the current study, 
compared to around 50 -  70% correct in the Holmes et al. data). This suggests that the 
fractionation between the recall and recognition measures is unlikely to be due to 
sampling differences.
It seems plausible that free recall memory would require access to more 
explicit, verbal memory whereas recognition memory could be achieved through 
access to either explicit, verbal memory or implicit, visual memory. Thus, the 
differentiation of these measures could be modelled by the dual representation theory 
of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgliesh & Joseph, 1996).
4.4.4 Experience of Intrusions
The fifth hypothesis predicting that emotional suppression would lead to a 
higher rate of subsequent intrusions was not supported. The suppress group tended to 
report fewer intrusions during the stream of consciousness task, but did not differ in 
the length of time they spent talking about the video. While the decrease in intrusions 
was not significant (p = .06), the findings run in the opposite direction to the original 
hypothesis. In the week after the film the suppress and control group did not differ in 
the number of intrusions they reported in their diary.
These findings are interesting given that a series of earlier studies have shown 
that attempts to cut off from experience through dissociation while processing 
traumatic material leads to a subsequent increase in intrusions (Brewin & Saunders,
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2000; Holmes, Brewin & Hennessy, 2004). An alternative data pattern may have 
emerged for a number of reasons. First, there may be important differences between 
suppression and dissociation. In particular, dissociation involves cutting off from 
cognitive, emotional, and bodily experience, whereas emotional suppression involves 
distancing only from affect (see section 1.5). Second, participants in the current study 
may not all have followed the suppression instructions, therefore masking the 
emergence of an increase in intrusions following suppression. Third, findings of 
increased intrusions following dissociation may not be robust. For example, Murray 
(1997) did not demonstrate an increase in intrusions following dissociation.
4.4.5: Implications for Modelling the Consequences of Emotional Suppression
In summary, there was little support for the concept of ‘affective rebound’ 
following emotional suppression in the current data in terms of reported experience of 
affect or experience of intrusive memories. There was partial support for the rebound 
hypothesis in terms of psychophysiological response, with the suppress group 
showing greater HR deceleration during the affective picture task. Further, the 
suppress group did show impaired free recall of the content of the trauma induction, 
consistent with an impairment in episodic memory resulting from emotional 
suppression. This suggests that thought suppression and emotional suppression do not 
have analogous consequences on subsequent information processing.
This complex data pattern suggests that the original conceptualisation of 
affective rebound based on dual representation theory (Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 
1996; Brewin, 2001) outlined in the introduction may have partial validity. The 
finding of impaired free recall of the material is consistent with a weakened explicit,
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verbal trace of the trauma material following suppression and the finding of ongoing 
physiological arousal is consistent with a strengthened implicit, perhaps situational, 
memory trace. Crucially, however, this framework would predict that a strengthened 
situational trace should lead to an increased number of intrusions, which was not 
found to be the case following suppression. This suggests that the consequences of 
emotional suppression during trauma encoding cannot be understood fully through 
recourse to dual representation theory.
4.5 Methodological Concerns
A range of methodological issues should be bom in mind when interpreting 
the results of this thesis, which limit how confidently theoretical and clinical 
implications arising from the data can be put forward.
4.5.1 Sample Size
A relatively small sample size was used in the thesis, meaning the study has 
limited statistical power. The power calculation estimated a required sample size of 
26 participants in each group, whereas due to recruitment difficulties the final sample 
was 23 in the control group and 21 in the suppress group. This weakness was 
exacerbated by missing data in some of the analyses, resulting from not all 
participants attending the follow up session and from equipment failure. It may be the 
case that clearer consequences of emotional suppression would have emerged in a 
larger study.
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In partial defence of this criticism, logistical constraints meant that it was not 
possible to test a larger population. Over 250 letters were sent out to volunteers on the 
MRC CBU panel, of whom only a relatively small number replied and then 
participated. At the end of data collection, available participants on the panel who had 
not previously done similar experiments had been exhausted.
Further, it can be argued that, for emotional suppression to have any clinical 
utility as a concept, then a large magnitude effect of applying it would be required 
(i.e. a large effect size of the experimental manipulation would be predicted). The 
current study was only slightly under powered to detect large effect sizes. While it 
may not have been adequately powered to detect smaller effect sizes, any such effects 
would be unlikely to have much ecological validity in informing clinical practice.
Finally, the sample size in the current thesis is actually comparable to that 
used in the original Gross and Levenson (1993) study which showed significant 
effects of expression suppression (n = 22 in the control condition; n = 21 in the 
suppress condition). This suggests the current sample size may have been adequate to 
detect reliable differences between the two conditions.
4.5.2 Sample Selection
The sample used in the thesis may not be representative of the general 
population, because of the recruitment methods used. For ethical reasons all 
participants were approached by letter prior to the study to outline what it would 
involve. Of the people written to (all of whom were on a panel of research volunteers 
and regularly help out in research), only about twenty percent agreed to participate. 
This means that the sample is in a sense self-selected and it is therefore unclear how
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representative this group is of the general population. For example, the people who 
were willing to take part may have been confident they were unlikely to show a strong 
emotional reaction (i.e. are not easily upset).
4.5.3 Type I Error Rate
The complex design of the experiment means that a large number of statistical 
comparisons were run between conditions (particularly on the emotion and mood 
variables), potentially inflating the possibility of making a Type I error in 
interpretation (false positive effect of experimental condition). In defence of this 
criticism, no correction was made for multiple comparisons in a majority of the 
analyses run as they were based on a priori hypotheses.
Further, the significant findings that emerged came from measures where a 
relatively small number of contrasts were run (the psychophysiology data, the 
intrusions data, and the episodic memory data), suggesting Type I error is not a major 
issue. The exception to this was the finding of elevated BDI at one week follow up in 
the suppression group. A large number of comparisons were run on emotion self- 
report variables and this was the only significant effect that emerged. The BDI 
difference would not have survived correction for multiple comparisons, so therefore 
this positive finding should be interpreted very cautiously and requires replication.
4.5.4 Violation of Assumptions of Parametric Statistics
A number of variables analysed were significantly non-normal in their 
distribution, meaning they violated some of the assumptions of the parametric
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assumptions of the statistical tests used. To partially control for this, data were 
transformed where possible and equivalent non-parametric tests were also run where 
available. In the case of repeated measures ANOVA, however, there was no non- 
parametric equivalent to use. Further, non-parametric techniques are less powerful, so 
it is hard to interpret unambiguously whether the disappearance of an effect in these 
analyses is due to violations of data assumptions in the original analysis or a lack of 
power in the non-parametric analysis.
4.5.5 Differentiation between the Suppress and Control Conditions
How distinct the two experimental groups were in terms of their use of 
emotional suppression can also be questioned. While participants in the suppress 
group reported making greater use of suppression overall than the control group, there 
was considerable overlap between the two conditions. A number of participants in the 
control group reported high levels of suppression (perhaps reflecting that suppression 
is a typical emotion regulation strategy used in the general population) and a number 
of participants in the suppress group reported low levels of suppression (perhaps 
reflecting that people may have habitual emotion regulation strategies that they use 
and are not always amenable to instruction in other methods). It is possible that 
clearer group differences may have emerged if the groups had been more distinct in 
the use of suppression.
One way round this problem would have been to exclude participants in the 
control group who reported high levels of suppression and participants in the suppress 
group who reported low levels of suppression. This was not possible in the current 
study, as this would have left the samples too small to analyse validly. A second
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solution would be to repeat the study but splitting groups in terms of use of trait 
suppression rather than using an instruction manipulation.
4.5.6 Interpretation of the Suppression Manipulation
It is also somewhat difficult to interpret the meaning of the suppression 
manipulation. While suppress participants differed from control participants in how 
hard they reported attempting to suppress, there were no clear and strong differences 
in self-report of emotional response to the video. This means that the experiment 
looks at the consequences of attempts to suppress emotional response to material as 
opposed to the consequences of successful suppression of emotional response to 
material. It is possible that the consequences of successful versus unsuccessful 
suppression may be quite different. One way to investigate this possibility would be to 
split the suppression group based on how successful they were (i.e. those who showed 
a large emotional response to the video compared with those who showed a small 
emotional response to the video). Again, this analysis was not possible with the 
current data set due to the relatively small sample size.
4.5.7 Construct Validity of Emotional Suppression
It should also be pointed out that the suppression manipulation used in the 
current study was novel, extending Gross’s definition of emotional suppression 
(Gross, 1998; Gross, 2001) to down-regulation of experienced affect as well as 
expression of affect. The validity of this broader definition has yet to be established.
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Further, it is possible that the suppression manipulation served as form of 
distraction, whereby participants’ attentional resources were diverted towards 
ensuring they were suppressing rather than in processing the content of the video. 
Distraction could potentially explain why episodic memory was impaired and 
intrusions decreased following suppression, although it would struggle to account for 
the change in psychophysiological response. To explore whether the experimental 
manipulation worked specifically via suppression or more generally via distraction, 
additional work seems warranted to contrast these two processes.
Finally, it could be argued that the instructions in the suppress condition 
focused on the goal of the manipulation (i.e. to suppress expression and experience of 
emotion) without giving participants any clear advice or suggestion of techniques 
about how to do this (i.e. use relaxation, think of other things and so on). It may be 
that certain forms of suppression are more or less effective (for example, distancing, 
reappraisal, use of relaxation) and have different consequences. Future research could 
potentially delineate and contrast the consequences of different ways to achieve 
emotional suppression.
4.5.8 Impact of Trait Emotional Suppression
The current study focused on the consequences of an emotional suppression 
induction without considering the impact of trait individual differences in adoption of 
emotional suppression. Lazarus (1993) points out that group differences as a result of 
experimental manipulation are often washed out by individual differences within each 
of the samples. In relation to the current study, individual differences in trait use of 
emotional suppression may determine to what extent participants can follow the
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emotional suppression instructions. Further, trait differences in emotional expressivity 
could mediate the impact suppression would have on reported and experienced affect.
One way to explore this issue would have been to run a correlational analysis 
between individual differences measures and the experimental tasks in the current 
project. This approach was not adopted due to the lack of statistical power in the 
current design. The large number of correlations that would need to be run, often in 
the absence of any clear a priori hypotheses, would have resulted in a marked 
inflation of Type I error rate. Future research with a larger sample size is warranted to 
explore the impact of trait measures.
4.5.9 Ecological Validity of the Trauma Induction and Other Measures
Another limitation of the study is that the ecological validity of the trauma 
induction can be questioned. There is obviously an important difference between 
watching a video of a traumatic event and being personally involved in a trauma. A 
number of participants commented that they felt they were watching the television 
programme Casualty, and so were not particularly upset. They felt their reaction 
would have been very different if they or a loved one were personally experiencing 
the accident, rather than being in an observer position. Therefore, considerable 
caution needs to be taken before generalising these findings to the consequences of 
emotional suppression in a personally experienced traumatic event. It is possible that 
the consequences of emotional suppression are very different in a situation that is 
more arousing and personally salient.
In addition, some participants commented that the quality of the images in the 
video were poor (as they are based on old footage of accidents that have some
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blurring and decolonisation). Participants reported this helped them realise they were 
looking at something from the past.
Finally, a number of participants reported that the film was ‘not as bad as they 
were expecting’, so that the emotions they had experienced while watching it had 
partially been relief and/or guilt that they were not showing a more marked reaction. 
Again, this may have been an inadvertent consequence of using letters to recruit 
participants in the most ethical fashion available.
A similar critique could be made about the ecological validity of the affective 
picture task, where static images are used to induce moderate amounts of happiness, 
sadness, fear, and disgust. Differences resulting from the use of emotional suppression 
may have only emerged on a more powerful emotional induction.
In defence of these criticisms, it is clearly not ethical to expose experimentally 
volunteers to a more severe trauma or emotional induction, particularly when it is 
predicted that the emotion regulation instructions being used will be unhelpful. 
Further, the use of analogue trauma inductions is a common research strategy in the 
literature which has helped develop clinical understanding of conditions like PTSD 
(for example, Davies & Clark, 1998; Rassin et al., 1997 to understand the 
consequences of thought suppression; Holmes, Brewin & Hennessey, 2004 to 
understand the consequences of dissociation). This body of work therefore suggests 
that analogue inductions may have some relevance to understanding PTSD.
In addition, there are specific advantages in the use of an analogue design. 
First, when studying a group of people with a diagnosis of PTSD it is obviously not 
possible to systematically examine coding of the traumatic event (since this has 
necessarily already occurred for a diagnosis to be obtained). Investigation of initial 
encoding can be undertaken in an analogue design. Second, the nature of the trauma
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stimuli can be carefully controlled by the experimenter (as opposed to there being 
marked variation in trauma exposure in naturalistic settings). Third, it is possible to 
have gathered normative data on typical responses to the trauma material to inform 
interpretation of the data.
A naturalistic design could potentially be adopted in future research to 
increase the ecological validity of the work. For example, people routinely exposed to 
trauma (for example, emergency services personnel) could be trained in different 
forms of emotion regulation (for example, reappraisal versus suppression) and the 
short and long term consequences of this measured. Obviously, there are ethical issues 
about conducting such a study if emotional suppression does turn out to be an 
ineffective or potentially harmful way of managing emotions. Careful thought would 
need to be given to this issue in the experimental protocol, outlining how and when 
the experiment would be terminated.
4.5.10 Intrusion Methodology
A number of issues about how the intrusion data were collected may also be 
problematic. First, a number of participants’ data were missing in the analysis, either 
due to equipment failure or the participant not attending follow-up. Second, the data 
were scored by the experimenter only, whereas an optimal design would be to have 
the data double-scored to control for interpretation bias. Third, the distinction between 
length of time spent talking about the video and the number of content related 
intrusions used in the analysis of the stream of consciousness task may not be valid. 
Fourth, use of a stream of consciousness task may not have been the optimal way of 
monitoring intrusions immediately post-experiment in the first place. The failure to
137
Chapter 4: Discussion
find significant differences in reported intrusions may therefore partially be the result 
of these problematic methodological issues.
Interestingly, failure to find an effect of condition on experience of intrusions 
appears to not be the result of a floor effect. If anything, a higher than average number 
of intrusions were found in the diary in the current study (around 12 on average in the 
control group; around 6 on average in the suppress group) compared to previously 
published research using the road traffic accident video (for example, Holmes, Brewin 
& Hennessy, 2004 found an average number of intrusions ranging from 2 to 7 across 
experiments in their control conditions)
Alternative ways to monitor the impact of emotion regulation on thought 
content could have been a written stream of consciousness task, where participants 
write down what was running through their mind, or a button press task, where 
participants press a button whenever they think about the trauma induction. The 
written task was not chosen because it was felt it might lead to ‘narrative smoothing’, 
where participants could potentially miss out important parts of their 
phenomenological experience in an attempt to produce fluent prose. The button press 
task was not selected because it would not be possible to verify or analyse the content 
of participants’ thoughts for each button press. A further alternative could have been 
to combine the verbal stream of consciousness task with the button press task. It was 
felt that this would effectively require ‘dual task performance’ and increase the 
cognitive load on participants, thus potentially altering their experience. All of the 
potential ways of measuring immediate memory rely on participants self-report and 
are thus open to the contaminating effects of response bias.
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4.5.11 Psychophysiology Methodology
The psychophysiological recording methods used can be criticised. Two 
peripheral measures were taken, meaning that only limited aspects of body-state were 
studied. A more complete picture would have emerged if other measures such as 
facial muscle contraction were adopted. Additionally, the validity of the analysis 
approach used is not fully established. In particular, it is currently unclear in the 
literature how best to model the interaction between phasic and tonic aspects of 
system response and the change scores reported in this thesis are only one of a variety 
of methods available.
These comments reflect the fact that psychophysiology is a developing field 
and many basic issues regarding recording and analysis are unresolved. Indeed, the 
development of the recording and analysis system used in this thesis may present a 
reasonable advance on existing approaches to event-related psychophysiology. The 
use of digital markers to indicate when certain events occur on a physiological record 
and the programming of powerful and flexible analysis software gives the researcher 
more control over the analysis of data and allows a more extensive analysis to be run.
4.5.1 2______ Experimenter Demand Effects
The information sheet given to participants implied that emotional suppression 
may have some influence over how they felt and what they remembered afterwards. It 
is possible that this may have biased how participants reported their experience after 
the experiment through an experimenter demand effect. Consistent with this 
possibility, a number of volunteers ‘apologised’ at the one week follow up for not
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having shown a more marked response to the trauma induction and not reporting any 
intrusions in the diary. To minimise this potential confound, the experimenter 
attempted to remain neutral when discussing the study and the information sheet did 
not state in which direction it was hypothesised mood and memory would change. 
While it was ethically important for participants to be fully briefed about the nature of 
the experiment, this may nevertheless have influenced how they responded. This 
confound may be particularly relevant for interpretation of the intrusive memory 
findings.
4.6 Clinical Implications of Findings
The methodological limitations of the current study and the use of an analogue 
design mean that only very tentative comments can be made about the clinical 
implications of the results. Nevertheless, a number of the findings, if replicated and 
extended to clinical populations, may have some theoretical and clinical implications 
for understanding PTSD and related conditions.
4.6.1: Emotional Suppression is an Ineffective Form of Affect Regulation
Perhaps the major implication of the current data is that emotional suppression 
does not appear to be a particularly effective form of emotion regulation. Replicating 
findings from the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998; 2001), 
emotional suppression does not reliably reduce experience of negative affect and may 
actually increase physiological arousal during encoding. This means that clients who
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report using emotional suppression to cut off from aversive emotional experience 
should perhaps be encouraged to adopt other forms of emotion regulation (for 
example, reappraisal). Further, professionals regularly exposed to trauma in their 
every day working lives (for example, emergency service personnel, clinical 
psychologists) should be trained in other, more effective, ways of down regulating 
emotional experience.
Given the ineffectiveness of emotion suppression found in the current 
experiment, it seems something of a paradox that people would ever use this as a form 
of emotion regulation in the first place. Work on trait use of emotion regulation 
strategies does appear to suggest that emotion suppression is a commonly used form 
of naturalistic mood regulation (Gross & John, 2002; 2003), so is not purely a 
laboratory phenomenon. One possibility explanation of why this strategy continues to 
be used is that people hold the false belief that it is an effective form of mood control. 
Fear of overwhelming affect if they do not adopt emotional suppression may prevent 
people ever trying other strategies, and emotions eventually passing may reinforce the 
belief that emotional suppression led to this desired outcome. In other words, 
emotional suppression may be maintained in a similar fashion to safety behaviours in 
anxiety disorders. Further research seems warranted to investigate lay beliefs about 
the efficacy and consequences of different forms of emotion regulation to test these 
speculative notions.
An important caveat to this discussion is that the current data do not 
differentiate between successful and unsuccessful application of emotional 
suppression, which may have quite different consequences.
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4.6.2: The Costs of Emotional Suppression: Implications for PTSD Svmptomology
An additional implication of the current data is that there appear to be a variety 
of secondary costs of adopting emotional suppression as a form of affect regulation. 
Some of these costs mimic the symptoms seen in PTSD, perhaps suggesting that use 
of suppression could potentially contribute to the maintenance and development of 
these difficulties. The three main symptom clusters identified in PTSD are hyper­
arousal, re-experiencing, and avoidance/numbing (APA, 1994).
There was some evidence to suggest that emotional suppression led to an 
ongoing elevation of physiological response, consistent with the notion that it could 
contribute to hyper-arousal symptoms. Participants in the suppress group showed 
more variable HR response during the video and exaggerated initial HR deceleration 
on the affective picture task. Southwick, Yehuda and Chamey (1997) review 
neurobiological alterations in PTSD and conclude that there is strong evidence of a 
hyper-responsive reaction to trauma reminders in the sympathetic nervous system 
(both in terms of increased initial activation and impaired habituation of response). 
Given the similar profile of hyper-arousal found following emotional suppression, it 
seems plausible to suggest that use of emotional suppression could be one of the 
contributing factors to the hyper-arousal symptoms seen following trauma in PTSD. 
Obviously, this tentative claim needs to be validated in clinical studies looking at the 
consequence of emotional suppression of trauma-related material in sufferers of 
PTSD.
There was no evidence to suggest that emotional suppression led to any re- 
experiencing symptoms, indicating it should not be implicated as a contributing factor 
to this aspect of PTSD. The suppress group actually had fewer content-related
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intrusions immediately afterwards and did not differ from the control group in number 
of intrusions in the week afterwards. This suggests that emotional suppression, in 
contrast to use of dissociation (for example, Holmes, Brewin & Hennessey, 2004) or 
thought suppression (see Purdon, 1999 for a review), does not confer vulnerability to 
re-experiencing symptoms found in PTSD. If anything, the opposite may be the case, 
where suppressing emotions is protective against PTSD in that people experience 
lower rates of re-experiencing symptoms. This would be superficially consistent with 
accounts that emphasise how high levels of affect peritraumatically confer 
vulnerability to PTSD (Ozer et al., 2003), although the fact that emotional suppression 
did not actually reduce reported negative affect is hard to reconcile within these 
frameworks. Again, care is needed when extending the findings from an analogue 
study to understand PTSD, so this should be viewed as a tentative possibility and 
more systematically examined in subsequent research.
Similarly, there was no suggestion that emotional suppression led to any 
avoidance or numbing symptoms, since there was no change in subsequent mood or 
reported affect to novel emotional material. This again indicates that emotional 
suppression should not be viewed as a candidate contributing factor to these 
symptoms.
Interestingly, adoption of emotional suppression did appear to have mnemonic 
costs, in that free recall of the content of the trauma was impaired. Lack of clear 
memory for events is often a barrier to effective work in therapy, since it is difficult to 
reprocess thoughts and feelings associated with previous events when they cannot be 
recalled in detail. It is possible that habitual use of emotional suppression may 
increase the likelihood or exacerbate the extent of these mnemonic deficits. 
Additionally, use of emotional suppression during recall of the material in session
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could further limit the material that can be recovered. Encouraging clients to adopt 
other forms of emotion regulation may therefore minimise difficulties in recall of 
distressing material and facilitate working through in PTSD.
In summary, the current data show that use of emotional suppression leads to 
secondary costs of mnemonic impairment and hyper-arousal. Further work with 
clinical populations seems warranted to test out the speculative notion that use of 
emotional suppression could actually be contributing to the emergence and 
maintenance of these symptoms in psychopathology. Intriguingly, the finding of 
reduced frequency of intrusions following suppression suggests that there may also be 
a secondary gain of this form of emotion regulation. Again, additional work in clinical 
populations seems appropriate to help clarify this profile of costs and benefits 
following emotional suppression.
4.7 Summary and Overview
The thought suppression literature illustrates how attempts to control the 
contents of conscious experience may have paradoxical subsequent costs (Wegner et 
al., 1987; Wegner, 1994). A growing body of work is also suggesting that attempts to 
regulate emotions may sometimes backfire (Gross, 1989; 2001), which could 
potentially contribute to the development and maintenance of different forms of 
psychopathology. As yet there has been limited empirical examination of the costs of 
emotion regulation in psychological disorders.
This thesis reports an experiment looking at the concurrent and subsequent 
impact of emotional suppression while processing traumatic material in a healthy 
population, in a preliminary attempt to investigate whether emotional suppression is 
implicated in PTSD. It was found that emotional suppression was an ineffective form
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of emotion regulation, in that it led to no reduction in reported negative affect while 
viewing the trauma induction. There was also a more variable heart response to the 
video when suppressing, but it is important to note that other physiological measures 
were not affected and what this heart rate change means at a psychological level is 
currently unclear.
The subsequent consequences of emotional suppression were mixed. The 
secondary costs of emotional suppression were that physiological response continued 
to be altered when processing subsequent material and there was impaired free recall 
(but not recognition memory) of the trauma material. A potential secondary gain of 
emotional suppression was that it led to experiencing fewer intrusions of video 
content in the five minutes after the induction, but it is important to note that this 
trend did not reach statistical significance and there was no difference in the number 
of intrusions reported in the week after the experiment. There was no clear impact on 
emotional experience, either in terms of background mood or response to novel 
emotional material, following suppression.
In terms of theories of emotion regulation, these data replicate and extend the 
process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998; 2001) by showing that findings of 
no change in experienced affect, altered physiological response, and impaired 
episodic memory are also demonstrated when broadening the definition of emotion 
suppression to include inhibition of internal feelings as well as their expression.
In terms of understanding PTSD, this pattern of results suggests that emotional 
suppression during trauma encoding could potentially contribute to the hyper-arousal 
symptoms seen in the disorder, may minimise re-experiencing symptoms, and has no 
clear impact on avoidance/numbing symptoms. The deficit in episodic memory found 
following suppression could also be a potential barrier to successful resolution of
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trauma in therapy, since recall of the traumatic event may be poor if suppression has 
been used during initial encoding.
A broad clinical implication arising from the thesis is that emotional 
suppression appears to be an ineffective form of emotion regulation with some mild 
secondary costs, so clients presenting to clinical psychologists should perhaps be 
discouraged from using it as a primary form of mood control. It is important to note, 
however, that overall there were few differences between the suppress and control 
groups, suggesting that suppression is an ineffective form of mood control rather than 
a clearly harmful one. These tentative implications for understanding PTSD and 
guiding clinical practice should be used cautiously until results are replicated and 
extended with clinical populations.
The demonstration of secondary costs following suppression of emotions 
during trauma encoding, whereby physiological response is altered and free recall 
episodic memory is impaired, suggests that adopting an emotion regulation 
perspective may be a useful avenue to follow to better understand the development 
and maintenance of PTSD and other related forms of psychopathology.
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Appendix One: Letter to Participants 
Dear Panel Member,
We are writing to invite you to take part in an experiment taking place at the MRC 
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit. The study aims to investigate whether the way in 
which we control our emotions when we are experiencing unpleasant events 
influences our memory of the event and how we feel afterwards. The results of the 
study may help us understand what leads to the development of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder following exposure to stressful life events.
The experiment will involve you viewing a video of the aftermath of road traffic 
accidents and looking at emotional images (pictures of crying people, decaying food, 
frightening animals), which you may find upsetting. We will measure how this makes 
you feel, what you remember about the material, and the physiological response in 
your body, recorded by attaching a small number of electrodes to your face, hand, and 
leg. Due to these unusual features of the study, we wanted to write to you in advance 
to explain what it will involve. If you feel you may be interested in taking part in the 
study, please read the enclosed information sheet for more information. If you have 
any further questions you can contact Tim Dalgleish on the above telephone number.
We would be grateful if you could indicate whether you may be interested in taking 
part in the study by completing the enclosed form and returning it in the stamped 
addressed envelope provided. If you say you are potentially interested we will then 
contact you by telephone to answer any questions you may have and arrange times for 
testing. Testing is most likely to take place on Wednesdays or Fridays, so please 
indicate on the form whether these days are convenient for you. As with all 
experiments at the unit, you will receive five pounds an hour for your time and have 
your travelling expenses reimbursed. You are also free to withdraw from the 
experiment at any stage of testing. Thank you for considering this request and we 
hope to hear from you soon.
Yours sincerely,
Dr. Tim Dalgleish Dr. Barney Dunn
(researcher and clinical psychologist) (researcher and trainee clinical psychologist)
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Appendix One: Information Sheet
“Exploration of the Cognitive and Affective Consequences of 
Suppression and Reappraisal of Emotional Response to Traumatic Material”
Please read the information below to decide if you would like to take part in the project:
What is the purpose of the study?
The aim of the study is to investigate if the way in which people manage their thoughts and feelings 
when they experience traumatic events effects how much they remember about the event and how they 
feel about it afterwards. This is important because it may help us understand what makes some people 
go on to develop posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) when they experience traumatic events, and 
possibly lead to the development of new therapies for the condition.
Why have I been asked to take part?
You are being asked to take part so we can see how healthy volunteers respond to different ways of 
processing mildly traumatic material
What will I have to do?
If you decide to take part, it will take up to two hours to complete the experiment. This will take place 
over two sessions at the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cambridge, at a time of 
your convenience. We will reimburse your travelling expenses for getting to and from the unit and give 
you an honorarium of £5 an hour for your time. In the first session you will be asked to watch a film 
about the aftermath of road traffic accidents, which you are likely to find upsetting. The content of the 
film includes emergency service personnel working to extract trapped victims, injured victims 
screaming, dead bodies being moved, and body parts among car wreckage. We will give you some 
instructions about how we would like you to control your thoughts and feelings while you watch this 
film. We will then measure how these instructions influence your emotions during the film, your 
memories about the film, and your response to a set of emotional pictures after the film. Some of these 
pictures may be unpleasant, including images of people ciying, frightening animals, and decaying food. 
We will measure your emotions in terms of what you describe, how much your heart rate changes, and 
how much you sweat through the finger tips. We do this by placing a small number of electrodes on 
your arm, leg and face, which most people find comfortable to wear. After the first session we will ask 
you to keep a diary for two weeks, recording whether or not you had any thoughts about the film each 
day and how it made you feel. This should take up to ten minutes to complete each day. In the second 
session we will review your diary and ask you to complete some questionnaires measuring your 
thoughts and feelings.
Are there any risks in taking part?
All of the tasks we will ask you to complete and equipment we use have been used safely in previous 
research. You may, however, find the film we ask you to watch upsetting. For this reason, we do not 
think anyone who currently has or previously had a mental health condition (for example, clinical 
depression or clinical anxiety) should take part in the study. If you become upset during the film we 
will stop the experiment and you will have the opportunity to talk to a clinical psychologist about your 
reaction if you wish to.
Other information
This study has received ethical approval from the Ethics Committee of the University of Cambridge. 
The data we collect will be used in the strictest confidence, and no identifying will be stored with the 
data, to safeguard your confidentiality. The data will be stored in a locked filing cabinet, which only 
the investigators will have access to. Results from the study will be presented at conferences and 
written up in journals. Results will be presented in terms of groups of participants, so individual data 
will not be identifiable. You are free to decide not to take part in the study and can withdraw from the 
study at any time and for whatever reason. If you do decide not to take part or to withdraw you do not 
need to explain your reasons to us if you do not want to.
If you have would like any further information about the project please contact Dr. Tim Dalgleish on 
the above contact details. Thank you for reading this information sheet.
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Appendix One: Consent Form
CONSENT BY VOLUNTEERS TO PARTICIPATE IN A STUDY ENTITLED: 
“Exploration of the Cognitive and Affective Consequences of Suppression and 
Reappraisal of Emotional Response to Traumatic Material.”
I.....................................................................................................................................
Of..................................................................................................................................
hereby fully and freely consent to participate in the above study. I understand and 
acknowledge that the trial is designed to add to medical knowledge. I note that I may 
withdraw my consent at any stage in the investigation and I acknowledge that the 
purpose of the trial, the risks involved from any procedures, and the nature and 
purpose of such procedures have been explained to me by:
and that I had an opportunity to discuss these matters with him/her.
I have received a written explanation of these matters, a copy of which is attached to 
this form. I understand that I may change my mind and withdraw from the study at 
any time without any effect upon my rights.
Signed......................................................................................................................
Date............................................................................................................................
I confirm that I have explained to the volunteers the nature and effect of these 
procedures (team member acting on behalf of the person responsible for the project).
Signed............................................................................................................................
Date...............................................................................................................................
Place............................................................................................................................. .
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Appendix 2: Emotion Regulation Instructions
Control Condition 
Prior to Practice Task:
We will now show you a short film. Please watch the film carefully and we will then ask you to rate 
how you feel at the end of it. It is important you stay focused on the film and do not look away from 
the screen. Also, try not to move too much while watching the film. We will start off with a short 
practice film about the Nagasaki bombing before moving on to the test film. Please ask the 
experimenter any questions if these instructions are not clear. Otherwise, press the button to begin the 
practice.
Prior to Test Film:
You will now move onto the test film. This will show real life video footage of the aftermath from five 
road traffic accidents, which you are likely to find upsetting. It is important for the experiment that you 
watch the film, but if you become so distressed that you wish to stop the film let the experimenter 
know by saying 'stop' and we will terminate the experiment. Remember to pay attention to the film and 
do not look away from the screen, as we will ask you questions about it afterwards. After the video we 
will ask you to rate how you are feeling. Press the button below when you are ready to begin.
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Suppression Condition 
Prior to Practice Task:
We will now show you a short film. It is very important for the experiment that when you watch the 
film you try and suppress any emotional responses to it you are having. What we mean by this is that 
you should adopt a detached and unemotional attitude as you watch the film. Try to think about what 
you are seeing objectively in such a way that you don't feel anything at all. Further, if you do have any 
feelings try not to let these show and keep a 'straight face'. In other words, as you watch the film, try to 
behave in such a way that a person watching you would not know that you were feeling anything. For 
example, if the film makes you feel afraid, we would like you to decrease the intensity of fear that you 
feel and show. While suppressing your emotions, it is important you should stay focused on the film 
and do not look away from the screen. Also, try not to move too much while watching the film. We 
will start off with a short practice film about the Nagasaki bombing, before moving on to the test film. 
Please ask the experimenter any questions if these instructions are not clear. Otherwise, press the 
button to begin the practice.
Prior to test film:
The experimenter will now ask how easy you found the suppression instructions to follow. If the 
instructions are not clear please ask for clarification. You will now move onto the test film. This will 
show real life video footage of the aftermath from five road traffic accidents, which you are likely to 
find upsetting. It is important for the experiment that you watch the film, but if you become so 
distressed that you wish to stop the film let the experimenter know by saying 'stop' and we will 
terminate the experiment. Remember to keep suppressing how much emotion you feel and show. Also, 
remember to pay attention to the film and do not look away from the screen, as we will ask you 
questions about it afterwards. After the video we will ask you to rate how you are feeling. Press the 
button below when you are ready to begin.
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Appendix 3: Compliance with Emotion Regulation Instructions
Control Condition
We are interested in how you controlled your emotional responses while viewing the 
road accident video. Please rate the following questions from 0 not at all to 100 
extremely by marking a point on the line:
How much did you find yourself trying to suppress your emotional response to the 
video?
0--------------------------------------------50----------------------------------------100
How much did you find yourself trying to change the meaning of the video while you 
watched it?
0--------------------------------------------50---------------------------------------- 100
How much did you find yourself not looking at the video?
0--------------------------------------------50---------------------------------------- 100
How much did you find yourself not paying attention to the video?
0--------------------------------------------50---------------------------------------- 100
How much did you find yourself deliberately thinking about other things while 
watching the video?
0--------------------------------------------50---------------------------------------- 100
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Suppression Condition
We are interested in how you controlled your emotional responses while viewing the 
road accident video. Please rate the following questions from 0 not at all to 100 
extremely by marking a point on the line:
How hard did you try to suppress your emotional response to the video?
0--------------------------------------------50----------------------------------------100
What strategies did you use to attempt to suppress your emotional response to the 
video?
How much did you find yourself trying to change the meaning of the video while you 
watched it?
0--------------------------------------------50---------------------------------------- 100
How much did you find yourself not looking at the video?
0-------------------------------------------- 50---------------------------------------- 100
How much did you find yourself not paying attention to the video?
0-------------------------------------------- 50---------------------------------------- 100
How much did you find yourself deliberately thinking about other things while 
watching the video?
0-------------------------------------------- 50----------------------------------------100
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Appendix 4: Video tape commentary 
Scene 1.
After a sudden rain storm, several collisions occurred at one spot on the motorway due to the slippery 
conditions and bad visibility. Eight people died, and one of these four died before they could be taken 
to hospital. Here is a 21-year old women who was trapped in her car. Unfortunately she died before she 
could be taken to hospital. The baby survived the accident. The parent, 26 and 30 years old, also died 
during the accident.
Scene 2.
Here a 58-year old man skidded onto the wrong side of the road because he was driving too fast around 
a comer. He hit a minibus which was coming the other way, and the occupants, a 51-year old woman 
and her adult daughter, were both injured. The daughter was knocked unconscious but received only 
cuts and bruises. By the time this video was taken, the man and the older woman, both severely injured, 
had been trapped in their vehicles for over an hour, since because of the remote location ambulance and 
fire crews took 20 minutes to reach them. The woman was permanently disabled by her injuries, due to 
spinal cord damage, although the man did recover completely.
Scene 3.
These two men were involved in a multiple pile up on the motor way. Their wives, who were sitting in 
the back of the car, survived the accident although they sustained major injuries. Both men had grown 
up children who were still financially dependent on them.
Scene 4.
This 56-year old man and his 52-year old wife were on the way to visit their son, a student, in a near by 
town when their car went out of control on the motorway after one tyre was punctured. They skidded 
and crashed. The woman died shortly after the accident as a result of the injuries she received. The man 
remained conscious throughout the accident, although he had suffered extremely severe injuries. 
However, he was trapped in the car next to his wife and it proved too difficult to rescue him in time. He 
died of internal bleeding about 30 minutes after the accident, and could only be removed from the 
wreckage when he was already dead.
Scene 5.
This woman, a 20-year old student, and her friend, were on the way to Italy in a car during the summer. 
On a major road they drove straight into the rear of a traffic jam going round a blind comer. Both 
women were not hurt by this. However, a lorry which they had overtaken earlier also came round the 
comer and hit them from behind. Both women suffered very serious injuries. The student sustained 
massive internal injuries, an injured skull and deep cuts to her face. The lorry driver was not hurt.
155
Appendices
Appendix 5: Visual Analogue Mood Rating Scales
Week Version
Over the past week, how much have you experienced each of the following emotions 
(please mark a point on the line from 0 not at all to 100 very much so).
HAPPINESS 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
SADNESS 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
FEAR 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
DISGUST 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
SURPRISE 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
ANGER 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
GUILT 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
SHAME 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
HELPLESS 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
HORROR 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
TERROR 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
DISTRESS 0-------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
Rate how aroused and pleasant you felt over the past week (circle a number):
«  not at all very much s o »
AROUSAL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
« v e ry  unpleasant neutral very pleasant»
VALENCE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Immediate Version
Right at this point in time, how much are you experiencing each of the following 
emotions (please mark a point on the line from 0 not at all to 100 very much so).
HAPPINESS 0------------------------------------50----------------------------------- 100
SADNESS 0----------------- ------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
FEAR o------------------------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
DISGUST o------------------------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
SURPRISE o------------------------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
ANGER o------------------------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
GUILT o------------------------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
SHAME o------------------------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
HELPLESS o------------------------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
HORROR o--------------------- ------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
TERROR o------------------------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
DISTRESS o------------------------------------50----------------- ----------------- 100
Rate how aroused and pleasant you felt over the past week (circle a number):
«  not at all very much s o »
AROUSAL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
« v e ry  unpleasant neutral very pleasant»
VALENCE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Appendix 6: Instructions Used for Verbal Stream of Consciousness Task
For the next few minutes you will simply be asked to speak your stream of consciousness out loud, 
letting us know whatever is going through your mind. This might include, but is not limited to, images, 
ideas, memories, feelings, fantasies, plans, sensations, observations, daydreams, objects that catch your 
attention, and efforts to solve a problem. There are no restrictions, qualifications, conventions, or 
expectations. Measures have been taken to ensure your privacy and to guarantee confidentiality 
concerning your participation in the study, so please speak out loud whatever goes through your mind. 
Do not worry if what goes through your mind seems silly, embarrassing or disturbing, just keep 
speaking. We will tape record your speech, but only the experimenter will listen to this tape after the 
experiment has finished. The experimenter will sit in the adjacent room and the door will be shut, so he 
will not be able to hear what you are saying at the time. Remember to try to keep speaking out loud all 
of the time to indicate what is going through your mind. If nothing comes to mind, just stop speaking 
and wait. When something else comes to mind starts speaking about this. Try not to move too much 
during the task. Let the experimenter know when you are ready to begin a one-minute practice of 
speaking your stream of consciousness out loud.
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Appendix 7: Images Selected from the I APS for the Picture Task
Fear 1 Fear 5
mtm
Fear 4 Fear 8
Fear 2 Fear 6
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Fear 9 Sad 3
Fear 10 Sad 4
Sad 1 Sad 5
Sad 2 Sad 6
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Sad 7
Sad 8
Happy 4Sad 10
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Disgust 1
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Disgust 6 Disgust 10
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-
Neutral 6Neutral 2
Neutral 3 Neutral 7
Neutral 5
Neutral 8
Neutral 1
Neutral 4
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Neutral 10Neutral 9
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Appendix 8: Instructions for Affective Picture Task
In this task we are interested in how people respond to pictures that represent different events that 
occur in life. You will be asked to look at photographs on the computer screen and rate how they make 
you feel. There are no right and wrong answers and we would like you to be as honest as possible. We 
will give you no particular instructions about how we would like you to control your emotions - please 
just view the images as you normally would. We are interested in how you actually feel, rather than 
how you think you should feel. Some of the pictures may be upsetting, similar to images you may see 
in television news broadcasts. We will ask you to rate how you feel using the same scales as in the 
video task. Please remember to rate all emotions on each of the sliders. After you have rated the 
picture, there will be a break of a number of seconds before the next picture is shown. We will begin 
with three practice trials. Please click the button when you are ready to start.
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Appendix 9: The Intrusion Diary
TIME OF 
DAY
TOTAL 
NUMBER of
intrusions (please 
write a number for 
each intrusion you 
have for that time 
period; if no 
intrusions please 
put a 0 in the box)
Was the intrusion 
as IMAGE (I) 
THOUGHT (T) 
or BOTH (IT)
CONTENT: please describe briefly the content of 
each intrusion
How DISTRESSED
were you by the 
intrusion (0 = not at 
all to 100 = 
extremely)
Morning
Afternoon
Evening
Night
(Please try to keep this daily diary as it is vital for the experiment. THANK YOU)
Volunteer Number: Day of Week: Date:
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Instructions for Intrusions Diary
Volunteer Number 
Date
Experimenter and their contact details: e-mail barney.dunn@mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk
An important part of the experiment is measuring whether people’s memory is influenced 
by how they control their emotions when they view traumatic material. To assess this we 
would like you to complete a daily diary saying whether you have experienced any 
spontaneously occurring intrusions about the road traffic accident film you have just 
watched. By ‘intrusions’ I mean memories (thoughts or images) of the video that 
suddenly pop into your mind spontaneously. I do not mean times when you deliberately 
think about it or mull it over in the diary. Please carry the diary around with you, and if 
you notice yourself having an intrusion about the film please fill it in. If you forget or are 
too busy at that time, please try and fill it in as soon as possible afterwards.
The diary is divided into four periods: morning (when you wake to 12), afternoon (12 -  
6pm), evening (6pm -  when you go to bed), and night (when you go to bed till you 
wake). Please fill in for each time period for each day. In Colum 1 indicate what number 
intrusion it is for that time period. In Column 2 please say whether it was a thought 
(words in your mind), an image (a picture in your mind), or a combination of the two. In 
Column 3 very briefly describe the content of the intrusion (for example, a fire engine 
driving up the road). In Column 4 rate how distressing the intrusion was, ranging from 1 
not at all distressing to 100 very distressing. This process should take no more than a 
minute to complete for each intrusion. If you do not have any intrusions during a time 
period, please place a 0 in the column. Please use one diary sheet per day. If you cannot 
fit all the intrusions for one time of day into the space provided, please continue on 
another sheet. On the back of this sheet is an example of a completed diary for one day to 
help clarify the process.
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Appendix 10: Memory Questionnaires
a') Cued Recall Memory Test
Please answer these questions about the film you watched last week.
The questions are difficult so don’t worry if you’re not sure, just put down your best guess.
1. What colour was the car that was on fire in a field, by a tree, at the beginning of the first scene?
2. What part of a body did you see sticking out of the upside down car in the first scene?
3. What was in the blanket that the man wearing the cap and long coat was carrying at the end of the
first scene?
4. What colour was the t-shirt worn by the middle-aged woman trapped in the mini-bus in scene 
two?
5. When the woman was finally cut out of the mini-bus and placed on a stretcher, which parts of her 
body was/were cut and bleeding in scene two?
6. In scene two, once they got the man out of the car onto the stretcher, what did they do to him?
7. What part of the injured man’s body was zoomed in on in scene two?
8. In scene three, a body was still in a car covered by a stripy blanket. What body part did you see 
hanging out from under the blanket?
9. What kind of vehicle had the mangled car from the above question crashed into?
10. In scene four, what colour was the car that had its roof cut off in order to remove the dead?
11. How many doctors in white coats were shown at the scene of the accident in scene four?
12. How many people were put in coffins in scene four?
13. In the final scene, what was the female student receiving medical attention wearing?
14. In the final scene, what part of the female student’s body was bandaged by the paramedics?
15. Can you remember any other medical procedures that were performed on the injured girl?
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b) Recognition Memory Test
For each statement indicate whether you believe the event occurred in the film by answering Yes or No.
Scene 1
a) The baby in the blanket is passed to a paramedic and placed in an ambulance.
b) An upside down car is focused on and a paramedic manipulates a naked leg which is sticking out.
c) A team of fireman race to a car that is on fire and spray foam on it in order to quench the flames.
d) A distraught teenager is led away from the scene by a member of the public.
e) Three members of the public help the emergency personnel carry a body to the side of the road 
Scene 2
a) A woman being cut out of a crashed vehicle cries out, and appears to lose consciousness.
b) When the man with the injured leg is on the stretcher the paramedics shine a light into his eyes.
c) A team of firemen attach metal equipment to the front of the minibus to pull the wreckage away from the 
woman’s legs.
d) A policeman stands watching the wreckage whilst making notes on a clipboard.
e) When the man with the injured leg is on the stretcher the paramedics cut his trousers and reveal a bloody 
wound.
Scene 3
a) A body which had been covered by a blanket inside a wrecked car is removed and placed on the ground. 
Two blankets are then laid over it.
b) Rescue workers put up a yellow and blue police incident tape in order to keep the crowd back from the 
scene.
c) Before covering a man’s body with a blanket, the fireman closes the man’s eyes.
Scene 4
a) Emergency personnel use cutting equipment to remove the body of a man from a beige car who has been 
crushed in the driver’s seat.
b) A fireman struggles to release the trapped woman’s seatbelt.
c) A bent car number plate lies on the ground close to the coffin the man is placed in.
d) Two men lift up two bodies and bundle them into metal coffins.
Scene 5
a) A female student is moaning as she is treated in an ambulance. She is naked and electrodes are attached 
to her chest.
b) A paramedic injects the female student in her right arm, whilst the others attend to her injuries.
c) As her head is bandaged, a relative arrives at the ambulance and is kept to one side by paramedics.
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